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Abstract
This thesis investigates the theme of "manufacturing offshoring" that became a po-
litical issue during the 2004 U.S. presidential election. As during previous elections,
employment became a key focus on the home front. Whereas the 1992 presidential
election was marked by the debate around the loss of manufacturing jobs due to
NAFTA, the 2004 election focused on both manufacturing and services jobs lost due
to offshoring to low cost countries. For the first time, well paying jobs, such as IT
programming, were outsourced to emerging countries like India or China. Offshoring
of "white collar" jobs became the focus of academic, consultant, and journalist discus-
sions in U.S., whereas offshoring of manufacturing activities generated comparatively
less interest.
For decades offshoring of manufacturing activities to low cost countries was used by
American companies to either reduce production cost or to avoid high tariffs on ex-
ports. Offshoring strategy was historically applied in labor intensive industries, such
as the apparel and electronics sectors. On the other hand, the influence of offshoring
on high-tech industries was assumed to be limited. However, with the fast technolog-
ical development of China and India, this paradigm might change quickly.
This thesis explores the U.S. manufacturing sector by looking at employment and
trade data at a macro-level. The terms offshoring and outsourcing will be defined
and the main international trade theories discussed. The thesis develops a model to
show that offshoring was only a part of the reason for the shrinkage in manufacturing
employment between 1997 and 2003; the others being a drop in demand and gains
in productivity. After introducing several case studies of companies in the apparel
sector and the semi-conductor industry, a framework for understanding the offshoring
decision process is developed. This framework defines the conditions needed to make
manufacturing in U.S. competitive with production abroad.
Finally through a detailed study of the expansion of the Chinese economy and the
Wal-Mart phenomenon, the thesis presents the next challenges of the U.S. manufac-
turing sector: the birth of new competitors for high value added products and the
rising constraints on price due to the pressure of retailers on manufacturers.
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Professor of Engineering Systems
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Thesis Context
After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the concurrent 9/11 crisis and the burst of the
internet economy bubble, Americans have been extremely concerned about the sit-
uation of employment. Nevertheless, the situation seems to be fairly different from
the chaotic image produced by the Media, politics, and analysts. According to The
Economist, between 1980 and 2002, America's population grew by 23.9% and the
number of employed Americans grew by 37.4%. In 2006, 134.5 million Americans are
in work: a near-record, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of the population.
The gap between the reality of the employment in the U.S. economy and the percep-
tion of many American workers can be explained by the large losses of jobs in the
manufacturing industry, sector which used to be considered in the past as the first
employer in the country. The two most evident reasons for these job losses are the
continual increase of productivity in the U.S. manufacturing sector and the increase
of outsourcing of manufacturing activities. Large improvements in telecommunica-
tions technology such as Internet technologies and the consistent rising skill levels of
workforce in emerging economies have made international sourcing a tangible option
for many American industries and companies. The consequence is that employment
in manufacturing is shrinking and the service industry might not be able to absorb
every person, thus causing a potential net loss of American jobs.
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In the early 20th century, immigration of numerous people from European countries
was the main fear for American people. In the 1930s, capitalism was often viewed
as a job destructive theory. Then, automation was considered as the next predator
of American jobs. In 1929, Stuart Chase asked in its famous book, "Men and Ma-
chines", "Has the machine in its last furious manifestation begun to eliminate workers
faster than new tasks can be found for them?" In the 1980s, Japan and its incredibly
growing companies were thought to cause the endless decline of US manufacturing.
These economic trends have been considered at some point in the American his-
tory as a driving cause for future job loss. Today, nobody will seriously argue that
these changes in economic practices have negatively impacted U.S. economy. Joseph
Schumpeter exposed this dynamic process in his theory of Creative Destruction: "The
fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from
the new consumers' goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new
markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates.
[These developments] incessantly revolutionize the economic structure from within,
incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one." [106] This thesis
examines if Schumpeter's prediction still stands today for the increase of imports from
low costs countries, the relocation of manufacturing capacities abroad, and the rise
of new low cost competitors such as China. The thesis determines how U.S. compa-
nies can still produce domestically, supplying employment in the U.S., while being
competitive with imports from offshore production.
1.2 Thesis Synopsis
Chapter 2 presents a snapshot of the U.S. economy in 2006. Employment trends, GDP
level by industry, trade data and U.S. personal expenditure will be studied. Chapter
3 will clarify the definition of offshoring, as well as its historic context. The most vul-
nerable industries will be identified and the available data to measure the number of
jobs lost in the manufacturing sector due to offshoring exposed. In chapter 4, interna-
tional economic theories related to the offshoring decision will be explained. Chapter
18
5 shows the evaluation of the number of jobs lost in manufacturing for the period of
1997 to 2003, following the model developed by Baily and Lawrence (2004) [32]. Two
industry case studies, a framework of the location decision are exposed as well. In
chapter 6, the case study of the Chinese economy, and its implication for U.S. com-
panies, will be investigated. Finally, chapter 7 will exposed the practical implication
of massive sourcing from low cost countries through the Wal-Mart example.
1.3 Summary of findings
The offshoring decision is not a macro-economic decision: two companies competing in
the same industry will decide to locate their production either in low cost countries
or in the U.S. depending on their specific products, customers, and strategy. For
instance, a company might decide to stay in the U.S. to compete on product variability
and responsiveness to change in domestic demand, whereas another company will
source its products from low cost countries to compete on price. The macro-economic
study has revealed that the origin of imports is not correlated to the level of job
losses in U.S., implying that low cost countries are exporting products that look like
products from developed countries. Rising Asian economies, like China, are producing
more and more advanced products, embedding the latest technologies. It is obvious
that these countries are not looking to be only a manufacturing subcontractor for
American brands and are becoming real competitors of American companies not only
in Asia, but also in the U.S. for the most advanced products. It appears that there
is no valid reason to believe that these new competitors will not be able to produce
products as advanced technologically as American's products in the future. With the
convergence of U.S. and Asian countries' manufacturing expertise and technological
knowledge, companies will not decide to manufacture goods in the U.S because of
quality or technology disparity. Insuring manufacturing jobs in U.S. implies finding a
sustainable advantage that production offshore cannot acquire easily in the future. It
appears that competing on the proximity to the customers is a sustainable solution
for U.S. domestic manufacturing.
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Chapter 2
General Facts and Snapshot of the
U.S. Economy in 2005
"The movement of jobs to the developing countries does not alter the overall level of
employment in the advanced economies; however, the pattern of employment, to be
sure, does change", The Economist, February 2004 [46]
2.1 U.S. Employment
During the last sixty years, employment in the U.S. has shown strong and consistent
growth. The total number of workers increased three-fold (passing from 40 million
non-farm workers in 1945 to 135 million in 2006), with job growth almost exclusively
in the services industry (Fig. 2-1). Employment in the manufacturing sector, on the
other hand, remained constant during this period, and began to fall after 1990.
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Figure 2-1: U.S. Employment by Sector
In 2005, the manufacturing industry employed approximately 10.6 percent of all
U.S. workers, compared with 30 percent in 1956 (Fig. 2-2) . The manufacturing
employment share declined, primarily due to productivity gains accompanied by re-
structuring of this industry sector.
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Figure 2-2: U.S. Manufacturing Employment
Looking at international data (Fig. 2-3 and Fig. 2-4), the U.S. tends to follow the
same trends as the UK, France, and Germany. Industrialized countries successively
build their economic development on agriculture, manufacturing, and then services
sectors. The decline in the agriculture sector can be explained by the fact that once a
country reaches a high level of productivity through automation, it can move human
resources from old economic sectors to the new booming industries. The shift from
manufacturing to service is explained by a combination of factors, namely, offshoring,
outsourcing, international competition on home and foreign market and productivity
gains.
US Employment Distribution
% of Employed Adults
80
70
60 
-
50 - - Agriculture
40 - M Industry
30 - 0 Services
20
10
0i
1870 1950 1973 1987 1995 2000 2001
Figure 2-3: U.S. Employment Distribution Evolution 1870-2001
U.S. employment distribution change can be explained by different causes. First,
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Figure 2-4: U.S. Employment Distribution Evolution 1870-2001
U.S. productivity has increased dramatically since 1980, especially in the manufactur-
ing sector (Appendixes 2.1). Thus, automation of manufacturing processes initially
reduced the requirement for human resources in many manual or repetitive tasks. Sec-
ond, sourcing of labor-intensive and less technologically advanced goods (like apparel
or footwear) from low cost countries (LCC) has been used for years by multinational
companies. Since the 1990s, large imports from such countries as China, Mexico or
other low-cost countries have competed with U.S. national production for a wider ar-
ray of products. Moving activities overseas or sourcing goods from abroad reduces the
relative demand for unskilled labor force in the U.S., in much the same way as replac-
ing these workers with automated production. [48] Consequently, relative demand for
blue-collar workers has declined, since the mid-1970s, changing the distribution of the
U.S. labor force. In 1969, Blue Collar workers represented 38 percent of U.S. workers
and only 24.5 percent thirty years later. During the same period, the share of service
workers, professional occupations and managers has increased strongly (Fig 2-5).
Thus, business sourcing location and productivity gains reduced the absolute num-
ber of workers in the U.S. manufacturing sector, but also shaped employment distri-
bution between industries and occupations. Consequently, employment changes will
24
The Adult Occupational Distribution
% of Employed Adults
40
E3 1969
U 1999
Is.
Service Blue Collar Administrative Sales Related Technicians Professional Managers and
Workers Workers Support Occupations Occupations Administrators
Workers
Note:Data represent all industries
Service workers: waiters, janitors, policemen, childcare workers, and other job which require face to face interaction
with customer
Blue collar workers: craftsmen, assembly line workers, day laborers
Sales related occupations: from McDonald's clerks to stockbrokers to real estate agents
Professional occupations: engineers, teachers, scientists, lawyers
Source: Levy and Murnane 2004 "The New Division of Labor" / March 1970 and March 2000 Current Population
Surveys
Figure 2-5: Occupational Distribution of U.S. Employment
be explored within two dimensions: the industrial dimension, and the occupational
dimension. The industrial dimension refers to classification by Industries such as
the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) which distinguishes the
different industries by grouping together establishments that use the same or similar
processes to produce goods or services. The occupational dimension refers to classifi-
cation by Occupations such as the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) which
classifies workers into occupational categories.
For the industrial dimension, technological breakthroughs or international compe-
tition can massively impact demand for a type of product. For instance, increase of
imports of apparel and footwear trimmed down U.S. employment in these industries
for all types of occupations, dismantling a huge part of these industries in the U.S.
For the occupational dimension, business evolutions and new practices in companies,
such as outsourcing, offshoring, automation, or intensive use of IT have largely modi-
fied the profile of employment within the manufacturing industry. Thus, business and
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economic mutations have changed both the level of employment and the employment
distribution between occupations within each industry: by changing the way workers
process tasks, treat information, perform processes, and by modifying the processes
and tasks to perform, or by relocating the tasks elsewhere, the demand for certain
categories of occupation has fallen. For instance, outsourcing of accounting services in
companies might uniformly impact demand for administrative support workers among
all industries. In other words, the extensive use of computers by companies, or the
implementation of an outsourcing strategy will have the same impact on employment
among all manufacturing industries, but a discriminated impact on occupation.
Thus, job demand changes have altered the set of skills now needed to perform emerg-
ing types of jobs. The new set of skills required to fulfill high demanded job can be
observed by looking at employment data by occupation. "The new division of Labor",
recently published by Levy and Murnane, explores the impact of IT and computers
on U.S. employment (Fig. 2-5). [86] An interesting conclusion of the book is a compar-
ison of U.S. occupational distribution of jobs between 1969 and 1999, corresponding
to two business cycle peaks. Over a thirty year period, blue collar and administrative
support workers employment share declined from 38 percent to 24.5 percent, and from
18 percent to 14.5 percent, respectively. These two occupational categories require
the least advanced education level. Thus, the employment share of low skilled jobs
dropped from 56 percent to 32.5 percent. During the same period, the employment
share of service and professional occupations, technicians, managers and administra-
tors, and sales related occupations jumped from 44 percent to 67.5 percent. Therefore,
employment growth has been mainly concentrated in service-providing industries.
For this purpose, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) issues employment statistics
by occupation. The Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) program provides
employment and wage estimates for over 800 occupations using the 2000 Standard
Occupational Classification (SOC) system. The workforce is divided into 820 occu-
pations according to occupational definition of jobs and the SOC system. Data is
available from 1988 to 2003.
In chapter 5, a detailed study of the U.S. manufacturing sector employment changes
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will be developed through both the occupational and the industrial dimensions. The
impact of offshoring and more broadly, the impact of trade and international competi-
tion on employment, job numbers, and job occupational composition will be identified.
Between 2001 and 2004, employment issues have been the foremost topic of the pres-
idential elections. The net change in employment level has become the cornerstone
for media reporting, political agenda, and U.S. worker concern. The Bureau of Labor
Statistics introduced, in 1992, a new survey to track the creation and destruction of
jobs. These data provide complementary information on current employment trends.
The Business Employment Dynamics (BED) survey consists of a set of statistics per-
taining to gross job gains and losses from 1992 forward. The data provide a picture of
the dynamic state of the labor market that underlies economic expansion and contrac-
tion. Between 1993 and 2002, 8 million jobs were created and destroyed, on average,
every quarter in the U.S. Private sector (Fig. 2-6). For instance, Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Alan Greenspan has indicated that it is not unusual for 1 million
workers to quit or be fired in a single week, while another 1 million are hired. [63]
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Figure 2-6: U.S. Business Dynamics
Indeed, job losses can result from lower levels of job creation, or higher levels
of job destruction than usual, or both simultaneously. During the 2001 recession,
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employment creation levels shrank from 9 million to less than 8 million per quarter.
During the same period, job losses soared up from 8 million to 9 million per quarter.
After 2001, job losses per quarter came down to their initial pre-recession level at
approximately 8 million per quarter. Concurrently, job-gain levels remained at the
recession level, approximately 8 million per quarter. Therefore, the term "jobless-
recovery" has been applied by political and economic analysts to describe the post-
recession employment dynamic.
A similar picture can be observed for the manufacturing sector (Fig. 2-7), though a
pre-recession differential between job gains and job losses was small. During recession,
job losses increased by 25 percent, from 0.8 million jobs per quarter to 1 million jobs
per quarter. At the same time, job gains decreased by 25 percent, from 0.8 million
jobs per quarter, to 0.6 million jobs per quarter. Thus, the jobless-recovery is even
more pronounced for manufacturing. The job-gain levels remained at the recession
levels two years after the recession ended. Moreover, current job creation in the
manufacturing sector is not due to a strong creation of new jobs, but rather, an
exceptionally low level of job losses, below average pre-recession levels. This trend
might reveal that U.S. has reach a level where industries cannot move any more jobs
and are reaching a level where jobs are not in competition with imports anymore.
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Figure 2-7: U.S. Manufacturing Business Dynamics
Figure 2-8 shows that the manufacturing sector has consistently performed poorly
compared to the entire private sector in terms of job creation. Between 1993 and 1997,
the manufacturing sector constantly gained proportionally fewer jobs than the private
sector as a whole. Between 1998 and 2000, the manufacturing sector lost jobs while
the U.S. economy still showed net job creation.
The 2001 recession impacted the manufacturing sector more severely than the private
sector, as a whole. This picture is consistent with the long term employment changes
in the U.S., and comparable with the situation in many other industrialized nations.
Nevertheless, the amplitude of job destruction in the manufacturing sector since 2001
reveals more than the standard long term shift from manufacturing jobs to services
jobs. Chapter 5 attempts to explain the recent job losses in the US manufacturing
sector.
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Figure 2-8: U.S. Business Dynamics Comparison
2.2 GDP by Industry
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the market value of all final goods and services
produced within a country during a given time period. GDP is commonly used as the
foremost indicator of economic progress and development. GDP includes only goods
and services produced within the geographic boundaries of the country, regardless of
the producer's nationality.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) provides U.S. GDP data by goods and
services (Fig. 2-9). Since 1968, the service sector has had a higher weight in the
US economy than the goods producing sector. The services-providing industry in-
cludes wholesale trade, retail trade, transportation and warehousing, utilities, in-
formation, financial activities, professional & business services, education & health
services, leisure & hospitality sectors. The good producing industry includes natu-
ral resource & mining, construction and manufacturing sectors. In 1949, the good-
producing industry counted for 56 percent of the U.S. GDP, compare to 33 percent
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in 2004. On the other hand, the service-providing industry counted in 2004 for 57
percent of the U.S. GDP, compare to 34 percent in 1948.
GDP by Major Type of Product
.o1TotaGDP
0.7
0.G
0.5 -
0.4 -
0.3
0.2 
-+ Go ods + Services
0.1
0
939 1944 1949 1954 1959 1964 1969 I974 1979 984 1989 1994 1999 2004
Note: Goods producing includes Construction, Natural resources & mining and Manufacturing
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts Table, Table 1.2.5 / Author
Figure 2-9: U.S. GDP by Major Type of Product
At a more detailed level, the manufacturing sector, by itself, counted in 2004,
for 13 percent of the whole U.S. GDP compared with almost 30 percent in 1950
(Table 2.1). During the same period, the finances and services sectors have grown
dramatically, from 11 to 21 percent, and from 8 to 23 percent, respectively. However,
U.S. GDP has grown spectacularly since 1950 from $1,777B (billion of 2000 dollars)
to $10,390B in 2004 (billions of 2000 dollars). Consequently, the value added by the
manufacturing sector is considerably greater today than in the past, even though its
share of the U.S. economy has been divided by three over the last 50 years. Such
performance is due to consistent productivity gains. Nevertheless, these numbers
suggest that other industries have experienced an even greater growth during the last
decade.
31
Table 2.1: U.S. GDP by Industry
Value-Added as a Percentage 1950-SIC 1960-SIC 1970-SIC 1980-SIC 1987-NAICS 2000-NAICS 2004-NAICS
of GDP by Industry
Agriculture, forestry, 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
and fishing
Mining 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01
Construction 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
Manufacturing 0.28 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.17 0.15 0.13
Wholesale, Retail, 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.22
Transp., Information
Finance, insurance, 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.21
and real estate
Services 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.22 0.23
Government 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12
Note: Data before 1987 are based on SIC system. Data after 1987 are based on the NAICS system. Bridges between
the two systems are not closed. The author has grossly aggregated data to get a full horizon time series.
Source: : BEA / data compiled by author
As expected, employment level has paralleled the GDP trends. Employment in
manufacturing used to represent 28 percent of the total jobs in US after World War
II, compared to only 10 percent in 2005 (Table 2.2). Employment in other goods
producing sectors (construction and mining) remained almost at the same share.
During the same period, the services-providing industry has captured one third of
the total jobs in the U.S.
Table 2.2: U.S. Employment Share by Industry
Employment Share by Industry 1950-SIC 1960-SIC 1970-SIC 1980-SIC 1987-NAICS 2000-NAICS 2004-NAICS
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Mining 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Construction 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Manufacturing 0.31 0.29 0.27 0.23 0.17 0.13 0.12
Wholesale, Retail, 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.22 0.21
Transp., Info.
Finance, Insurance, 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
and Real Estate
Services 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.23 0.30 0.36 0.33
Government 0.15 0.19 0.21 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.16
Note: Data before 1987 are based on SIC system. Data after 1987 are based on the NAICS system. Bridges between
the two systems are not closed. The author has grossly aggregated data to get a full horizon time series
Source: BLS / data compiled by author
Thus, during the last decade, the U.S. manufacturing sector created fewer jobs and
generated less value compared to services or other sectors. Between 1977 and 2004,
the manufacturing sector consistently showed weaker growth than the U.S. economy
as a whole (Table 2.3). During this period, the GDP of the manufacturing sector grew
annually by 6.3 percent on average, compared to 10.4 percent for the U.S. economy.
The services and finance sectors, on the other hand, grew by 14.8 percent and 13.2
percent, respectively. Between 2000 and 2004, the manufacturing sector growth was
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weak, increasing on average by only one percent annually, compared to 6.7 percent
for the U.S. economy with 8.2 percent annually in the services and finance sectors.
Table 2.3: Annual U.S. GDP Percentage Change by Industry
Average Annual Real 1977-1987 1987-2000 2000-2004 1977-2004
GDP percentage change
Gross domestic product 0.149 0.083 0.067 0.104
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 0.059 0.006 0.094 0.038
Mining 0.064 0.078 0.138 0.081
Construction 0.165 0.096 0.116 0.124
Manufacturing 0.103 0.050 0.010 0.063
Wholesale, Retail, 0.130 0.061 0.048 0.084
Transp., Info.
Finance, insurance, 0.196 0.101 0.082 0.132
and real estate
Services 0.214 0.120 0.082 0.148
Government 0.160 0.085 0.088 0.113
Note: Data before 1987 are based on SIC system. Data after 1987 are based on the NAICS system. Bridges between
the two systems are not closed. The author has grossly aggregated data to get a full horizon time series. Value
added by industry has been corrected to represent Real value added using 2000 Dollars
Source: BEA / data compiled by author
2.3 Personal Consumption Expenditures
Advanced economies are shifting more resources to services, particularly in the dis-
tribution, finance, and business services areas. As seen previously, several factors are
driving this process: productivity gains in manufacturing and agriculture, increases
in demand for services due to an aging populations and higher overall income and,
development of new services. Simultaneously, personal consumption expenditures per
capita for services have become higher than expenditures for goods in the early 1980s
(Fig. 2-10). Moreover, between 1984 and 2004, expenditures for services grew by 5.7
percent annually on average, compared to 4.1 percent for goods expenditures. During
the 2001 recession, expenditures for services still grew faster than expenditures for
goods. Indeed, services expenditures increased by 4.4 percent annually between 2000
and 2004 compared with 3.6 percent for goods expenditures.
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Figure 2-10: Annual Personal Consumption Expenditures per Capita by Type of
Goods
One of the main reasons for the increase of service expenditures is the aging U.S.
population through its increasing need for health care. Between 1980 and 2000, the
fraction of the population over 65 years old has increased from 11.3 percent to 12.4
percent, whereas the share of the population between 45 and 64 has increased from
19.6 percent to 22 percent (Fig. 2-11).
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Figure 2-11: Distribution of U.S. Population by Age
The 65 and older population numbered 35.9 million in 2003 and represented 12.3
percent of the U.S. population. By 2030, there will be approximately 71.5 million
senior citizens, more than twice than 2000 figure according to the Administration
on Aging (AoA), an agency in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
According to this same agency, people over 65 represented 12.4 percent of the popu-
lation in the year 2000, but are expected to grow to be 20 percent of the population
by 2030. The phenomenon of an aging population has become a burning topic with
the explosion of health care costs, although it is not a new idea. Elderly people tend
to spend more money in services and health care than other demographic groups
(Fig. 2-12).
According to a 2002 study of the International journal of Epidemiology [125] and
Congressional Budget Office projections, [1] Medicare, Social Security and publicly
funded long-term care will represent 13.2 percent of the US GDP in 2050 compared
to 6.8 percent in 2000.
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Figure 2-12: U.S. Consumer Expenditure by Population Age
2.4 Trade
Productivity gains and expenditure shifts from goods to services are two sources of the
U.S. manufacturing employment decline. Productivity gains weakened the demand
for workers to sustain the level of output, while demand for output has been growing
more slowly as a result of smaller goods expenditures. Nevertheless, there has been
a recent rise in the number of alternative explanations about why the U.S. manu-
facturing employment fell, since the approval of NAFTA. One of the most popular
explanations during the 2004 U.S. presidential election highlights the recent expan-
sion of the Chinese economy and its exports to U.S. as a key factor, mirroring the
spectrum of Mexican imports and other NAFTA related damages during the 1992
presidential election. Indeed, observations on trade data provide insights to evaluate
other driving forces on weak U.S. manufacturing employment and growth. Weakened
exports and rising imports, lower demand for U.S. output, and thus slow down do-
mestic manufacturing activity. More generally, imports from low labor cost countries
created an intense controversy over U.S. trade balance and the impact on employment
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in the U.S. manufacturing sector. Imports reduced the demand for goods produced
in U.S., resulting in a stall in U.S. job creation. Moreover, the emergence of foreign
competitors reduced the demand for products manufactured in the U.S. to supply
international demand, negatively impacting employment in the U.S. export sector as
well.
The increasingly global markets, due to increased international trade, places compa-
nies from all around the world into one competitive market. In the long term, this
plunge in national production will create deep re-organization of resources within
the manufacturing sector. Intuitively, investments, becoming more and more volatile
between sectors, will be concentrated in sectors seen as strategic or still competitive
and fall in sectors, where low cost countries are already more competitive. Chapter 5
exposes a more detailed study, at the industry level within the manufacturing sector,
to analyze the changes in the U.S. manufacturing sector. Thus, the role of altered
trade, productivity gains, changing national demand, and new personal expenditures
will be used to explain employment decline and weakened growth in U.S. manufac-
turing during the last decade.
When U.S. trade data over the last decade is evaluated, the public concerns during
the 2004 U.S. presidential election become more understandable. Between 1997 and
2003, the trade deficit grew by 460 percent, ballooning from $108B in 1997 to $498B
in 2003 (Fig. 2-13). The trade deficit counted for 4.5 percent of the U.S. GDP in 2003
compare to 1.3 percent in 1997.
The explosion of the trade deficit results from simultaneous observable facts. First,
imports during this period increased until 2001, before leveling off between 2001 and
2003 (Table 2.4). Imports increased annually by 8.6 percent on average between 1997
and 2003. Second, exports were unusually low over the same time period. Exports
increased annually by only 1.5 percent on average between 1997 and 2003. In contrast,
exports increased by 7.6 percent on average between 1977 and 2003, and imports by
8.6 percent over the same period. Thus, it appears that the trade deficit is due mainly
to an unprecedented low level of exports during the last eight years rather than an
abnormally high level of imports.
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Figure 2-13: U.S. Trade Balance 1960-2003
Table 2.4: Annual U.S. GDP Percentage Change by Industry
Annual Average % Change US trade 1977-1987 1987-1997 1997-2003 1977-2003
Imports 10.8% 7.6% 6.4% 8.6%
Exports 8.6% 10.4% 1.5% 7.6%
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) / U.S. International Transactions Accounts Data / Data compiled by
author
In 1997, the recessions in East Asia reduced the demand for U.S. exports and
consequently, caused a significant drop in the demand for U.S. production. U.S.
exports for East Asia accounted for 30 percent of total exports before 1997. Between
1997 and 1998, U.S. manufacturing exports to East Asia declined by 12 percent.
Because the total export of goods and services represented 11.9 percent of U.S. GDP
in 1997, the Asian impact reduced U.S. output by 0.4 percent. This reduction in
demand was offset by increased spending by households and businesses in the United
States, supported by lower interest rates on interest-rate sensitive goods, such as
automobiles and new homes. Nevertheless, since many Asian currencies declined
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in value relative to the dollar, imported goods became temporarily cheaper than
U.S. goods. Thus, the U.S. goods sector experienced a lower demand for exports
and an increasing competition from countries with a devalued currency in the U.S.
national market, resulting in a lower domestic demand as well. Ultimately, these
two phenomena, lower demand for U.S. exports and lower demand in the U.S. due
to rising imports, underline the considerable importance of competitiveness for US
companies, to assure local market share while maintaining a market share abroad.
As presented in the following two figures (Fig. 2-14 and Fig. 2-15), the U.S. trade
deficit is derived solely from the goods producing sector. In 2003, U.S. trade deficit
in goods accounted for almost 5 percent of the U.S. GDP.
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Figure 2-14: U.S. Goods Trade Balance 1960-2003
The picture of the U.S. manufacturing sector trade pattern between 1997 and 2003,
is even more extreme than that of the U.S. economy as a whole. Between 1997 and
2003, exports grew annually by 0.8 percent on average, compared to 7.1 percent on
average between 1977 and 2003 (Table 2.5). During the same period, imports growth
remained relatively high at 6.2 percent on average. Indeed, the recent colossal trade
deficit in U.S. manufacturing, and U.S. economy overall, resulted from low growth in
exports and high increase in imports.
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Figure 2-15: U.S. Services Trade Balance 1960-2003
Table 2.5: Annual U.S. GDP Percentage Change by Industry
Annual Average % Change 1977-1987 1987-1997 1997-2003 1977-2003
U.S. Manufacturing Trade
Imports 0.104 0.079 0.062 0.085
Exports 0.076 0.105 0.008 0.071
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis / U.S. International Transactions Accounts Data / Data compiled by author
In addition to trade volume and growth dynamics, the origin of imports and
exports is noteworthy. Indeed, goods imported from low cost countries were tra-
ditionally commoditized goods, with low prices and less technologically advanced.
These types of imports typically compete with U.S. manufactured goods for national
demand. Such imports are called "substitute imports". On the other hand, imports
from developed countries are usually very specific and technologically advanced items
that generally, do not compete with U.S. production. This is due to that fact that it
is frequently concerned with products only produced in foreign countries, requiring
skills or materials only present in foreign countries. Such imports are less directly
competitive with U.S. production. These imports are called "complementary im-
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ports".
Theoretically, in the presence of open markets and free international trade, countries
will specialize in sectors where they have comparative advantages over other coun-
tries. U.S. firms would be expected to specialize in sectors where they are competitive,
abandoning markets where foreign competitors are more effective. Therefore, most
advanced and industrialized countries tend to compete over similar products, such
as high-tech, bio-technology, or nano-technology, whereas low cost countries compete
together on low price products and commodity items. Low cost countries would have
shattered the U.S. manufacturer of such items, destroying employment in the U.S.
manufacturing sector. For instance, apparel imports from China are currently de-
stroying the remaining jobs in the U.S. apparel sector. Chapter 4 will present several
commonly accepted international trade models and clarify this dynamic.
Aggregated data of the U.S. manufacturing sector provides a general idea about the
change of trade partners' distribution. For instance, in 1989, only 6 percent of U.S.
manufacturing imports came from low cost countries (LCC- countries with GDP per
capita inferior to 5 percent of U.S. GDP per capita) compared with 21 percent in
2004. Imports from China grew substantially, jumping from 3 percent in 1989 to 16
percent in 2004, accounting for the largest part of the LCC market share gain (Table
2.6).
Table 2.6: U.S. Imports Partners 1989 and 2004
US Imports Partners 1989 2004
China 0.03 0.16
Other LCC 0.03 0.05
Others 0.94 0.79
Note: Low Cost Country (LCC) GDP2004 Per Capita = 0.05*US GDP2004 Per Capita
Source: BLS / the Office of Trade and Industry Information (OTII) U.S. Department of Commerce / Author
The evolution of the distribution of imports between import partners is mainly
consistent with theories and ideas developed above. Imports from Europe have re-
mained stable over the last 20 years, oscillating around 23 percent (Fig. 2-16). Since
the U.S. and Europe have similar levels of development and technological advance-
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ment, imports from Europe might be concentrated in specific goods. For example,
the U.S. imports mainly nuclear reactors and machinery, aircrafts, pharmaceutical
products, and beverages. From France, beverages account for almost 45 percent of
total French exports to the U.S. in 2004; nuclear reactors and machinery, vehicles,
and medical instrument from Germany, account for almost 60 percent of total Ger-
man exports in 2004. The same pattern is observed for Canada: imports have been
concentrated in a few sectors, and have remained stable during the last decades. This
has been especially apparent following the NAFTA treaty. Imports of vehicles, min-
eral fuel and oil, wood and machinery accounted for 55 percent of total Canadian
exports to the U.S. in 2004.
The simultaneous rise of Chinese and Mexican imports coincides with the decline of
imports from Japan, Latin America and recently, other Asian countries. All these
countries export mainly machinery, electrical equipment, apparel, furniture, toys and
rubber products to the U.S., and are competing on the same market segments. Ad-
ditionally, Japan and Mexico export a substantial number vehicles to the U.S. The
recent increase of Chinese exports to the U.S. corresponded to a decline in imports
from Mexico, and other Asian countries. These trends confirm that industrialized
countries and less-developed countries have been competing only in their category
with other countries at the same level of development. Nevertheless, it is hard to
believe this situation will remain stable considering the increasing range, as well as
the sophistication, of goods produced and exported, by such countries as China, India
or Taiwan.
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Figure 2-16: U.S. Goods Imports Partners
Although the origin of imports and the level of technological advancement of the
country of origin is an important characterization of imported goods, the type of
goods imported is a key factor in understanding the tradeoff between the rise of
imports and the decline of employment in the U.S.
The end-use category data provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis can be used
to characterize the stage of processing of the goods shipped. In this code system,
industrial supplies and materials represent the less manufactured products, such as
raw materials, steel, newsprint, and textile yarns. Capital goods are used by firms for
both investment (like machinery), and intermediate inputs. For instance, all electrical
parts and components are included within capital goods. Finally, consumer goods
consist of finished products. Even for consumer goods, there is still some value-added
on these goods in the U.S., such as advertising overheads, as well as marketing and
product development (Fig. 2-17).
Between 1978 and 2003, the distribution of imports into the U.S. has dramatically
changed (Table 2.7). Finite products, such as consumer goods, today represents 26
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Figure 2-17: Simple Model of Good Production
percent of imports, compared to 17 percent in 1978. In 2003, industrial supplies
and materials represented only 25 percent of imports compared to 47 percent in 1978.
Thus, the U.S. is importing more goods in an advanced stage of production, including
already a finite product, than it used to. This adds less value in the U.S. compared
to previously. This change in the composition of imports leads to fewer opportunities
for the U.S. manufacturing sector to expand onshore. Whereas the old manufacturing
model was to import raw material and intermediate parts from international partners,
and then to manufacture the goods in U.S., now a new model of finished goods
import is emerging. Between 1978 and 2003, the distribution of U.S. exports has
followed the same trends (Table 2.8). The U.S., like other rich countries, specializes
in equipment production. Nevertheless, since the price of equipment (relatives to
the price of consumption goods) tends to decline over time, due to innovation in
technology and productivity gains, such exports distribution for the U.S. is not an
assurance of future high employment in manufacturing to support exports and future
economic growth.
Changes in import composition and origin may in fact have serious impact on
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Table 2.7: Distribution of Imports by End-use Category
Distribution of Imports by End-us Category 1925 1950 1965 1978 1990 2003
Foods, feeds, and beverages 0.22 0.30 0.19 0.09 0.05 0.04
Industrial supplies and materials 0.68 0.63 0.53 0.47 0.29 0.25
Capital goods, except automotive 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.23 0.23
Automotive vehicles, engines, and parts 0 0 0.05 0.14 0.18 0.17
Consumer goods (nonfood), 0.09 0.06 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.26
except automotive
Imports, n.e.c., and U.S. goods returned 0 0 0 0.02 0.03 0.04
Table 2.8: Distribution of Exports by End-use Category
Distribution of Exports by end-us category 1925 1950 1965 1978 1990 2003
Foods, feeds, and beverages 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.09 0.08
Industrial supplies and materials 0.60 0.45 0.35 0.28 0.27 0.24
Capital goods, except automotive 0.09 0.22 0.31 0.33 0.39 0.41
Automotive vehicles, engines, and parts 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.11
Consumer goods (nonfood), 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.13
except automotive
Exports, n.e.c. 0 0 0 0.02 0.04 0.03
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. International Transactions Accounts Data / Table 2 / Robert C.
Feenstra (1998)/ Author
U.S. manufacturing. Moreover, the volume of imports compared to GDP is increas-
ing. Imports in 2003 accounted for 14 percent of the U.S. GDP instead of 9.1 percent
in 1977 (Table 2.9). This trend is observed for most of countries in world due to
trade liberalization, network and transportation improvement, and specialization and
concentration of manufacturing activities. Imports for Germany and France represent
31.8 percent and 24.6 percent of their GDP, respectively, in 2003. Nevertheless, to
compare U.S. economy, with the European Union, as opposed to particular European
countries, appears more accurate since population, distances, and economy are sim-
ilar. Then, imports represent only 10.6 percent of the GDP of the E15, slightly less
than the U.S.
Imports and exports represent a larger percentage of GDP in 2006 for almost all
countries in the world compare to 30 years ago. International competition determines
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Table 2.9: Exports and Imports Relative to GDP and Degree of Openness
Exports and Imports relative to GDP 1977 1987 1997 2003
Mexico Exports 10.3 19.5 30.3 28.4
Mexico Imports 10.2 13.4 30.4 30.1
Mexico Degree of Openness 20.5 32.9 60.6 58.5
China Exports 4.3 13.6 23.1 34.3
China Imports 4.0 13.7 18.3 31.8
China Degree of Openness 8.3 27.3 41.4 66.1
France Exports 19.6 19.7 25.5 25.8
France Imports 20.4 20.7 22.5 24.6
France Degree of Openness 40.0 40.5 48.0 50.4
Germany Exports 19.5 22.4 27.9 36.0
Germany Imports 21.8 22.8 26.5 31.8
Germany Degree of Openness 41.3 45.1 54.5 67.7
USA Exports 7.9 7.7 11.6 9.5
USA Imports 9.1 10.8 12.8 14.0
USA Degree of Openness 17.0 18.6 24.4 23.5
E15 Exports 9.8 10.4
E15 Imports 9.2 10.6
E15 Degree of Openness 19.0 21.0
Note: Degree of Openness is defined as Imports plus Exports divided by GDP for each country
Source: OECD / World Bank Group
the flow of goods in the world, and thus, U.S. companies' level of competitiveness.
Chapter 5 will determine if trade changes in volumes, trading partners, or types
of products have impacted the development of U.S. manufacturing during the last
decade, triggering changes in the employment patterns of this sector overall.
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Chapter 3
What is Offshoring?
3.1 Definition of Offshoring
Offshoring generally describes the practice of investing in production capacity abroad
(or "offshore") to produce goods previously make domestically (or "onshore"). Sub-
sequently, goods are shipped back to the home country to serve the domestic market.
This first, strict definition would imply that the company will still build and af-
terward own the production facilities abroad being used to serve the U.S. market.
Nevertheless, in term of company strategy, the decision to locate production onshore
or offshore, and the decision to own or not to own the production facilities are not
correlated. This thesis does not discuss the ownership decision, usually referred to
as the buy-or-build decision or outsourcing, since ownership of production facilities
does not impact home employment level by itself, unlike the location of the facilities.
Outsourcing defines a process in which a company delegates some of its in-house op-
eration and processes to a third party or subcontractor.
Thus, offshoring will here refer to U.S. companies investing in production capacities
abroad to produce goods or services previously made or performed in the U.S. to
serve the U.S. market and also to imports of goods or services from foreign suppliers
or subcontractors to serve the U.S. market, replacing goods or services previously
made in the U.S. by the company itself or a local subcontractor (Fig. 3-1). The goods
produced offshore by U.S. companies may be used to supply the U.S. market but
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also to supply foreign markets. In the second case, the company is not offshoring
its production to serve its domestic market, but is relocating its production capacity
to serve local markets abroad. Nevertheless, such relocation of production capacity
abroad to serve foreign markets will be accompanied by a destruction of jobs in the
U.S. since production capacity is not performed domestically, as formerly.
Since one of the objectives of the present thesis is to evaluate the number of U.S.
jobs recently lost through the movement of domestic production capacities abroad,
offshoring for U.S. companies will also refer to the movement of U.S. domestic pro-
duction capacity abroad to produce goods or services to serve both foreign markets
and the domestic market. Finally, in the rest of the thesis, offshoring will refer to
U.S. companies investing in production capacities abroad to produce goods or ser-
vices previously made in the U.S. to serve the U.S. market or foreign markets, but
also imports of goods or services from non-domestic suppliers to serve the U.S. market
and replacing goods or services previously made in the U.S. by the company itself or
a subcontractor.
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Figure 3-1: Market Location and Facility Location
3.2 Drivers of Offshoring Activities
Offshoring is a strategic business decision for companies based on the well-established
theories of comparative advantage and international trade. It is more efficient for the
U.S. to import goods and services which can be sourced inexpensively from a low-cost
supplier and to export to the rest of the world goods or services that U.S. companies
can produce onshore more efficiently than competitors abroad. By the same logic,
U.S. companies can decide to source a part of their manufacturing process or the whole
of their production from a cheaper country for the U.S market. U.S. companies will
keep production of products or parts of products only if the production onshore is still
competitive. This practice will induce a specialization of U.S. companies in sectors or
occupations where they have comparative advantages over foreign competitors, such
as technology or labor skills.
As seen above, offshoring is considered as an approach to reduce costs. Labor cost,
land and other resource costs are significantly cheaper in such countries as China or
India. Moreover, according to data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, this gap will
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remain in Asian countries and Mexico, where the low wage labor supply is seen as
almost infinite. Finally, health insurance and pension burden have greatly increased
US total labor cost during the last 5 years, and this trend is not expected to stop,
making the Asian or Mexican labor force even more competitive (Fig. 3-2).
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Figure 3-2: Normalized International Comparisons of Hourly Compensation Costs for
Production Workers in Manufacturing between 1975 and 2003 (U.S.=100)
The second main reason for a company to offshore production is to penetrate
the local foreign market. Companies are attracted by economies with high growth
rate. Companies have already been doing business overseas for several decades and
an offshore production presence could reinforce company market share. For instance,
Intel Corp. is generating 70 percent of its revenue from outside the United States,
though 60 percent of its employees still work in the States. [93]In the future, Intel
Corp. will likely relocate a part of its production overseas and those percentages
will shift. A local production location allows companies to be closer to their final
customer, getting more accurate information about the local demand and being more
responsive to change in demand volume or customer taste.
In some cases, like China for example, production within the country is desirable to
facilitate domestic selling. Indeed, to get licenses and to follow local content laws,
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foreign companies usually have to create a venture with a Chinese company or to
produce locally.
Reducing costs is not the only target of offshoring. The quality of the services or
products can be increased using a high skilled labor force while being competitive. For
example, call centers in India employ bachelor degree workers instead of high school
degree workers in the U.S. for a competitive rate. Thus, using foreign affiliates gives
companies access to local expertise. Interestingly, a recent study published by the
Brooking Institute shows that two-thirds of all the investments American companies
make abroad are located in "high-wage" economies of the European Union and Japan,
demonstrating that wage differentials are not the only driver of foreign investment
and offshoring of activities and that U.S. companies are also searching for specific
talent, capability, local specialty or proximity to the local demand. [40]
Whereas benefits from offshoring exist, they are often overestimated by companies.
For instance, costs to build capacity offshore are often higher than expected and
quality of offshore production can also be disappointing. A 2005 study has polled
5,321 executives across North America and Europe who are considered as buyers of
offshored services. [123] The study found that the average cost savings was slightly
below 10 percent. Moreover 28 percent of the surveyed companies have experienced
higher costs and 25 percent experienced no material savings.
3.3 Hidden Cost of Offshoring
The main driver of offshoring for companies is lower costs. Nevertheless, companies
have to consider extra cost related to operation overseas (move-in costs and extra-
operating costs) when making such changes. Even if well-established and efficiently
managed offshored operations usually make it possible to lower production costs sub-
stantially, companies have to consider the hidden cost of offshoring which can offset
the benefits of offshored operations.
Move-in costs, related to the establishment of operation overseas, include the cost of
selecting a subcontractor (in the case of outsourced offshoring) and new suppliers,
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documenting requirements, evaluating the responses, and negotiating the contracts.
This entire process can take from six months to a year. Move-in costs also include
the cost of transition: it takes from three months to a full year to completely hand
the work over to an offshore partner. In addition, companies have to include the cost
of layoffs of U.S. employees.
After establishment, companies have to deal with the extra costs associated with
transportation, communication, higher inventory, learning curve, quality, warranty
claims and business disruption, and travel for executives, engineers and/or sales rep-
resentatives. According a recent study of the Boston Consulting Group, offshoring
can potentially reduce manufacturing production costs by 50 percent. Nevertheless,
after re-adjusting manufacturing costs with logistics costs, extra management costs
and duties, the offshore production model has the potential to save 30 percent of an
onshore production model, far away from the potential 50 percent savings (Fig. 3-3).
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Figure 3-3: Modeled Economics for a Typical Industrial Product Sourced from a Low
Cost Country
As seen with the previous model developed by the BCG, labor cost counts for
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a large part of the production differential cost between U.S. and LCCs. One of
the main questions about the long term viability of an offshored company model is
the rise of wages in LCCs. However, a study from the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
which compares hourly compensation costs for production workers in manufacturing
in several countries worldwide, has shown a stable gap between U.S. and LCCs and
even a growing differential with countries like Mexico (Fig. 3-4).
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Figure 3-4: International Comparisons of Hourly Compensation Costs for Production
Workers in Manufacturing between 1975 and 2003 (U.S. dollars)
Moreover, the wage differential is consistent across the different manufacturing
industries. For instance, wages for production workers in Mexico were around 15
percent of U.S. wages for the five different industrial sectors presented below in 2002
(Fig. 3-5). In 2002, wages in Korea were around 40 percent of U.S. wages for the
manufacturing industries presented.
The differential of wages is also found for both less skilled workers and engineers:
in electronics, the wage ratio for engineers is about 10:1 between USA and China.
China produces an abundant skilled labor force: 350,000 engineers compared to 90,000
in the U.S. every year. [67] Because middle manager wages are also low in Asia, the
ratio of managers to staff is much higher. Thus, offshored operations will be run by
more middle managers than the equivalent in the U.S. Firms could be motivated to
redesign their products to take advantage of low labor cost: a "Design for Offshoring"
will need less capital investment, using labor force instead of machines and automated
processes. A recent report of the National Bureau of Economics Research confirms
that for U.S. affiliates in developing countries, manufacturing activities are half as
capital intensive as the same activities in affiliates in the U.S. (capital intensity is
measured by property, plant and equipment per worker). [39]
In addition, operations in LCCs could involve some additional costs associated with
54
Hourly Compensation US=100
Costs
140 - E Textile, Apparel and Leather
120 Products
a Chemicals and Allied ProductsManufacturing
80 o-  Primary Metal Manufacturing
60
40 o Industrial and CommercialMachinery and Equipment
20 m Electronic and Other Electrical
0 Equipment
< 0 z ,n I
z uW 4 0 U
C) (D
Note: Industries are defined using the SIC code system
Source: BLS / Hourly Compensation Costs for Production Workers in Manufacturing, 30 Countries or Areas, 40
Manufacturing Industries, Selected Years, 1975-2002 /
http://www.bls.gov/fis/fishcind.htm / Data compiled by author
Figure 3-5: International Comparisons of Hourly Compensation Costs for Production
Workers in Different Manufacturing Industries in 2002 (U.S.=100)
specific risks: currency fluctuations, political instability or intellectual property theft.
In some cases, suppliers become competitors. These risks explain the reservations
of some companies to offshore their production for strategic products. Moreover,
to some extent, the U.S. government might intervene to preserve U.S. expertise in
certain strategic sectors, such as military, energy, aeronautics, nano-technology or
bio-technology, making offshoring illegal for companies operating in certain markets.
For instance, the sale of the IBM laptop division to China's largest PC company
Lenovo, has been reviewed and finally approved by U.S. Treasury Department's Com-
mittee on Foreign Investments in the United States in 2005. In fact, PC and laptop
manufacturing is no longer considered a strategic and crucial manufacturing sector.
Most of the production is already done in Asian countries, such as Taiwan or China.
It is considered a commodity product. On the other hand, the unsolicited $18.5B
offer by CNOOC Ltd., a major Chinese oil company, to buy California-based Uno-
cal Corp. has forced the chairmen of the U.S. House Resources and Armed Services
committees to request President George W Bush to initiate a "thorough" National
Economic Council-National Security review of China's growing energy requirement
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and the implications for U.S. political, strategic and economic interests. This offer
raises many concerns about U.S. energy production and energy security. Even as
CNOOC's chairman and chief executive Fu Chengyu said the transaction wouldn't
have "any negative impact to the national security interests of the United States,
and people need to understand this is a purely commercial transaction, driven by
market forces and market considerations," the U.S. government was still far from let-
ting China own strategic U.S. assets. This example highlights the growing influence
of Chinese companies in the global market. Chapter 6 will discuss the case of the
Chinese fast development and growing influence.
3.4 History of Offshoring
The first wave of offshoring occurred at the beginning of the nineteenth century to
capture new markets and avoid high tariffs and other trade barriers. For instance, The
Ford Company established operation in the UK in 1930 to avoid trade barriers. [70]
Companies started operation abroad to serve the local market at a competitive price.
The objective was not to capture a local advantage and then export back to the home
market.
Then during the 1980s, a second wave happened to take advantage of enormous wage
differentials in the Asian countries: the finished goods were then mainly exported
back to the home market. That wave touched labor intensive companies such as tex-
tiles and toys.
Since the late 1990s, companies have been offshoring the production of a broad range
of goods, from toys, apparel and, electronics to semiconductors and services such as
back office work or data processing. Companies are now producing goods abroad to
serve the domestic market but also to serve the new market overseas. This recent
trend has been supported by external economic and political factors and by manu-
facturing industry mutations. The continual liberalization of economies and the end
of trade barriers or quotas make it possible to invest in production capacity in other
countries and ship goods abroad without excessive duty. Meanwhile, improvements
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in transportation and communication technologies support the growth of demand for
flows of goods and information (Fig. 3-6).
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Figure 3-6: Transportation Costs and Telecommunication Costs
Within the manufacturing industry, a rapid adoption of global standards in the
company has allowed firms to break down more easily their operations into indepen-
dent segments, which could be outsourced and offshored, while still being manage-
able. [85] Companies can be broken into two groups following different organizational
models (Fig. 3-7). First, companies can be vertically integrated, owning and control-
ling the whole sourcing, production and distribution of products. Companies, such as
Samsung or Sony, have decided to build their entire strategy on the full integration
of design, development, manufacturing, marketing and after-sales services of their
products. In this case, the company will operate all the manufacturing stages but
distribution is usually done by retailers for consumer products. Second, companies
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can be specialized, focusing only on one part of a manufacturing process or a single
part of the entire supply chain. For instance, the American television manufacturer
Brillian owns the display technology used in the television distributed under its name.
Nevertheless, the design and the development of the electronic part and chips are done
in India by Wypro. Then OEMs such as Flextronics, Solectron or Celestica produce
TVs in China or elsewhere at low cost. After-sales services are performed by an
Indian call-center in Bangalore. [18]
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Figure 3-7: Simple Company Models
In the footwear industry, U.S. companies such as Nike or Reebok have specialized
in certain activities for many years. They mainly focus on design, marketing and dis-
tribution while manufacturing is outsourced to numerous suppliers in different Asian
countries.
Using the same industry to present the two structures, Dartmouth economics profes-
sor Douglas Irwin explains that "fifty years ago, Detroit's River Rouge plant sucked
in iron and coal at one end and spat out an automobile at the other. Now auto firms
outsource component parts from a vast array of domestic and foreign suppliers." [75]
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Automakers and suppliers both specialize in one specific segment of the whole car
production process.
Finally, company organizational structures, vertically integrated or specialized, refer
mainly to the issues of ownership of operations by the company. Indeed, both organi-
zational structures will allow companies to develop a coherent and efficient strategy
of locating the different stages of their supply chain.
On one hand, the specialization of different agents creates favorable circumstances for
offshoring. The standardization of manufacturing processes and interfaces between
parts, allows companies to easily and quickly outsource a part of their supply chain.
The suppliers select the best location to manufacture their parts, while companies
can focus on their competitive or strategic activities onshore. On the other hand,
the vertical integration of operation allows the company to develop a global sourc-
ing strategy by locating its different production stages appropriately to optimize the
whole company supply chain. The trend toward modular design makes offshoring
easier for companies. A piece of a supply chain can be easily offshored to reduce
overall production cost while minimizing impact on the rest of the supply chain since
the production steps are already clearly broken down.
Additionally to specialization at the firm level, Hummels, Rapoport, and Yi's study
shows that world goods production has become more specialized at the nation level,
with countries focusing on different stages of the production process and then shipping
intermediate goods to other countries for further processing. [72] These empirical re-
sults are fully supported by the classic theories of international trade such as absolute
advantage theory and comparative advantage theory, discussed in Chapter 4.
3.5 The Old Paradigm of Trade-related Job Losses
Over the years, studies and analysis have refuted the idea of the substitution of U.S.
manufacturing jobs by offshored activities. The U.S. jobs were not "exported" to low
cost production sites. Instead, the employment competition occurs mainly between
offshore affiliates in countries at the same level of development.
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For instance, Lael Brainard and David A. Riker (1997) [82] analyzed data from the
Annual Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad (Bureau of Economic Analysis),
including all firms whose parent industry is in the manufacturing sector, over a ten-
year period ending in 1992. They found that, although employment at affiliates in
developing countries is very sensitive to wages in other developing countries, par-
ent employment responds very little when foreign affiliates wages fall. For instance,
when wages in Mexico decrease by 10 percent, U.S. parent employment falls 0.17
percent, while affiliates in other developing countries, such as Malaysia, lay off 1.6
percent of their workforce. The results suggest a vertical separation of activities to
take advantage of wage differentials, with affiliates in developing countries perform-
ing the activities that are most sensitive to labor costs. Another example comes
from the textile industry: when quotas on baby clothes and soft luggage ended in
2002, China's export of baby clothes to the US increased by 826 percent and luggage
imports increased fivefold. [9] In the same period, production in Thailand, the Philip-
pines, Indonesia and Mexico dropped by half. Indeed, domestic industry employment
and overseas affiliate employment are complementary, but not negatively correlated.
For instance, between 1979 and 1989, total U.S. manufacturing employment shrank
10 percent and during the same period total overseas affiliate employment shrank 14
percent. [110]
Nevertheless, this old paradigm remains valid as long as production in low cost coun-
tries is complementary with U.S. domestic production. If low cost countries start
producing parts or products usually manufactured by U.S. companies domestically,
U.S. employment will be hurt. During the last decades, the pattern of imports has
changed in the U.S. According to data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA),
the U.S. is importing more goods at intermediate and finished stages of processing
compared with raw materials (Table 3.1 and Table 3.2).
The data indicates that products are being imported into the U.S. at increas-
ingly advanced stages of processing, which suggests that U.S. firms may have been
substituting away from these processing activities at home. According to Robert
C. Feenstra (1998) the changes in the imports suggest a plausible shift of produc-
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Table 3.1: Distribution of U.S. Imports by End-use Category
Distribution of Imports 1925 1950 1965 1978 1990 2003
by end-use category
Foods, feeds, and beverages 0.22 0.30 0.19 0.09 0.05 0.04
Industrial supplies and materials 0.68 0.63 0.53 0.47 0.29 0.25
Capital goods, except automotive 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.23 0.23
Automotive vehicles, engines, and parts 0 0 0.05 0.14 0.18 0.17
Consumer goods (nonfood), 0.09 0.06 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.26
except automotive
Imports, n.e.c., and U.S. goods returned 0 0 0 0.02 0.03 0.04
Table 3.2: Distribution of U.S. Export by End-use Category
Distribution of Exports 1925 1950 1965 1978 1990 2003
by end-use category
Foods, feeds, and beverages 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.09 0.08
Industrial supplies and materials 0.60 0.45 0.35 0.28 0.27 0.24
Capital goods, except automotive 0.09 0.22 0.31 0.33 0.39 0.41
Automotive vehicles, engines, and parts 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.11
Consumer goods (nonfood), 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.13
except automotive
Exports, n.e.c. 0 0 0 0.02 0.04 0.03
Note: Industrial supplies and materials: raw materials, as steel, newsprint, textile yarns. The capital goods are used
by firms for both investment (like machinery) but also are used as intermediate inputs (for example, all electrical
parts and components are included within capital goods). The consumer goods consist of finished products, but
there is still value-added on these goods in the US, such as for advertising, marketing and product development
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. International Transactions Accounts Data / Table 2 / Robert C.
Feenstra (1998) / Author
tion overseas. [48] Pierre Biscourp and Francis Kramarz (2003), studying the period
between 1986 and 1992, conclude that imports of intermediate and finished goods im-
pact employment in industrialized countries more than imports of raw materials. [37]
Feenstra and Hanson (1997) find that imported inputs increased from 5.7 percent of
total intermediate purchases (domestic intermediates inputs + imports) in 1972, to
8.6 percent in 1979, and 13.9 percent in 1990. As shown in the previous tables (3.1 &
3.2), finished goods imports are growing rapidly, which will continue to impact U.S.
manufacturing employment for the next several decades.
Imports of raw materials or first stage parts, which still needed processing onshore
in the U.S., are not necessarily hurting the U.S. manufacturing sector since imports
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are usually used to supply the domestic production. In many cases there will be
additional value added by American firms. An example is the Barbie doll (Tempest
1996) [115]: raw materials (plastic and hair) are obtained from Taiwan and Japan,
then assembled in Indonesia, Malaysia or China. China supplies the cotton used for
dresses. The production cost is $2 (35cents Labor, 65cents cost of materials, $1 trans-
portation between LCCs). The doll is sold for $10 in the U.S., of which Mattel earns
$1. The remaining $7 cover transportation, marketing, wholesaling and retailing in
the U.S., which is the value added domestically. Thus, even with a largely offshore
model, the majority of value added still comes from onshore activities, such as mar-
keting and distribution.
However, according to 2003 data, the U.S. is now importing an increasing amount
of finished goods such as consumer goods or automobiles. Such imports have two
negative impacts on U.S. employment. First, these imports compete directly with
domestic production for the U.S. market, reducing U.S. domestic demand for goods
manufactured in the U.S. Second, these imports do not require further processing in
the U.S. and so, do not create subsequent employment in the domestic manufacturing
sector. Chapter 5 will evaluate trade-related job loss due to increasing imports.
3.6 Which Industries Are the More Vulnarable?
A recent study by The Boston Consulting Group has shown that in 2002, the imports
from Low Cost Countries (LCCs) counted for approximately $6 billion, equivalent
to 11 percent of the total U.S. consumption. Overall, imports have been growing 12
percent faster than the domestic sales and all the industrial sectors have experienced
growth of imports. [65]
The study classifies industries in four categories. First, the "Moving early indus-
tries" category defines industries which historically import a large part of the onshore
consumption. These industries already have a large numbers of overseas suppliers and
a large part of their production capacities abroad. It includes industries as footwear
and audio and video equipment. The overseas expansion of these industries is almost
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stable (only 2 percent of net growth imports from LCCs). In the future, offshoring
will continue but job losses will be limited because the American companies have al-
ready largely moved their production offshore, and the remaining onshore production
is in other organizational segments (distribution, marketing) or niche markets (See
example of the apparel industry in chapter 5). For example, Nike employs 75,000
people in Asia (only a few hundred of these are actually employees of the company)
and only 2,500 employees in the U.S. mainly in design and marketing occupations
(Tisdale, 1994) which are expected to stay in the U.S. [116]
The second category is composed of the "Growing faster industries." It character-
izes industries with a high imports penetration rate and which are already largely
located in LCCs such as the computer equipment industry. Such companies move
to Asia to use a low-cost and highly skilled workforce. Technology advancement and
educational improvement in LCCs allows companies to produce a broader range of
products offshore at the same level of quality and complexity as domestic produc-
tion. Thus, companies are importing more products from LCCs. Moreover, such
countries as China have a high growth internal market for high technologies, creating
new opportunities for sales there, allowing an even more rapid development of these
industries in LCCs (suppliers, distribution, and technologic cluster), making offshore
production more efficient. Job losses are expected to occur in the U.S. in the future
for these industries.
The third category is the "Up and coming" industries. It refers to the industries with
a low penetration rate of imports from LCCs but a high growth, such as measuring
and controlling devices. These industries still have an important part of production
onshore but are more and more taking advantage of LCCs' manufacturing capabil-
ities. The category is composed of industries which produce technologically more
advanced and complex products, usually requiring high capital investment.
The last category refers to "Globalizing slowly" industries. This category is composed
of industries remaining onshore. These industries could remain onshore for different
reasons. Some industries produce bulky and relatively low value products such as
construction materials. Other industries have to produce domestically because of lo-
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cal content legal requirements, such as the motor vehicle industry. Some industries
which require technical skills that LCCs do not have and would not acquire easily also
remain onshore. Another reason for U.S. companies to keep manufacturing operation
is IP protection. For example, the Minnesota-based company, Hutchinson supplies
the suspension assemblies used in computer disk drives. Most of its customers and
competitors are in Asia, but the company still wants to produce in the U.S. because
of the availability of domestic highly skilled labor and IP protection. [29] Finally,
some strategic industries such as energy or military industries remain in the US for
obvious security reasons.
The first factor which influences the offshoring decision for U.S. companies is the
level of capability of foreign suppliers and the skills of the foreign labor force over-
seas to handle activities previously done domestically. Thus, apparel, textiles and toys
manufacturing activities, which require low technology and low labor skills, have been
performed in LCCs for years. To most U.S. manufacturers, low cost Asian countries
have always been synonymous for low quality, low efficiency and low productivity.
However, since the late 1990s, Asian countries have made substantial progress in
quality and technology. Electronics, computer and electrical equipment have experi-
enced the largest recent shift to overseas location, particularly in Asia (37 percent of
firms announcing a shift in 2002 and 2001, predominantly large multinational OEMs
such as GE, GM, Ford, Mattel, Motorola, Intel, LaCrosse, Lexmark, Samsonite, Dell,
International Paper, Rubbermaid). [124] According to a recent study of an American
consultant, Asian companies can now offer comparable or even superior performance
for a larger range of products across almost all industries. [67] Indeed, one U.S. elec-
tronics company has tripled its productivity since moving operations to China and
at the same time, cycle times and defect rates have fallen. For instance, China and
Taiwan have developed world-class design expertise in such specific areas as wire-
less chips, electronic devices, and software development. In the electronic industry,
offshore production which began with simple printed circuit board assembly (labor
intensive activity), moved on to more complex products and now competes in the
semi-conductor market (an industry which needs multi-billion dollar wafer facilities).
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The president's Council on Science and Technology has recognized "that offshoring
has created a deep sense of anxiety in the IT community that our nation is not just
losing the manufacturing capacity of 'commoditized' products, as has occurred in the
past, but also high-value-added manufacturing and services that the U.S. has long
dominated." [93]
The lack of high technologic capabilities in Asian LCCs has been considered as a
limitation to offshore U.S. production for years. On the other hand, the current catch
up of Asian LCCs technologic competences with U.S. companies is becoming a new
constraint for offshoring by raising crucial IP protection questions.
3.7 Which Types of Jobs Are the Most Vulnera-
ble?
Jobs can be separated in three categories as defined by Giraud (1995). [58] First,
the "protected jobs" category defines jobs which cannot be offshored because of their
nature (i.e. catering, health care, etc.). Second, the "competitive jobs" category
includes U.S. workers who cannot be offshored because of comparative advantages
linked to their U.S. location. Comparative advantages linked to U.S. location in-
clude, for instance, jobs which require technical skill or use specific infrastructures
which do not exist overseas. Competitive jobs can also be found in companies that
use a particular supply chain organization or require proximity with customers and
so, presence in the U.S. Another comparative advantage linked to the location is
the brand power of "made in the U.S." For instance, Fender or Harley Davidson are
building their whole brand image on their U.S. origin. Third, the "exposed jobs" cat-
egory characterizes all types of jobs which could be performed offshore competitively
as well as in the U.S. The last category mainly includes labor intensive industries
jobs or low skilled jobs. As seen in section 3.6, low cost countries have raised their
manufacturing capabilities, allowing them to expand the range of products they can
produce. Today, they can produce goods from almost the entire range of U.S. indus-
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tries. The U.S. manufacturing sector will have to create jobs in the first and second
categories to absorb the workers who belong to the last category. For the manufac-
turing sector, manufacturing costs and workforce wages are not the only element to
take into account to evaluate the viability of employment in a particular industry.
Other factors, different from production cost and wage differential, have to be taken
into account to identify a competitive job or an exposed job. Thus, McKinsey has
created a graphic to characterize zones where onshore production is appropriate and
zones where offshore is suitable along two dimensions: customer service capability
and factor cost importance (Fig. 3-8). Customer service capabilities include lead
time, demand volatility, product obsolescence, product lifecycle, product mobility,
product customization, labor experience, sensitivity to supply interruption, cost fluc-
tuation sensitivity, valuation of national identity, and IP sensitivity. Companies or
industries which build their comparative advantage on these dimensions will be more
likely to locate their operation onshore. In fact, their competitive advantage is their
location, close to the demand. Factor costs include direct labor, energy, government
compliance costs and taxes. Industries or companies which compete uniquely on low
price will tend to offshore their production in countries where production costs are
lower. In the second part of the Chapter 5, a series of case studies will discuss the
key variables to consider when locating production.
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Source: McKinsey Company
Figure 3-8: The Factors Which Determine the Location Decision
In the future, U.S. companies and industries will provide jobs in the U.S. if they
can compete on advantages linked to the location. Using the McKinsey figure, it
will require competing more on customer service capability than on production costs.
For example, competing on lead time will give a competitive advantage for onshore
production that offshore production cannot fight without carrying a lot of inventory.
Then, U.S. companies can compete on variability: by offering a larger range of prod-
ucts, they can force their competitors that use offshore production to carry a lot of
inventory for a lot of products, making their margin smaller and then offsetting the
production cost gap. Moreover, shipping product from China still takes a couple of
weeks via sea transportation. With high oil prices, it is unlikely that air transporta-
tion costs will decrease in the future. Thus, the last and unconquerable advantage
of U.S. onshore production is no longer technology or access to an unmatched skilled
labor force, but it is being located in U.S., close to the customers.
67
3.8 Offshoring by Numbers
The estimates of job losses due to offshoring have always been controversial. The first
source of numbers is consulting and banking companies. The most quoted forecasts
released by these firms have been compiled below (Table 3.3).
Table 3.3: U.S. Job Losses due to Offshoring
Sources
Goldman Sachs
Business Week
Mark Zandi Economy.com
Gartner Inc.
Forrester Research
Goldman and Sachs
Bardhan & Kroll
Estimates
Between 300,000 and 500,000 jobs lost annually
between 2001 and 2004 in manufacturing and services
Between 400,000 and 500,000 jobs lost annually
between 2001 and 2004 in manufacturing and services
995,000 jobs lost annually
between 2001 and 2004 in manufacturing and services
500,000 jobs lost in the IT sector since 1997
Forecast of the loss of 3.3 million jobs
in services between 2003 and 2018
Forecast of the loss of 6 million jobs
in services and manufacturing between 2003 and 2013
UC-Berkeley Estimates of 14.1 million jobs
subject to offshoring in services
Note: Date compiled by Author
Such projections are subject to considerable uncertainty due to the lack of infor-
mation about the methodology used by these firms to build these figures but also
because these studies rely heavily on expert judgment rather than large surveys. [55]
In addition, companies' offshoring strategy might be affected by political events, such
as protectionist legislation in the United States or geopolitical events.
These estimations (around 100,000 jobs lost annually because of offshoring) have to
be compared with the number of jobs annually created and lost every years in U.S.
(around 30 million).
To identify reasons for layoffs, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provides the
Mass Layoff Survey (MLS). This national survey collects information on reasons for
long-term job destruction on a quarterly basis. Questions on job loss related to the
movement of work were added to the MLS program in January 2004 by the BLS.
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According to data from BLS, of the 239,361 private sector "nonfarm" workers who
were separated from their jobs for at least 31 days in the first quarter of 2004, the
separations of 4,633 workers were associated with the movement of work outside of
the country, counting for less than 2 percent of job losses (Table 3.4).
Table 3.4: MLS Program, Separations by Selected Employer Action,
2004
Mass Layoff Separation, first quarter 2004
Total, private nonfarm sector
Total, excluding seasonal and vacation events
Total with movement of work
Overseas Relocations
Within company
Different company
Domestic Relocations
Within company
Different company
Job loss
239361
182456
16021
4633
2976
1657
9985
8191
1794
First Quarter
% of Total
1
0.76
0.07
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.04
0.03
0.01
Source: BLS / Extended Mass Layoffs Associated with Domestic and Overseas Relocation, First
Table 1 / ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/news.release/reloc.txt
Quarter 2004 /
The BLS data also expose the different reasons for layoffs: only 1,182 of job
separations are due to import competition and only 219 of them are associated with
movement of work (either a domestic relocation or overseas relocation) (Table 3.5).
From 2001 to 2004, for the U.S. private nonfarm sector, the BLS data would sug-
gest a loss of approximately 113,000 jobs due to imports competition and overseas
relocation compare to respectively between 300,000 to 500,000 according to a Gold-
man Sachs evaluation and between 400,000 and 500,000 according to a Business Week
study (Table 3.6). The data published by the BLS suggest that imports competition
and overseas relocation have counted for only 2 to 3 percent of total separations in
the U.S. private nonfarm sector between 1996 and 2003.
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Table 3.5: Reason
Reason for Layoff,
first quarter 2004
hline Total, private nonfarm
Automation
Bankruptcy
Business ownership change
Contract cancellation
Contract completed
Environment-related
Financial difficulty
Import competition
Labor dispute
Material shortage
Model changeover
Natural disaster
Plant or machine repair
Product line discontinued
Reorganization within company
Seasonal work
Slack work
Vacation period
Weather-related
Other
Not reported
for Layoff,
Job loss
239361
(1)
8422
4217
4238
51795
0
15755
1182
21293
(1)
(1)
0
(1)
1675
26982
56478
16999
427
1382
11004
15656
First Quarter 2004
Associated with
movement of work
16021
(1)
0
512
(1)
(1)
0
2394
219
0
0
0
0
0
(1)
8736
(2)
291
(2)
0
3410
0
% of Total
Separation
1.00
0.04
0.02
0.02
0.22
0.00
0.07
0.00
0.09
0.00
0.01
0.11
0.24
0.07
0.00
0.01
0.05
0.07
Note: (1) data do not meet BLS or state agency disclosure standards (2) The questions on movement of work were
not asked
Source: BLS / Extended Mass Layoffs Associated with Domestic and Overseas Relocation, First Quarter 2004 /
Table 2 / ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/news.release/reloc.txt
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Table 3.6: Separations due to overseas relocation and imports competition between
1996 and 2004, U.S. private nonfarm sector
Mass Layoff,
private
nonfarm
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Total Sep.
948122
947843
991245
901451
915962
1524832
1272331
1216886
993899
Sep. due to
overseas
relocation
4326
10439
8797
5683
9054
15693
17075
13205
*
Sep. due to
imports
competition
13476
12019
18473
26234
13416
27946
15350
23734
8064
Share of sep. due to
overseas relocation and
imports competition
0.019
0.024
0.027
0.035
0.025
0.029
0.025
0.030
Note: *The MLS program discontinued the collection of "domestic relocation" and "overseas relocation" as standard
reasons for layoff beginning with data for the first quarter 2004. Extended mass layoff data report on establishments
which have at least 50 initial claims filed against them during a 5-week period and where the employer indicates
that 50 or more people were separated from their jobs for at least 31 days.
Source: BLS / Mass Layoff Statistics (MLS) Program / http://data.bls.gov/labjava/outside.jsp?survey=ml
A second source of numbers for job losses due to offshoring is empirical studies.
Hufbauer and Wong (2004) estimates that imports increase has displaced 422,000 jobs
annually between 1990 and 2003. [71] Baily and Lawrence estimates that trade caused
the loss of between 85,000 and 197,000 manufacturing job per year between 2000 and
2003. [32] Such a difference between numbers from the BLS, banking or consulting
firms and empirical studies underlines the complexity of evaluating the numbers of
jobs lost due to offshoring. Chapter 4 exposes international trade theories to get a
better understanding of the trade off between import level and domestic employment.
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Chapter 4
Economic Theories
"The benefits from new forms of trade, such as in services, are no different from
the benefits from traditional trade in goods. When a good or service is produced at
lower cost in another country, it makes sense to import it rather than produce it
domestically. This allows the United States to devote its resources to more productive
purposes". The Council of Economic Advisers [98]
"Outsourcing is a particular type of international trade. We are used to trade in goods,
but trade in services has expanded recently, made possible in large part by advances
in telecommunications. Like all forms of international trade, outsourcing benefits
an economy overall, though there are also short-term costs as workers are displaced.
These costs are real, and the President has policies to help ease the transition - to
help people find jobs. But overall, expanding trade is good for economic growth and
for American living standards". N. Gregory Mankiw [88]
4.1 Absolute Advantage Theory: Adam Smith
The logic that free trade could be advantageous for countries is based on the concept of
absolute advantages in production. Adam Smith wrote in The Wealth of Nations, "If
a foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make
it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed
in a way in which we have some advantage." [111] The idea here is straightforward and
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instinctive. If a country can produce some set of goods at lower cost than a foreign
country, and if the foreign country can produce some other set of goods at a lower
cost than the first country can produce them, then clearly it would be best for the
first country to trade their relatively cheaper goods for the other's relatively cheaper
goods. In this way both countries can gain from trade. This analysis implies that
countries should concentrate on industries in which they are the low-cost producer.
4.2 Comparative Advantage Theory: The Ricar-
dian Model
The Ricardian model provides the simplest setting to illustrate comparative advantage
and the gains from trade in a general equilibrium setting.
4.2.1 Assumtions
The production of goods uses only one input, such as labor, with constant returns to
scale. This assumption means that the technology in each country and each sector is
entirely determined by the labor requirement per unit of output. Moreover, labor is
assumed to move freely between the sectors of a country, but not between countries.
These assumptions imply that wages must be the same in both sectors but do not
have to be the same in the two countries.
4.2.2 Model
This theory can be illustrated with a simple example: two countries (1 and 2) that
manufacture two goods (A and B). It is assumed that the only production factor
is labor (L' and L2 , respectively). Q1 and Q' represent country I's production of
goods A and B (respectively, Q2 and Q2 for country 2). The unit labor costs (ala 2)
for producing the two goods are given in Table 4.1.
The total labor supply constraints are: alQ+a'Q1 < L' and a2Q2+a2Q2 < L2
and are expressed graphically in Fig. 4-1.
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Table 4.1: The Ricardian Model: Unit Labor Requirement
Country Good A Good B
1 a'=20 a1=10
2 al=25 al=50
a A
B a
Figure 4-1: The Ricardian Model: Labor Supply Curve
The absolute values of the slopes are a'/al and a2/a2 and they represent the
respective costs of good B in terms of good A for each nation. A country has an
absolute advantage in good A when al < a2 and a comparative advantage in good
B when a'/a' < a2/a2. Here, country 1 has absolute advantage in both goods and
a comparative advantage in good B, and country 2 has a comparative advantage in
good A.
Next, a numerical example is used to illustrate that both countries will benefit from
the specialization. It is supposed that both countries have 100 units of labor. Before
trade, it is assumed that Q1 = 4, Q1 = 2, Q' = 2, and Q2 = 1. After specialization,
Q = 2, Q1 = 6, Q2 = 4, and Q2 = 0. If Country 2 exports 2 units of good A in
exchange for 2 units of good B, both are strictly better off.
In general, the gains from trade arise because of the possibility of separating con-
sumption from production. Under autarky, the market clearing constraint requires
that consumption equals production for each good. Under trade, the market clearing
constraint requires that world production equals world consumption for each good.
The market clearing constraint under trade is therefore weaker than the market clear-
ing constraint under autarky. Trade weakens a constraint, and therefore leads to the
possibility of welfare gains.
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4.2.3 Conclusions and Limitations
The model shows that trade is not a zero-sum game and that, under appropriate
conditions, it is possible for both countries to gain from trade.
Moreover, this model underlines the important role of technology differences in ex-
plaining trade and in creating gains from trade. Nevertheless, in the real world,
countries tend to export goods when they have lower opportunity cost of production
than other producers.
Furthermore, a limitation of the Ricardian model is that it does not directly address
the relationship between trade and the distribution of income. The Ricardian model
tends to suggest that the biggest gains from trade come from trade between countries
with very different relative technologies specializing in different goods. Yet, trade
data show that developed countries usually trade with countries with similar tech-
nologies. In addition, if a country has enough resources to supply the world market
and sufficient technological advantages to be the most efficient producer in all goods,
such conclusions are not sustainable. This is one of the central concerns in the ongo-
ing debate over offshoring. China, for example, has a nearly infinite labor resource,
and is tending to gain productivity and technologies in more and more sectors. Thus,
to remain prosperus, the U.S. has to redistribute its economic efforts to sectors where
comparative advantage still exists.
4.3 Trade and Income Distribution: The Specific
Factors Model
Even if trade is seen as a mutually beneficial process, some nations (including the
U.S.) have protected particular economic sectors by establishing tariffs, quotas, or
other trade barriers. Though international trade is good for the country as a whole,
distribution of income within the country may be dramatically impacted. The main
reasons are: first, some resources, such as labor, cannot move instantaneously and
without cost from one industry to another; second, industry demand for production
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factors differs from one industry to another. Thus, international trade often hurts
some groups within the country, at least in the short term.
Paul Samuelson and Ronald Jones developed the specific factors model (using works
of Viner on the Ricardian model) to incorporating income distribution.
4.3.1 Assumptions
In the specific factor model, the authors consider three factors of production: labor,
capital, and land. Labor is a mobile factor that can move between sectors, but other
factors are specific and can be used only on the production of one good (Fig. 4-2).
Good A Good B
Exportable Import-competing
Specific Capit al Lan d
Factor I
Common Labor Labor
Factor I
Figure 4-2: The Specific Factors Model: One Economy Model
One Economy In the Ricardian model, the production possibility frontier is lin-
ear since only one movable production factor is assumed. If more workers are used
to produce good A, fewer workers will be available to produce good B. Production
quantities are linearly correlated according to respective productivities (Fig. 4-3).
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Ricardian Model
LL a
LiaB
Figure 4-3: The Specific Factors Model: Production Frontier
With the specific factor model, if a factor is increased (labor) and the other factor
remains constant (land or capital), there will be diminishing returns. Adding a worker
will dilute the capital invested among more workers, making the addition of a worker
less productive than previously. To illustrate this phenomenon, the marginal-product
of labor (MPL) curve, which represents the additional output produced by adding
one more person-hour, can be plotted (Fig. 4-4). (See in Appendix B-i a use of the
MPL curve).
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Marginal Product of Labor
Labor input
Figure 4-4: The Specific Factors Model: Marginal Product of Labor Curve
Thus, in the specific factors model the production possibility frontier is a curve
which reflects diminishing returns to labor in each sector (Fig. 4-5).
A Economy's production
possibility frontier
Figure 4-5: The Specific Factors Model: Production Frontier
4.3.2 Model
The split of the labor force between the two sectors depends on the demand and
supply on the labor market. Because of diminished returns, at some point, hiring
a new employee will cost as much as the added value produced by this employee.
The value of labor's marginal product (equal to the value produced by adding a new
employee) is equal to MPLA * PA for good A (PA is the price of one output of good
A), which will be equal to the wage rate of labor, w. Likewise, the value of labor's
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marginal product is equal to MPLB * PB for good B. In this model, labor is assumed
to be freely mobile between sectors. Thus, wages of the two different sectors will
equalize: MPLA * PA = MPLB * PB = W - Since the total amount of labor is limited,
we can plot the following illustration of the allocation of labor. The model assumes
that firms choose an output level to maximize profit, taking prices and wages as given
(Fig. 4-6).
Value of labor's
marginal product
MP L* P2
MP LA PA
LA
L
Figure 4-6: The Specific Factors Model: The Value of Labor's Marginal Product
If PA increases, a new curve of MPLA * PA4 for good A is obtained (Fig. 4-7).
Thus, labor has shifted from manufacturing of good B to manufacturing of good
A. Because the price of good A is higher, more workers can be hired and profitability
can be maintained (value of labor's marginal product equal to wage). Thus, the
relationship between relative output and relative price of each industry can be drawn;
it corresponds to the relative supply curve RS. On the same graph, a relative demand
curve RD can be added (Fig. 4-8)
Two Economis and Trade The relative demand is assumed the same in the two
countries; if both countries face the same relative price, they will consume goods in
the same proportion. Thus, incentives for international trade come from differences in
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Figure 4-7: The Specific Factors Model: Price Change
Relative Price of Goods
RS
RD
Relative Quantity
QA B of Goods
Figure 4-8: The Specific Factors Model: The Relative Supply Curve
relative supply. Differences in relative supply could come from different technologies
or differences in resources. Country 2 is assumed to have a larger supply of capital
than country 1. With trade, the relative price of goods in both countries will converge
(Fig. 4-9).
Indeed, trade has lowered the relative price of good A for country 1 and increased
it for country 2. In country 1, a decrease in the relative price of good A leads to
a rise in consumption of this good. Moreover, because the relative price of good A
decreases, labor shifts from the good A sector to the good B sector and the output
of the good B sector rises. Before international trade, both countries were producing
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Relative Price of Goods
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Figure 4-9: The Specific Factors Model: International Trade and Price Convergence
the domestic demand for each good. Now country 1 becomes an importer of good A
and exporter of good B. Country 2 starts importing good A and exporting good B.
4.3.3 Conclusions and Limitations
Using this model, Samuelson and Jones show that factors specific to export sectors
in each country gain from trade, while factors specific to import-competing sectors
lose. International trade shifts the relative price of goods. Trade as a whole produces
overall gains which could compensate, in theory, for losses. Landowners or capital-
owners will benefit from trade, while the impact on labor will be ambiguous.
Governments usually prefer to compensate losers rather than to influence trade by
setting up barriers considering that multiple other changes such as technological evo-
lution or consumer preference changes will, in any case, impact income distribution.
Indeed, factors specific to use in the export sector in each country gain from trade,
while factors specific to the import competing sector lose (extension of Stolper Samuel-
son Theorem). The effect of trade on mobile factors is ambiguous (gain or loss).
Moreover, the assumption that any of the production factors can move between indus-
tries is very strong. In reality, labor cannot be displaced easily and quickly between
industries. Then, a short-term negative impact on employment is expected.
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4.4 Resource Differences and Trade: The Heckscher-
Ohlin Model
If labor were the only factor of production, as the Ricardian model assumes, com-
parative advantage could arise only because of international differences in labor pro-
ductivity. In the real world, a country's resources play an important role in trade.
A realistic model should take into account such other factors of production as land,
capital, and mineral resources. In the following model, differences in resources are
the source of trade through two dimensions: the relative abundance of factors of pro-
duction and the relative intensity with which different factors of production are used
in the production of different goods. This model is referred to as the Heckscher-Ohlin
model or the factor-proportions theory.
4.4.1 Assumptions
There are two countries (1 & 2), using two factors of production, capital and labor,
to produce two goods (A & B). These two inputs are in limited supply. The model
assumes full employment, which means it assumes that trade has no effect on the
aggregate number of jobs.
Production functions are assumed identical in both countries and production functions
in both countries display constant returns to scale. One of the commodities is capital-
intensive, the other is labor-intensive. Both nations have identical tastes. Perfect
factor mobility exists within each nation but not between nations.
4.4.2 Model
The model is a simple example of countries producing good A and good B, using
labor and land with the following expressions:
T =economy's supply of land
L =economy's supply of labor
w =wage rate per hour of labor
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r =the cost of one acre of land In each sector, the producer will face, not a fixed
input requirement, but a trade-off between production factors: it can decide to use
more labor and less land to produce the same amount of goods A. For example, if
land rents are low and wages are high, the producer will choose to use relatively little
labor and a relatively more land. The input choice will depend on the ratio of the two
factor prices, w/r, for each good. The following curve shows the relationship between
w/r and the land-labor ratio for good A and good B (Fig. 4-10).
Wage-rental
ratio w/r
A B
Land-labor
ration, T/L
Figure 4-10: The Heckscher-Ohlin Model: Resources Intensity
According to the figure, for any w/r ratio, goods B production will require a higher
T/L ratio. We say that goods B production is land-intensive. On the other hand,
good A production requires a lower T/L ratio; production of good A is said to be
labor-intensive.
Now, two countries (1 and 2) are assumed to have similar relative demand for goods
A and B and similar relative price for the two goods. Moreover, both countries
have similar technology: a given amount of land and labor yields the same output of
goods in both countries. Then, the only difference is in their resources: country 1 is
assumed to have a higher ratio of labor to land than country 2. Thus, country 1 is
labor-abundant and country 2 is land-abundant. Since good A is more labor-intensive,
country 1 tends to specialize in the production of good A; country 1 will produce a
higher ratio of goods A to goods B. Trade leads to a convergence of relative prices.
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Therefore, in the absence of trade the relative price of goods A would be lower in
country 1 and the relative price of goods B higher. According to the Heckscher-Ohlin
model, under balanced trade, a country will be a net exporter of the services of its
abundant factors and a net importer of the services of its scarce factors. The model
allows factor prices to adjust to maintain full employment and therefore can cause
changes in income distribution as a consequence of trade(Fig. 4-11).
Relative price of
goods PNPB Without trade, country 1's
* R5equilibrium would be at point 1,
where its supply intersects its
domestic demand curve. In the
same way, country 2's equilibrium
would be at point 3.
With trade, the world relative price
would be between the two local
prices, at point 2.
RD
Relative Quantity of good A
QA+QA*IQB+QB*
Figure 4-11: The Heckscher-Ohlin Model: Relative Supply Curve
4.4.3 Factor Price Equalization
One of the implications of the Heckscher-Ohlin model is the "Factor-price equalization
theorem." Without trade, labor in country 1 would earn less than in country 2 and
land would earn more. Moreover, without trade, labor-intensive goods 1 would be
cheaper in labor-abundant country 1 than in country 2. Thus, when countries start
trading goods, the relative prices of goods and the relative prices of labor and land
converge. Therefore, if two countries start out with similar technology and skills but
different wage rates, trade between them will reduce wages in the high-paying country
and increase wages in the low-paying country until, eventually, workers in both places
end up earning the same amount. This conclusion is true if both countries produce
both goods, technologies are the same, and trade equalizes the prices of goods in the
two countries.
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Table 4.2: Leontief Paradox: US 1947 Data
Data for 1947 Imports Exports
Capital (million dollars) $3,091,339 $2,550,780
Labor (million person-years) 170 182
Capital-labor ratio $18,184 $14,015
4.4.4 Leontief Paradox
In 1953, Leontief published a very famous empirical study to test the Heckscher-Ohlin
model with U.S. data. Leontief used the 1947 input-output table of the U.S. economy.
He aggregated factors into two categories, labor and capital. Then, he estimated the
capital and labor requirements to produce one million dollars' worth of typical exports
and imports in 1947 (Table 4.2).
Professor Robert Baldwin did another test with U.S. data for 1962 (Table 4.3).
Table 4.3: Leontief Paradox: US 1962 Data
Data for 1947 Imports Exports
Capital (million dollars) $2,132,000 $1,876,000
Labor (million person-years) 119 131
Capital-labor ratio $17,916 $14,321
At first glance, the results from both tests are counter-intuitive. It appears that
U.S. imports tend to be more capital-intensive than U.S. exports. Nevertheless, other
results from Baldwin's study tend to support the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Baldwin
compares qualitative factors of production workers. Imported goods appear to be
goods needing a less skilled labor force. Indeed, the U.S. might be exporting goods
with innovative technologies which could be less capital intensive but which require
a skilled work force and innovative entrepreneurship (Table 4.4).
Table 4.4: Leontief Paradox: Work force skills level
Data for 1962 Imports Exports
Average years of education per worker 9.9 10.1
Proportion of engineers per worker 0.0189 0.0255
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4.4.5 Conclusions and Limitations
This model shows that owners of a country's abundant factors gain from trade, but
the owners of scarce factors suffer loss. Moreover, the assumption that the entire
world has the same production function would mean that the entire world has the
same productivity (output per person hour and capital per output ratio). This is
obviously untrue. Moreover, an industry could be labor-intensive in a country and
capital-intensive in another country. Agriculture, for instance, is capital-intensive in
the U.S. and labor intensive in Asia.
It is hard to imagine that difference in resources alone can explain the features of
international trade. In fact, it is highly probable that technology plays an important
role.
4.5 The Standard Trade Model
The standard trade model tends to generalize the three models just discussed (the
Ricardian model, the specific factors model, the Heckscher-Ohlin model). This model
shows that an improvement in a country's terms of trade (the relative price of a
country's exports on the world market) increases its welfare. In contrast, relative
growth in the price of imported goods will increase the capability to produce import-
competing goods and thus improve a country's terms of goods.
4.6 Bhagwati, Panagariya, Srinivasan (2004)
Bhagwati et al. (2004) [36] have recently studied the impact of trade on offshore pur-
chasing of arm's-length services (services that do not require geographical proximity
of the buyer and the seller), and its effects on national output, wages and distribution
of income. They found that effects on jobs and wages from outsourcing of such ser-
vices are comparable to those from conventional trade in goods. The authors present
three different models.
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4.6.1 Model 1
This model assumes one good which is produced with two factors of production, labor
and capital. The authors assume that an innovation allows the country to buy the
services of labor abroad at a lower fixed wage (Fig. 4-12 - see details in Appendix
B-2). In this model, outsourcing is beneficial for capital owners but hurts local labor
income. Thus, a policy which compensates losers, such as workers, could create a
win-win solution for both parties.
Before Outsourcing After Outsourcing
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Figure 4-12: Model 1: Marginal Product Curve and the Distribution of Income
4.6.2 Model 2
The authors consider a two-good, two factor of production model using a Specific
Factors Model. There are a sector-specific factor and a production factor common to
both goods (Figure 4-13).
Good A Good B
Import-competing Exportable
Specific Land Capital
Factor
Common Labor Labor
Factor
Figure 4-13: Model 2: Good Ressources Requirements
The country trades in the world market and a technological innovation makes
outsourcing possible. Therefore, labor can be outsourced and bought abroad at a
lower wage (see details in Appendix B-3). At this new wage, Bhagwati et al. assume
an excess demand for labor satisfied through outsourcing. The graphs below show
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the situations before and after outsourcing. Thus, according to the new distribution
of income in the two graphs below (Fig. 4-14 and 4-15), a decline in the labor wage
for both local sectors happens simultaneously with a rise of income for capital and
land owners.
Value of labor's
marginal product
MPL * P MPL *P
Income of Income of
capital owner land owvner
Wages Wages
Sector A Sector B
L.
L
Figure 4-14: Model 2: Income Distribution Before Offshoring
Even If the terms of trade are assumed to be fixed, outsourcing remains profitable.
Subsequently, if trade in final goods changes, outsourcing enlarges the output of the
exportable good beyond the demand for it. Now it will cost more in terms of exports
to buy the same amount of imports, reducing benefits from outsourcing.
4.6.3 Model 3
In model 3, the authors present a three-good, two-factor model where the third good
is not tradable. Then, the authors suppose that the third good becomes tradable at a
lower price due to an innovation. The production of good 3 may disappear, releasing
resources for production of goods 1 and 2. Since the price of good 3 has declined,
owners of both factors increase their buying power in terms of that good.
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Figure 4-15: Model 2: Income Distribution After Offshoring
4.6.4 Conclusions
In the first model, outsourcing benefits are not shared by all actors: outsourcing
benefits capital owners but penalizes workers. In the second model, outsourcing may
again provide overall benefits but domestic workers will lose. In the last model, the
authors conclude that all actors will gain after workers and resources make the tran-
sition from the third sector to other industries.
On the one hand, the authors have used these models to show that the expansion of
skills abroad embedded in goods that the U.S. already imports is beneficial, since it
makes the imported goods even cheaper. On the other hand, when imports for an ac-
tivity performed domestically increase, net gains are expected for capital owners (the
unmovable factor) and losses are expected for local workers, who are now competing
with foreign workers. The last model suggests that outsourcing is likely to shift jobs
between sectors and occupations. There is no guarantee that the jobs created will be
better than the jobs lost.
4.7 Samuelson (2004)
In 2004, Paul Samuelson published a trade model considering two countries (USA
and China) and two goods (1 and 2) following a Ricardian model. [105] In this study,
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Samuelson assumes China's labor productivity is one-tenth that of the U.S. At the
same time, China's labor force is ten times larger. Initial Ricardo-Mills analysis shows
that geographical specialization and fair free trade double each country's autarky real
income. Secondly, Samuelson simulates that China quadruples its labor's productiv-
ity, through technical improvement, in good 2, which is the good China is exporting
to the U.S. The new equilibrium allows the U.S. to import good 2 at a lower price.
China also raises its real net national product. These conclusions are consistent with
traditional trade theories. Finally, Samuelson studies the case where China improves
its productivity in good 1, in which the United States previously had a comparative
advantage. Applying Ricardo-Mills arithmetic, the U.S. may experience permanent
losses in per capita real income. Losses can even totally offset gains from trade over
an autarky situation.
In the first case, technical improvement leads to benefits for both countries, but in
the second case, only China gets benefits from it, while the U.S. is permanently hurt.
4.8 Discussion
These models assume that workers who lose their jobs can find other ones fairly easily.
In the real world, workers may suffer from displacement. They may experience cuts
in wages, or even unemployment, if they do not have sufficient skills to find a job
in another sector. Governments often respond to labor displacement by allocating
special funds to retrain and replace workers laid off because of imports competition.
Such models clarify the causes of income inequalities in the U.S. economy. Developing
countries used to have comparative advantage in raw materials, such as mining or
agricultural products, because of abundant resources in land or mines. Between
the 1970s and the 1990s, the newly industrializing economies (NIEs), such as South
Korea or China, started improving productivity and expanding their manufacturing
industries (Table 4.5).
NIE started exporting to the U.S. goods such as apparel or shoes whose pro-
duction is intensive in unskilled labor, an abundant production factor for the NIE.
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Table 4.5: Composition of Developing Country Exports
Percent of Total Agricultur Mining Manufacturing
1973 30 47.5 22
1995 14 22.5 62.5
Concurrently, demand for unskilled labor in the U.S. has decreased. The U.S. has
experienced an increase in the inequality of wages during this period, since unskilled
workers came into competition with NIE workers.
On the other hand, production of certain goods is becoming more capital-intensive
and may involve external economies and diseconomies. In many cases, capital has
replaced labor in producing goods to the extent that the former labor is obsolete:
many countries with high unemployment and fertile lands now import agricultural
goods from the United States. From the review of these international trade models,
we can envisage that offshoring may be positive for the U.S. economy, ultimately
increasing aggregate profits. Nevertheless, the new distribution of income resulting
from international competition may not be a win-win game; it could lead to displace-
ment of workers from certain sectors. The U.S. capital owner and consumer may
be the only beneficiaries of the new situation, as a consequence of sourcing labor
at a lower price offshore or onshore and lower prices of import-competing goods. It
appears at the least to be vital for the U.S. to remain competitive in enough sec-
tors to provide enough well-paid jobs to manufacturing workers displaced from highly
import-competing sectors such as electronics devices and appliances or apparel.
Nevertheless, whereas offshoring can be assimilated to international trade, and ex-
plored using economic theories, the company case studies analyzed have shown that
companies' reasons to offshore for are often specific to their products and customers,
without necessarily following trends predicted by international trade theories. It has
become apparent that the offshoring decision is more specific to a certain product,
customer or company, than a universal rule within a particular industry. Thus, two
companies competing in the same industry might have different location strategies.
The next chapter analyzes offshoring strategy through business case studies.
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Chapter 5
How Are Trade and International
Competition Impacting
Employment in the U.S.
Manufacturing Sector
" The loss of jobs over the past three years is attributable largely to rapid declines in
the demand for industrial goods and to outsized gains in productivity that have caused
effective supply to outstrip demand." Greenspan [10]
The number of jobs in the manufacturing sector peaked in 1979, yet the share of
employment in the manufacturing sector began its decline after World War II(Fig. 2-
2). Needless to say, the decline of the employment in manufacturing sector is not a
new phenomenon and international figures in other advanced economies such as Ger-
many or UK, show that decline is not only occurring in the U.S. economy (Fig. 2-4).
However the recent shortfall in manufacturing employment during the 2001 recession
created a surprising debate about the contribution of manufacturing activities to the
prosperity and the competitiveness of the U.S. Suddenly, manufacturing goods do-
mestically appeared as a strategic activity. Indeed, with regards to the long decline in
manufacturing employment in U.S. and other advanced economies and the respective
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long term performance of these economies, the recent noise about job shortage in
manufacturing could appear odd. It illustrates the "fear" of many U.S. workers with
regard to a rapidly changing world economy and a new competition era after the 9/11
events and the burst of the internet economy bubble.
The apprehension of U.S. workers since 2001 is likely the result of series of coin-
cident, short term dynamics as well as long term trends.
To clarify the short term dynamics, it is pertinent to look at the recent dynamics in
the U.S. economy since 2001. After 9/11 and the burst of the internet bubble, the
U.S. economy went through a severe recession. At that time, no new technologies
emerged to replace the not-so-promising internet economy. Imports of traditional
manufactured goods from China and other low cost countries kept growing and re-
sulted in new imports and trade deficit records month after month. In this context,
all jobs became a vital asset for the U.S. The presidential campaign, at that time,
was an excellent circumstance for the media to raise public awareness of offshoring.
The media started publishing stories about relatively new phenomenon at this time,
the move of white collar jobs abroad, especially to such countries as India. Media cov-
erage on such a new trend was expected, but it was surprising to observe an increasing
number of stories related to manufacturing jobs offshored to low cost countries which
has been a common trend for American companies for decades in order to benefit
from wage differentials and to capture new markets abroad. Companies and CEOs,
participating in offshoring operations were suddenly viewed by many as public ene-
mies and even stigmatized by popular TV-shows like "Exporting America" by Lou
Dobbs on CNN.
The confusion about the real impact of offshoring and international trade on U.S.
employment resulted from the absence of governmental statistics. Indeed, the lack
of robust official numbers directly assessing the impact of offshoring on U.S. employ-
ment has made possible the unrestrained speculation by researchers, consulting firms
or journalists about the number of jobs lost. In this case, the absence of statistics has
been more prejudicial than having "bad" statistics by giving the opportunities for all
the parties to interpret and present the situation in their own way. In this context
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and with this attention on manufacturing in low cost countries, companies started
feeling pressure from their stakeholders to consider incorporating a "Chinese plan"
even if it was not always pertinent for their strategy. [20]
Nevertheless, along with these short-term events, this recent succession of events
resulted from long-term economic changes and corporate strategy mutations. U.S.
companies have been using plants abroad since the beginning of the 20th century to
capture wage differentials, special technology, skills, raw material or new markets.
The recent development of IT tools to support production abroad and the standard-
ization of design and manufacturing processes along with the fast development of
manufacturing capabilities abroad make the manufacturing in low cost countries pos-
sible for most goods. More recently, the intense use of communication tools has made
the transfer of data easier and has reduced the necessity for face to face exchanges.
By reducing the need of physical presence these tools have open opportunities for
workers abroad to perform tasks that used to be done domestically. The most well-
know examples include X-ray reading by doctors in India or outsourced call centers
and accounting services.
Lately, more functions in more industries have been subject to offshoring in low cost
countries, such as research and development in China for software companies or design
activities in the semi-conductor industry in Taiwan. Ironically, in certain case, like
IT programmers, offshoring in India has helped U.S. companies to match the extra-
demand from the Y2K problem. The domestic workers were not able to respond to
this temporary extra-demand. In the long-run, this momentary situation proved that
the contractors abroad were able to provide high quality services for relatively low
cost. [95] In a time when anti-immigration laws are reinforced and working visa quo-
tas are historically low, it appears that it is becoming more difficult to move people
where the demand is than to move the demand where the workers are. All these
recent trends have contributed to the current fear that any jobs, white collar job or
traditional manufacturing job, could be performed properly abroad for a fraction of
the domestic price.
This chapter will present a rational approach to measure the phenomenon of
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offshoring and will present a framework to clarify how companies make the offshoring
decision based on several case studies and the current trends in U.S. companies'
offshoring decisions.
The turn of the 20th century has marked the new integration of an increasing
number of developing countries in the global economy as new suppliers, new manu-
facturers, new services providers, and new consumers but also as new competitors for
market share in the U.S. and anywhere else. For instance, the next chapter will show
how a country like China is not only looking for manufacturing products designed
and developed by American firm in the U.S. to serve U.S. market but also tries to
acquire and develop technology and scientific knowledge to build its own research and
design capabilities and be able, someday, to compete with European and American
companies in a broad range of products.
5.1 Recessions and Employment: Is the Current
Trend Structural or Cyclical?
As seen in Chapter 2, the U.S. manufacturing sector share in U.S. total employment
has declined steadily since 1945. Nevertheless the absolute number of jobs in the
manufacturing industry has been remarkably stable during the 35 years between 1965
and 2000, oscillating between around 17 million and 19 million jobs (Fig. 5-1). The
variation was even smaller after 1987, with the number of total job in manufacturing
being stable around 17 millions. However, the situation has dramatically changed in
2001. From 2001 to 2006, the U.S. manufacturing sector has lost around 2.9 million
jobs.
This abrupt decline in employment may result from general down turn of the U.S.
economy during a recession or structural mutation resulting in losses of jobs. In the
case of job losses due to a recession, the manufacturing industry is supposed to lose
job while the whole economy goes down and recover when the economy starts getting
better. In the case of structural changes, the manufacturing industry will eventually
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Figure 5-1: U.S. Manufacturing Employment
lose jobs during the down turn of the economy but will not recover along with the
whole economy. The U.S. economy has encountered several recessions since 1945
(Fig. 5-2).
By looking at the behavior of the economy and the manufacturing sector during
recessions, some information on the nature of the cause of the job losses in the man-
ufacturing industry can be determined. By comparing the different recessions since
1949, it appears that job losses during recessions are becoming "flatter": it takes a
longer period for the economy to recover the initial level of employment prior to the
recession and at the trough of the recession, the economy loses less jobs (Fig. 5-3).
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Figure 5-2: U.S. Employment and Recession Periods
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Figure 5-3: U.S. Non-farm Employment Dynamic during Recession Periods
In contrast with most previous recessions, where job growth following the trough
was very strong, the recovery after the 2001 recession has been dramatically weak,
forcing economists, and politician to talk about a "jobless recovery." Finally the pre-
recession job level has recovered after 47 months compare to 25 months on average
for the previous recessions (Table 5.1 and Fig. 5-4). The percentage of jobs lost on
average during the 2001 recession has been lower and at the recession trough the job
loss has been relatively less significant than during the previous recessions, with 1.67
percent of jobs lost at the trough.
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Table 5.1: Recession Effect on U.S. GDP Employment
Recessions Time to Recover Avg. Employment Change Job Destruction
Previous employment Per Month During at Recession
level Recession Trough
1949 22 0.60% -5.18%
1954 23 0.32% -3.39%
1958 24 0.39% -4.37%
1975 19 0.32% -2.69%
1982 28 0.27% -3.10%
1990 32 0.11% -1.47%
2001 47 0.10% -1.67%
Note: The third column shows the average employment change per month during the recession. Job changes are
counted positively during the declining and recovery phases by considering the absolute change.
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Figure 5-4: Recession Effect on the U.S. Manufacturing Employment
The different economic sectors, such as manufacturing or services, followed differ-
ent trends during the post-recession recovery. Many reasons can be invoked to explain
the recent downturn of the U.S. employment, but as explained before, by looking at
the pattern of employment by industry during recession and recovery periods, job
flow fluctuations can be differentiated into two main categories: cyclical adjustment
or structural adjustment. Thus, Erica L. Groshen and Simon Potter, two economists
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, underlined that during the last recession
job losses have been mainly due to structural changes and not cyclical, comparing
job creation during recession and recovery (Appendix C-1). [64] It appears that dur-
ing the last recession, the manufacturing sector was losing jobs before and after the
recovery of the economy, suggesting that this sector was structurally declining. At
the same time, the financial services sector has been growing through the recession
period, suggesting that this sector has been structurally growing (Fig. 5-5).
By comparing the pattern of employment in the manufacturing industry during
the different recessions, the job-less recovery presages that the jobs lost in this sector
might be caused by structural changed such as productivity gains, offshoring or per-
manent decline of some manufacturing industries, and not only a temporary decline
in the demand due to the economic recession. Contrary to the previous recessions,
jobs in manufacturing sectors might have been lost permanently during the period
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Figure 5-5: US Employment Dynamic during the 2001 Recession by Industry
from 2001 to 2006 (Fig. 5-6).
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Figure 5-6: US Manufacturing Employment Dynamic during Recession Periods
Section 5.3, develops a model to assess the weight of the different factors that
have been influencing employment in the U.S. manufacturing sector between 1997
and 2005. The factors can be temporary, such as the decline of domestic demand due
to recession, or structural such as increase of productivity or change in trade balance
due to offshoring and foreign competition.
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5.2 U.S. Manufacturing Imports
After the adoption of NAFTA, many U.S. politicians and labor unions pointed out
the risk of job losses in the US economy due to massive imports from Mexico. Ten
years later, for a lot of observers, NAFTA has mostly benefited the U.S. and Canada
by opening large new markets for exports and by leveraging opportunities to access
a nearby low cost pool of workers. [114]
The recent explosion of imports from Asian countries and the adhesion of China to the
WTO in December 2001 have revived the debate. Two trends have been particularly
concerning: along with the increase of the volume of imports, the origin of the goods
imported has shifted increasingly to low cost countries (See Table C-1 in Appendix
C). In fifteen years, from 1990 to 2005, imports of goods has increased threefold,
reaching $1,674B in 2005. During the same period, the US trade deficit in goods
has increased sevenfold, reaching $781M in 2005. Simultaneously with this trend,
goods have been imported more from low cost countries: while imports from low
cost countries represented 6.7 percent of total imports in 1990, imports from LCCs
represented 23 percent of goods imported in the U.S. in 2005 (Fig. 5-7).
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Figure 5-7: Origin of U.S. Manufacturing Imports
Looking at the average GDP per capita of the exporting countries relative to the
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U.S. level helps to identify countries corresponding to the LCCs or high cost coun-
tries.
As show by the figure 5-8 below, the demography of the countries exporting man-
ufacturing goods to the U.S. has been fairly stable between 1989 and 2004 except
for countries with a very high relative GDP per capita (>1.4*U.S. GDP per capita)
and LCCs, which represent countries with an average GDP per capita less than 5
percent of the U.S. average GDP per capita. It appears that the U.S. are importing
11 percent of their goods in 2004 from countries with an average GDP per capita 1.4
fold higher than the U.S. level, compared to 24 percent in 1989. At the same time,
imports from countries with an average GDP per capita inferior than 5 percent of
U.S. GPD per capita have reached 44 percent in 2004 compare to 24 percent in 1989.
This phenomenon has occurred in all the manufacturing sectors at different degree
(Appendix C-3). This trend can be illustrated by plotting cumulative curve of imports
shown below. On the abscissa-axis, imports are ranked then aggregated according to
average GDP per capita of the exporting country. The ordinate-axis represents the
average GDP per capita for a given exporting country relatively to the average U.S.
GDP per capita. The graph presents the curves for 1989 and 2004 using constant 1995
U.S.$ and normalized imports volume, making graphical comparison more accurate
(Fig. 5-9 - See Table C-2 in Appendix C). S' represents the share of imports coming
from countries with a GDP per capita 1.4 times higher than U.S. GDP per capita
for year i. Si represents the share of imports coming from countries with a GDP
per capita 0.8 times higher but 1.4 times lower than U.S. GDP per capita for year i.
S3 represents the share of imports coming from countries with a GDP per capita 0.2
times higher but 0.8 times lower than U.S. GDP per capita for year i. Si represents
the share of imports coming from countries with a GDP per capita 0.2 times lower
than U.S. GDP per capita for year i.
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Figure 5-8: Profile of Imports Partners
The comparison of the 1989 and 2004 curves shows clearly two trends. First, US
GDP per capita has been growing faster than some of its traditional trade partners'
one. Second, imports increasingly come from countries with very low GDP per capita.
The second trends can be explained by two distinctive reasons: the low cost countries
are exporting goods that used to be exported to the U.S. from countries with a higher
level of development and the low cost countries are now exporting goods than used to
be produced in the U.S. Both these trends happened simultaneously since the volume
of export and the share of goods coming from LCCs have both grown faster than
the U.S. economy and the exports from other countries. By looking at the countries
of origin of U.S. Manufacturing imports in details, one can see that China is mainly
responsible of this new situation. Whereas imports from other low cost countries
have risen form 3.1 percent to 5.2 percent of the total US manufacturing imports,
imports from China have exploded from 2.7 percent to 15.8 percent of the total US
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manufacturing imports (Fig. 5-9). Chapter 6 will examine the new role played by
China in the international economic scene.
US Manufacturing Imports
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Source: The Office of Trade and Industry Information (OTII), Manufacturing and Services, International Trade
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce
Figure 5-9: U.S. Manufacturing Imports Share from China and Other Low Cost
Countries
Imports from China have increasing in all sectors in volume and share except
for food manufacturing, wood products and petroleum and coal products. Increases
have been particularly important in the apparel and textiles industries and in the
nonmetallic mineral industry, primary metal, machinery and computer and electronic
product sectors. More globally, whereas imports from LCCs accounting for more than
20 percent of total US imports only in the apparel and textile product mills industries
in 1989, in 2004 imports from LCCs represented more than 20 percent of total U.S.
imports in the textile mills (23 percent), textile product mills (62 percent), apparel
(57 percent), leather and allied products (69 percent), printing and related support
activities (29 percent), plastic and rubber products (23 percent), nonmetallic mineral
products (25 percent), fabricated metal products (23 percent), computer and elec-
tronic products (28 percent), furniture (52 percent) and miscellaneous manufacturing
(44 percent) sectors (Fig. 5-10).
To capture this trend with one indicator, the average GDP per capita of importing
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Figure 5-10: U.S. Manufacturing Imports Share from China and Other Low Cost
Countries by Industry
partners is computed for each manufacturing industry (Table C-3 in Appendix C).
This number represents the GDP per capita of a virtual country which will be the
unique exporter for a given industry to the U.S. and is given by the sum of the GDP
per capita of each exported weighted by the respective share of exports with U.S. For
instance, the average GDP per capita of exporting countries for the apparel sector
was $7,677 in 1989 compare to $5,479 in 2004. On the other hand, for Chemicals,
it was $23,071 in 1989 and $26,080 in 2004. For the U.S. manufacturing sector as
a whole, the average GDP per capita of exporting countries passed from $20,282 in
1989 to $17,546 in 2004, which correspond respectively to 78 percent of the U.S. GDP
per capita in 1989 and only 54 percent in 2004.
Thus, two strong trends are identified: first, the explosion of imports as compared
to the growth of the U.S. domestic use in all U.S. manufacturing sectors; second, the
change in the mix of countries exporting to the U.S. It has been argued by economists
that both trends account for recent job losses in the U.S manufacturing sector. How-
ever, the correlation between the change in the average GDP per capita of exporting
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countries, and the employment losses in the different U.S. manufacturing industries
is fairly low (R2=0.27 - Fig. C-2 in Appendix C). This result implies that the origin
of goods imported to the US is not directly correlated with the change in U.S. em-
ployment. Moreover, it signifies that low cost countries and more developed countries
are, in fact, producing and exporting surprisingly similar sets of products. Countries
are not only competing with other countries in the same stage of development but
with mismatched countries as well. On the other hand, the volume of imports is rela-
tively highly correlated to job losses in production employment in US manufacturing
industries (R2 =0,56, Fig. 5-11). According to this data, as the ratio of imports to
domestic use increased, employment of production workers decreased. This relation-
ship sustains the hypothesis that offshoring and trade will impact US manufacturing
employment. This is strengthened by the fact that the strong correlation with em-
ployment workers (Fig. 5-11) is strong, while the correlation with total employment
(including production workers as well as other occupations) is weak (R 2 =0,20 - Fig.
C-3 in Appendix C). This result confirms that import levels affect production ac-
tivities but not other activities, thus demonstrating that production activities are
offshored, while headquarters, R&D, marketing or human resource activities remain
domestic.
While offshoring and imports play an important role in job losses in manufac-
turing, other factors are also present. First, the domestic consumption, defined as
domestic use, will directly influence the demand for manufacturing goods. There-
fore, the level of imports and the level of domestic production output, effect domestic
employment. A second factor contributing to manufacturing job loss is the decrease
in exports due to U.S. manufacturer competitiveness and the economic situation
overseas. Weak exports will result in job losses or decreased job creation. Finally,
productivity, which has been one of the main causes of wealth creation during the last
century, has also resulted in employment decline and employment redistribution in
the U.S. manufacturing sector. The combination of these factors along with offshoring
and imports, explain the job decline in the U.S. manufacturing sector. A model is
developed in the next section to evaluate the influence of each factor on employment,
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Figure 5-11: U.S. Manufacturing Industries Employment and Imports Changes
during the period of 1997 to 2004.
5.3 Model
U.S. manufacturing has been declining in its employment share of the U.S. economy
since the end of the Second World War. Since 1979, it has also declined in absolute
number of jobs. Simultaneously, U.S. domestic consumption of both manufacturing
goods and imports has matched or outpaced the growth of the GDP. This demon-
strates a paradox: a growing demand with shrinking numbers of workers to supply
manufacturing goods. It has been widely explained by a continual rise in produc-
tivity over time. Demand for manufacturing goods has not grown rapidly enough to
offset the increase in the productivity of this sector. This has resulted in a decline in
the relative demand for manufacturing and a relative decline of manufacturing goods
prices. This trend is common of developed economies, and even of some developing
economies, and it is widely identified and accepted by economists. However, this ex-
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planation does not address all the issues at play. The significant role of international
trade in the manufacturing employment profile must also be included. Since the
end of nineteenth century, the United States has imported raw materials and specific
products that it either could not produce domestically, or could produce, but at a
higher cost. With this in consideration, it follows that changes in technology, wages
or political regimes, causing a change in a trade partner's economy could potentially
lead to the creation of a new competitor in an industry. Such changes will affect em-
ployment in the U.S. in a short-run, but according to trade theory, displaced workers
will ultimately find a new job in a growing sector or a new industry.
Nevertheless, the recent reduction in U.S. manufacturing employment brings into
question the ability of the U.S. economy to re-employ workers that have been dis-
placed by trade shifts. It appears that now, U.S. workers have to compete against
a growing pool of low-wage workers in an increasing range of products, activities,
and industries. Further, recent job losses have resulted from the confluence of several
factors and not only the increase in imports. Since 1997, U.S. exports stagnated in
the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, while U.S. imports increased rapidly as
the economy boomed. Until 2001, the spurt of domestic demand could absorb the
increase in imports. However, the decline in exports and increase in productivity
combined to cause a slowdown of manufacturing employment. After 2001, domes-
tic demand dropped, exports remained weak, and imports, after slowing down for 2
years, began to rise once again, resulting in a precipitous trend towards job decline
across all manufacturing sectors (Table 5.2).
Baily and Lawrence recently estimated the number of the job dislocations that
trade and electronic offshoring caused between 2000 and 2003. The results show that
the weakness in U.S. payroll employment since 2000 was not the result of either a
flood of import goods, or a flood of services. [32] Rather, it can be attributed to an
inadequate growth in domestic demand in the presence of strong productivity growth
and along with weaker exports (mainly due to the high U.S. dollar). Following the
framework developed by Baily and Lawrence, the relative impact of trade, productiv-
ity gains, and domestic demand in U.S. manufacturing on employment shifts between
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Table 5.2: U.S. Manufacturing Industries
Name NAICS Code Percent Change Percent Change Percent Change Percent Change Percent Change
Employment VA Imports Exports Domestic Use
Food and beverage 311, 312 -0.248 0.712 1.710 0.650 0.880
and tobacco products
Textile mills and 313, 314 -0.531 0.060 2.165 2.413 0.271
textile product mills
Apparel and leather 315, 316 -0.761 -0.287 1.682 1.329 0.814
and allied products
Wood products 321 -0.205 0.856 3.015 0.232 1.486
Paper products 322 -0.418 0.143 0.766 0.930 0.162
Printing and related 323 -0.428 0.294 1.803 0.985 0.321
support activities
Petroleum and 324 -0.262 0.377 2.305 1.983 0.872
coal products
Chemical products 325 -0.494 0.938 4.141 1.855 1.354
Plastics and rubber 326 -0.238 0.850 2.380 2.900 0.884
products
Nonmetallic mineral 327 -0.280 1.012 1.831 1.582 1.129
products
Primary metals 331 -0.485 0.226 1.274 1.012 0.535
Fabricated metal products 332 -0.318 0.555 2.145 1.783 0.662
Machinery 333 -0.488 0.256 1.610 1.306 0.349
Computer and electronic 334 -0.685 0.405 2.569 1.724 1.093
products
Electrical equip., appl., 335 -0.531 0.246 2.768 1.795 0.678
and components
Motor vehicles, bodies 336 -0.447 0.900 1.614 1.489 1.228
and trailers, and parts
Furniture and 337 -0.287 0.624 4.553 2.414 1.266
related products
Miscellaneous 339 -0.368 1.348 2.233 3.139 1.463
manufacturing
Manufacturing 31-33 -0.195 0.554 2.067 1.561 1.463
Note: Domestic use is defined as Value added plus imports minus exports
Source: BLS / the Office of Trade and Industry Information (OTII) U.S. Department of Commerce
1997 and 2003 can be estimated. [32]
To first approximation, the percent change in employment in each industry (es) cor-
responds to the percent change in domestic production output in this industry (qi),
minus the percent change in productivity over the period (vi):
ei = qi - vi Equation (1)
Thus, if productivity was similar in 2003 to the level in 1997, an increase in output of 2
percent would be translated mechanically to an increase in employment by 2 percent.
On the other hand, if total volume of output increases by 2 percent, but productivity
of workers increases by 2 percent, the number of jobs in the industry would not
change. For each industry i, the domestic production in industry corresponds to the
value added by the domestic use plus the value added due to exports minus the value
added due to imports (Fig. 5-12).
Domestic employment (E in Fig. 5-12) corresponds to the work force required to
produce the domestic output. Domestic production (Qi) and imports (Mi) equalize
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Figure 5-12: Correspondence Between Domestic Employment, Domestic Use, Exports
and Imports
the demand side corresponding to domestic use (Di) and exports (Xi). For each
industry.
Qj = Di + Xi - Mi Equation (2)
Finally, change in domestic employment will be affected by change in domestic pro-
duction. For instance, if imports increase while demand remains constant, domestic
production is expected to shrink (see examples in Fig. C-4 in Appendix C). Thus
change in domestic employment is equal to the weighted sum of change in domestic
use (wddi), change in exports (wxxi) minus change in imports (wmmi):
qz = Wddj + wxxi - wmmi Equation (3)
with Wd = Do/QO;wx = Xo/Qo;wm = MOIQO
Rewriting Equation (1) using the expression shown in Equation (3), it appears that
the percent change of employment for each industry is a function of the percent change
of productivity, the percent change of value added due to domestic use, the percent
change of value added due to imports and exports expressed by:
ei = wddj + wxxi - wmmi - vi Equation (5)
Effects due to trade are estimated by using the summary 1997 input-output tables,
the most recent that are available at a sufficient disaggregated level, and not by using
directly imports and exports data since a particular industry might embody imports,
as intermediate inputs, from another industry. For example, when an automobile is
exported from the U.S., it will include inputs such as steel, electronics. Thus, im-
ports of automobile might have an impact on the employment in the auto-industry
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but also on other industry which might have supplied the production of automobiles
domestically.
The calculation is carried out at the NAICS 3-digit aggregation level. After aggre-
gation at the sector level, the dynamics of employment in the U.S. manufacturing
industry between 1997 and 2003 is shown in Figure 5-13. Between 1997 and 2003,
the growth in domestic demand generated about 0.7 Million jobs. During the same
period, growth of imports displaced 1.4 Million jobs, while declining exports elimi-
nated 0.5 Million jobs. Finally, increase of productivity had eliminated 1.8 Million
jobs (Fig. 5-13 and Table 5.3).
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Figure 5-13: U.S. Manufacturing Employment Dynamic 1997-2003
Around 195,000 jobs were lost annually between 1997 and 2003 because of increase
of imports, which correspond to 1.3 percent of the 15 Millions jobs lost every year by
the U.S. economy (balanced by an equally sized creation of new jobs). In addition, this
method might overestimate the impact of increase of imports on U.S. manufacturing
employment. For instance, imports will be used to supply high domestic demand
when the economy is at full employment - as it was in 2000. Moreover, increase
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Table 5.3: Summary of the Results
Jobs Percent of 1997 Employment
Employment in 1997 17,402,000 1
Impact Domestic Use 693,495 0.04
Impact Imports -1,361,343 -0.08
Impact Exports -474,017 -0.03
Impact Productivity -1,810,135 -0.10
Employment 2003 14,450,000 0,83
Source: BLS / OTH
of imports in sectors which are already largely relying on imports, like apparel or
furniture sectors, will not directly destroy existing jobs in U.S. but will replace jobs
that could have been created in resulted to a higher domestic demand and constant
level of imports. Offshoring of operations will count for only a fraction of imports
and finally only for the fraction of jobs displaced. As seen, productivity has played
the first role to reduce employment in U.S. manufacturing. Moreover, in absence
of offshoring and increasing imports, productivity would have reduced jobs which
would not have been displaced. In the next parts, several case studies are developed
to understand how companies decide to use offshore production location to leverage
advantages over there.
5.4 Case Studies
5.4.1 The Case of the U.S. Apparel Industry
The Industry The characteristics of the apparel industry, low capital requirements
and labor intensity, make this industry a good candidate for offshoring. The apparel
industry is one of the four segments involved in the production of garments. At
the top of the supply chain, there are the fiber producers. The second segment is
the textile industry, which manufactures raw fiber into textiles. Then the apparel
manufacturers cut and sew the textiles into clothes. At the end of the supply chain,
the retailers distribute the apparel to customers. Traditional garment manufacturers
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are engaged in all the steps of production: product design, raw material sourcing,
the production of garments, and distribution of finished goods. The companies often
offshore the sewing, the more labor-intensive part of the process, or the whole of the
manufacturing processes. They can use their own facilities or subcontractors' capac-
ity overseas.
Productivity gains in the apparel industry have been limited since automation is par-
ticularly difficult to implement. The variety of fabrics, complexity of the assembly
process, and short life cycle of products, requiring adaptation of manufacturing pro-
cesses and tools, have prevented the apparel industry from automating. Therefore,
between 1989 and 1993, the apparel industry spent only $924 per worker for invest-
ment in new plants and equipment; during the same period, the textile industry spent
$4,269. [96]
Wage Differential The low wages in LCCs are the main incentive for companies
to offshore their production: the labor force is extremely inexpensive and accus-
tomed to being involved in these activities. In traditional manufacturing countries,
hourly wages are between $0.25 in Indonesia and $2 in Mexico (See Fig. C-5 in Ap-
pendix C), compared to $9.10 in the U.S. (See Table C-4 Appendix C). Moreover
the wages in most LCCs have been stable for the last ten years. The capital in-
vestment requirements are low and numerous subcontractors are already set up in
these countries. The companies who use subcontractors overseas are often criticized
for the bad working conditions. Companies are concerned about the bad publicity
that can be triggered by scandals from offshoring and consequently are taking actions
and conducting audits to monitor working conditions overseas and lower the negative
impacts of controversies so as to protect, for a long-term, this vertical integration and
business model. [74] Inspections are realized in plant owned by the companies but
also at suppliers' facilities.
Trade Agreements Until recently, the textile and clothing industries were the
only major manufacturing sectors not regulated by the General Agreement on Tariffs
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and Trade (GATT). A succession of trade agreements set up a widespread system
of quotas between exporting countries and the main importers. In 1962, the Long-
Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles and Substitutes
(LTA) was created.
In 1974, the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA), sometimes referred to as the Multifiber
Agreement, was accepted by the United States, Canada, and Europe. It extended
the LTA to materials other than cotton. It set quotas for the amount of textiles
and apparel that other countries could export to these countries, so as to minimize
market disruptions in developed countries, while permitting some growth in textiles
and apparel exports from developing countries. The MFA was seen as a protectionist
measure intended to prevent the loss of textile and garment industry jobs in the U.S.,
Canada, and the EU to LCCs. At the end of 1994, MFA was supposed to terminate
but was finally extended for 10 more years, as allowed by the GATT. At that time,
the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) was introduced to secure the removal
of MFA restrictions and quotas allocated unilaterally by Canada, Norway, the United
States and the EU. In 2005, the MFA expired, as anticipated in the Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing (ATC), and the quotas of the MFA were eliminated and tariffs
significantly reduced.
In addition, trade is also highly distorted by regional trade agreements. For instance,
Chapter 98 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the U.S. (formerly item 807) allows
goods assembled offshore to be re-imported with a tariff charged only on the value
added by foreign labor. This agreement allows manufacturers to lower production
costs by avoiding most tariff taxes, while still taking advantage of foreign low-wage
production: fabric is cut in the United States, but assembled abroad. The Caribbean
Basin Initiative (CBI) allows apparel assembled abroad from fabric produced domes-
tically to re-enter the United States with a partial duty exemption. In 2004, NAFTA
was fully phased in, eliminating barriers to trade between the U.S., Mexico, and
Canada. Under the NAFTA agreement, there are no duties for apparel cut in the
U.S. and assembled in Mexico.
All these arrangements are influencing the U.S. work force. The end of MFA quotas
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is considered by U.S. manufacturers as to be a major threat to the national produc-
tion and protectionism might be needed in the short term to assist the adaptation of
the industry. [9] For instance, in China's protocol of accession to the WTO, a clause
allows trading partners to impose temporary quotas on China until the end of 2008.
In May 2005, the United States imposed quotas on seven products.
Evolution of Imports and Employment in the Textile and Apparel Indus-
tries According to the US International Commission, half of the total productive
capacity in the apparel industry has shifted from developed countries to LCCs over
the last three decades. [44] Since 1993, the increase of domestic demand has been
totally balanced by imports. Between 1993 and 2004, imports more than doubled,
and since 1993, the value added by the U.S. apparel industry has declined (Fig. 5-14).
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Figure 5-14: Supply and Demand Origin in Apparel and Leather and Allied Products
Industries in the US
Consequently, the portion of domestic consumption supplied by imports has risen
from 61 percent in 1989 to 90 percent in 2004 (Fig. 5-15). Over this period, employ-
ment has fallen from 1,077,000 jobs in 1989 to 313,000 jobs in 2004. Jobs have been
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lost mainly because of the explosion of imports replacing domestic production after
1993.
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Figure 5-15: U.S. Employment in Apparel and Leather and Allied Products Industries
On the other hand, value added in the textile industry rose until 2001, along
with the increase of imports, to supply the increasing domestic consumption and
exports. During the 2001 recession, domestic production shrank and never recovered.
Simultaneously, imports remained constant during this period and, after 2003, started
increasing again to supply the strong demand (Fig. 5-16).
Until 2000, employment declined because of productivity gains, since the value
added domestically remained constant. During the 2001 recession, employment shrank
rapidly while imports exploded and domestic production declined. Between 2000 and
2004, the textile industry lost one-third of its jobs, declining from 613,000 jobs in
2000 to 402,000 jobs in 2004 (Fig. 5-17).
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Figure 5-16: Supply and Demand Origin in Textile Mills and Textile Mill Products
Industries in the U.S.
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Figure 5-17: Employment in Textile Mills and Textile Mill Products
Macro-economic figures thus show that in both the apparel and the textile in-
dustries, imports have played the main role in the recent decline in employment.
According to this picture, employment in the U.S. will be declining in tandem with
the increase of imports.
The following two companies' cases will present the trade-off between location deci-
sion and employment.
Case 1: Gildan Activewear Inc. Gildan is a Canadian apparel company with
products for sale in the Canadian, U.S., and European sportswear markets. The
apparel manufacturing sector is the fourth-largest industry in Canada with U.S.$ 10
billion in sales per year.
Gildan's supply chain is designed to take advantage of location particularities. The
highly automated textile plants owned by the company are in Canada, since tex-
tile plants use lots of energy, and Canadian's hydroelectricity is relatively inexpen-
sive. Cotton is imported from the U.S. since it is generally subsidized and conse-
quently cheaper. Then fabrics are cut and sewed in the Caribbean, Honduras, or
Mexico, where the labor force is inexpensive (Honduran wages are one-fifth of Cana-
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dian wages). Trade agreements, such as NAFTA, allow the company to re-import
the finished product into Canada or to export it to the U.S. without having to pay
taxes. Out of a total of 9,000 employees, 5,500 are Honduran and only 1,300 work in
Canada. [4]
Case 2: American Apparel American Apparel is a US apparel manufacturer with
around 2,000 workers. The company does not use any subcontractors overseas for its
manufacturing operations and has its own plant in Los Angeles. This organization
gives the company a shorter supply chain that allows for immediate response to
trends as well as changes in demand. For instance, the company has the ability
to cut off an item that is stagnating on the shelves. According to Dov Charney,
founder of American Apparel, the proximity to the market enables the company to
react more quickly. Marty Bailey, VP for operations, defines the factors of success
for manufacturing and selling T-shirts in the U.S. as being quality, market focus, and
ability to turn product quickly. The flexibility of the operation allows the company
to turn a sketch into an actual garment for sale in stores within five days, versus 90
days for operations relying on offshored production.
The supply chain is easily managed because all the operations are located on the
same sites. The proximity of the production facility makes possible small-quantity
manufacturing which can be easily and quickly executed. The company can use more
market tests to determine which items will be top-sellers. This competitive advantage
offsets the labor wages differential according Dov. Charney. The onshore production
allows the company to keep lower inventory and so reduce inventory obsolescence
risks, a common source of losses in this industry. [76] The proximity of operations
allows the company to manage the production more efficiently and the demand can
be integrated quickly into the production plan and to manage a broad range of SKUs.
The company carries now 10,000 SKUs. The workers offer also flexibility on volume
capacity: within months, the factory went from 30,000 garments a day to 90,000.
The company is profitable and does not plan to move production overseas to serve
the U.S. market. [62]
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Evolution of the Industry The end of quotas is perceived as a threat for the U.S.
apparel industry. It is certain that some jobs in U.S. will move to LCCs in the future.
According to a Bureau of Labor Statistics study, the apparel sector is expected to
lose more than 200,000 jobs between 2002 and 2012. [35] Companies as Levis Strauss
Inc, which closed its last U.S. manufacturing sites in 2004 and is moving its Spanish
plant to Poland and Turkey in 2005, will remain the most widespread business model
in this industry.
Nevertheless, the example of American Apparel shows us that the U.S. apparel in-
dustry could keep activities onshore by offering flexibility and quick response. For
instance, the U.S. apparel industry has maintained low import penetration rate for
some garments, such as dresses. Because dresses are high fashion items, the market
is best served by producers who can respond rapidly to changes in demand.
U.S. apparel manufacturers can make domestic production competitive if they build
their competitive advantage on proximity to market. Introducing new products
weekly, designing smaller batches of products and offering a broader variety of design
is possible if manufacturing capacity is located close to the demand. Such a strat-
egy would allow the company to keep less inventory for each SKU and then to carry
more SKUs while keeping a reasonable total inventory. The fast introduction of new
designs, keeping up with current fashion trends, makes products more attractive.
Savings on logistics costs and, higher attractiveness of products make a domestic
production model competitive with the vertically integrated model that uses offshore
producers. Each model has advantages and will be used according to the needs of
the companies. Using manufacturing capacity gives production cost advantages while
being in the U.S. gives the opportunity to the company to follow closely the new
trends and changes in demand. Gildan is going to invest in a new knitting, bleaching
and cutting facility in the Dominican Republic. At the same time, American Apparel
will still compete on the American market with onshore production. The company
is considering investing overseas to conquer new markets and then, reproducing the
same onshore model there.
The following section presents the case of a French semiconductor firm. This exam-
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ple will illustrate the trade off between production costs, productivity differential and
location of demand. In this example the company is moving part of its operations in
Asia to be located closer to a growing share of its customers, balancing lower worker
productivity by lower wages and quicker response to changes in demand.
5.4.2 The Case of a European Semi-Conductor Firm: STMi-
crolectronics
The Industry The semi-conductor industry requires large capital investments to
manufacture short life cycle products. Capital is used to buy expensive high-tech
machines used in the manufacturing processes. This industry requires, also, a highly
skilled labor force. The semiconductor sector is dominated by American companies,
such as Intel, TI, Motorola, and by Asian companies, such as NEC, Toshiba, Hitachi
and Samsung Semiconductor (Fig. 5-18). STMicroelectronics is one of the only Eu-
ropean semi-conductor manufacturers. On the demand side, the usual markets for
1980 $0 Sales 1990 $B Sales 2002 $8 Sales
1 TI 1.581 1 NEC 4.322 1 Intel 23.99
2 Motorola 1.111 2 Toshiba 4.202 2 Samsung 8.73
3 Philips 935 3 Motorola 3.539 3 TI 6.50
4 NEC 787 4 Hitachi 3.516 4 STMicroelectronics 6.35
5 National 747 5 Intel 3.171 5 Toshiba 5.88
6 Toshiba 629 6 Fujitsu 2.599 6 NEC 5.53
7 Hitachi 622 7 TI 2.574 7 Infineon Technologies 5.36
8 Intel 575 8 Mitsubishi 2.108 8 Hitachi 4.90
9 Fairchild 566 9 Philips 1.955 9 Motorola 4.76
10 Siemens 413 10 Matsushita 1.826 10 TSMC 4.66
Note: WSTS: World Semi-Conductor Trade Statistics
Source: ICInsights, 2003
Figure 5-18: Principal Semi-Conducteur Manufacturers
semiconductor products are composed by audio and video equipment and computer
equipments. These industries are largely concentrated in Asia. The audio and video
equipment industry has been traditionally located in Asia since the manufacturing
processes in this industry were very labor intensive in the past. Similarly, the com-
puter equipment industry is concentrating its operations in Asia taking advantage of
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an inexpensive skilled labor force, the proximity of suppliers and new consumers, and
a strong governmental support of high tech investments.
A New Strategy In 2004, STMicroelectronics launched a new plan, to reduce its
production costs. At least half of its European and U.S. 6-inch wafer manufacturing
capacity will either be upgraded to the 8-inch technology or moved to the company's
6-inch wafer plant in Singapore. The semiconductor industry has experienced rapid
change, as a result of cost reduction required by pricing pressure. For a 6-inch wafer
plant, the production cost is distributed as follows: 20 percent for the paying off for
machines, 40 percent for the labor force (workers, technicians and production engi-
neers) and 40 percent for the raw materials and operating costs. In Singapore, wages
for low skilled workers are 5 to 7 times lower than European wages, and wages for
engineers are 3 to 5 times lower. Moving operation to Asia divides the labor cost
by 4 and so reduces the total production cost by 30 percent, making production of
product using old processes still profitable for the company.
Companies which are using offshoring as a way to reduce production costs can also
try to increase productivity to achieve their goal. For instance, the 6-inch wafer
technology can to be replaced by new-generation 8- and 12-inch wafer technology.
Each technician then operates a machine which produces a wafer which is two times
larger, reducing the production cost per chip. STMicroelectronics has invested $200
million/year during the last three years to enlarge its 8-inch plant in France. The com-
pany is also investing in q new 12-inch plant for RD and advanced products located
in Europe as well as in a 12-inch new plant in Italy and France (these investments
are valued to $3 Billion).
STMicroelectronics is not the only semi-conductor firm using a combination of off-
shoring and new technologies and productivity gains onshore to define the most co-
herent strategy to lower production costs. A recent article in The New York Times
reports that Intel has constructed four factories in the United States over the last
fives years. Eight-inch production has been upgraded to 12-inch silicon wafers, and
the size of the transistor has been reduced to a mere 90 nanometers. Using the same
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work force, production on larger wafers is 2.5 times more efficient. "We do not stay
in America to optimize employment; we stay to improve productivity" Mr. Mulloy,
an Intel spokesman, said. [119]
Moreover, STMicroelectronics' main customers are in the process of shifting their own
production to Asia. In order to reduce delivery time and to insure fast delivery to its
customers, STMicroelectronics is moving some of its production capacity in Asia.
The Location Decision The relocation to Asia allows STMicroelectronics to lower
its production costs also to be close to its customers. Its Asian customers will not
only sell these products for the emerging Asian markets but will also subsequently
re-import products embedded with STMicroelectronics' chips to Europe.
Asian countries are experiencing high growth rates (Table 5.4), and selling on these
markets is crucial for most of the global high tech companies. Local production will
help them to penetrate these markets and simplify the supply chain by bringing them
closer to their customers and suppliers. Moreover, in market like China, manufactur-
ing locally is highly encouraged by government to have access to the home market.
Companies are moving production capacity closer to the demand, to manage their
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inventory more closely by reacting more quickly to the changes in the demand. The
industry is expecting more relocation to Asia to shorten supply chain and to leverage
wages differential. For instance, Intel Corp. is generating 70 percent of its revenue
from outside the United States, though 60 percent of its employees still work in the
States. Intel Corp. is planning to relocate a part of its production overseas and those
percentages will shift. [93]
5.5 Productivity and Offshoring
Thus, there is no significant difference between jobs lost because of new technologies
or work processes and those lost because of trade: all of those job losses are a painful
but necessary part of a larger process of innovation and productivity increases that
is a source of new wealth and rising living standards. [41] Actually, one can argue
that offshoring is better since it raises the living standards overseas, creating new
customers for U.S. companies' products. The Washington post illustrated the impact
of productivity on U.S. manufacturing sector: "In one striking example of the impact
of rising productivity on the workforce, a quarter of a century ago it took General
Motors 454,000 workers to build 5 million cars and trucks. Today it takes 118,000
workers to make the same number of vehicles." [7] Michael Arndt and Adam Aston
noted in BusinessWeek in 2004 that since 1997, the productivity of U.S. factories
has increased at a 4.6 percent annual average rate, but high tech and automobile
sectors accounted for pretty much the entire increase in U.S. manufacturing output
since the middle of the 1990s. [31] For instance, whereas 1997 total manufacturing
output is up by 19 percent, according to the Federal Reserve, by taking out automo-
tive and high-tech sectors, output in the rest of manufacturing has only grown by less
than 1 percent over the past seven years. When an industry has a low productivity
growth rate, it signals that this industry is maturing. Consequently, prices decrease,
innovation becomes less fertile and processes are standardized and well-know by the
U.S. competitors, as well as competitors abroad. With lower expected profits, man-
ufacturers cannot justify the investment for new equipment. At this point, Chinese
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Table 5.5: Productivity Gain and job Losses
Industry Growth in Output Employment Change,
per employee, Annual Avg, 1997-2003 - percent
1997-2003 - percent
Fabricated Metal Products 1.3 -31,8
Furniture 1.3 -28,7
Printing 1.3 -42,8
Food manufacturing 1.4 -24,8
Electrical Equipment 1.9 -53,1
Paper 1.9 -41,8
Primary Metals 2.1 -48,5
Manufacturing Sector 4,6 -19,5
Source: BLS / Federal Reserve / BusinessWeek
manufacturers can buy the same machines to produce similar quality products at
a lower cost than American manufacturers. Therefore, industries with low produc-
tivity gain might encounter more severely decrease of employment due to imports
competition than other industries (Table 5.5).
As shown by the semiconductor case study, U.S. firms can keep their production
capacity in the U.S. as long as productivity allows them to reduce the production
costs and to keep attractive benefits while competition increases. When gains in
productivity are insignificant, companies often see offshoring as the way to reduce
even more their production costs. In both dynamics, domestic employment shrinks.
The following section will show how U.S. companies can change the rule of the game
to make production in the U.S. financially attractive.
5.6 Framework If Location Decision
After presenting first the existing frameworks developed by consultancies to ratio-
nalize the location decision process, the following section builds a new framework to
identify the conditions to make manufacturing activities onshore competitive.
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5.6.1 Existing Frameworks
In a recent paper, Diana Farrell, Director of the McKinsey Global Institute, McKin-
sey and Company's think tank, structured and summarized the findings of a global
research effort in this consultancy firm. [30]
Using the analysis of four different industries, the study determines the factors which
influence the decision for a company or an industry to offshore its activity (Table
5-19). These factors are subdivided into three groups: production factors, regulation,
and organizational factors. By assessing the level for the different factors, a particular
industry or company would be able to evaluate the pertinence of using an offshoring
strategy.
The first industry described is the consumer electronics industry. This industry is
under pressure to cut prices and to introduce new products quickly. U.S. manufac-
turer are focused on marketing, selling and distributing the products rather than on
designing, sourcing and manufacturing the machines. Manufacturing components or
machines abroad appears coherent due to the actual labor intensity of this industry,
the standardization of the products, and the few trade barriers.
On the other side of the spectrum, the study presents the steel industry. This indus-
try is capital intensive, with a low share of labor costs, high tariffs and a relative high
shipping cost. It is unlikely to expect the steel industry to replace domestic produc-
tion with imports in the short term unless one these constraints changes dramatically.
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Figure 5-19: Factors Influencing the Offshoring Decision
The Boston Consulting Group, has also developed a framework to present the
key criteria to determine the products to manufacture in LCCs and the products to
produce domestically. The firm has identified seven relevant dimensions: labor con-
tent, growth of demand in home market, size of LCCs market, degree of development
of LCC supplier base, degree of standardization, intellectual property content, and
logistics requirement (Fig. 5-20). For instance, a product with high labor content,
high growth of demand in home market, high demand in the proposed manufacturing
LCC, high degree of development of the LCC supplier base, low sensible intellectual
content and low logistics constraints is the perfect candidate for offshore production
in LCCs.
Technology and innovation are traditionally seen as the key to create sustainable
employment in the manufacturing sector in the business literature. "America has
survived import waves before, from Japan, South Korea, and Mexico. The assumption
has long been that the U.S. and other industrialized nations will keep leading in
knowledge-intensive industries while developing nations focus on lower-skill sectors"
wrote Pete Engardio in Business Week in 2004. [47] With the rapid technological
catch up of China, it is hard to believe that U.S. will be able to build its competitive
advantage only on this dimension. "What is stunning about China is that for the first
129
Dicas m de at m n
"Mmoar1 t
Sew a2ts1cthm d
OKid$ dtr i how o
kide rlh smAtt bvp
- opJfmWW3ft
Source:BCG Analysis
Figure 5-20: Key Criteria to Determine the Products to Offshore to LCCs
Table 5.6: Production Cost Differential between the U.S. and China
Industry Price Gap US-China - Percent Data
Machine Mold Up to 50 XCel Mold
Networking Equipment Up to 30 3Com
Bedroom furniture 40 Universal Furniture
LCD TV 30 SVA America
Crepe Paper 45 Seaman Paper
time we have a huge, poor country that can compete both with very low wages and
in high tech," says Harvard University economist Richard B. Freeman. As seen in
Chapter 3, it is hard to believe that the U.S. would remain the knowledge economy and
China the subcontracted manufacturers. Considering the production cost differential
(Table 5.6), and the rapid convergence of LCCs and U.S. manufacturing capabilities
as well as knowledge, American companies have to find new dimensions that will
allow them to create sustainable domestic employment in the future.
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5.6.2 New Framework
The offshoring decision is a three steps process. In the first step, the company defines
its specific functions and its specific products to outsource or to perform in-house.
During the second step, the company identifies the appropriate locations to setup the
different phases of the operations. Finally, in the last step, the company aggregates
the decision of the first two steps and maps its entire supply chain.
1st Step: Functions and Products to Outsource In a manufacturing context,
six major functions can be identified: R&D, design, Manufacturing, distribution,
marketing, and after-sale services. A company can decide to focus on one or several
functions depending on its resources, skills, and experience. The functions that the
company decides to keep in house will be performed either onshore or offshore as
selected in the second step. Core competencies are defined as the competencies or a
particular functional area that create the company's competitive advantage, by gen-
erating high margin, differentiating its products from competitors. In other words,
these are the reasons for the customer to buy their product. For instance, Nike's core
competencies are mainly design and marketing. They are not very involved in the
manufacturing process beside the selection of the subcontractors. Dell is not building
its competitive advantage on R&D or on inventive design but it has on a perfect
control of its supply chain. The example of the Ipod illustrates the importance of
focus on core competencies. Apple is buying Ipod's hard-drive from Samsung and
the product in assembled in China while new customers are attracted primarily by
the design of this MP3 player that has been developed in California, USA.
In fact, some argue that companies should focus and invest only on their core com-
petencies, and should potentially outsource all the other functions.
2nd Step: Defining the Optimal Location After selecting the functions that
the company wants to keep in-house, a particular location strategy for each product
is defined. If the company decides to outsource a step of its supply chain, the selected
contractor will follow the same type of analysis. In the rest of this step, we can as-
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sume that the company will perform everything in-house, since the ownership of the
operations does not affect the location decision.
The location decision is not a macro-economic decision. Two companies in the same
industry can have very different location strategies, as seen in the case study of the
apparel industry in the previous section. The location decision is specific to each
company, for each product, depending on the different final-customers. For the man-
ufacturing function, three dimensions are considered to evaluate the opportunity to
offshore the production of a particular product (Fig. 5-21). First, the company has to
look at the product's characteristics, such as technology and manufacturing capability
requirements, cost structure and the position in the its life cycle. The distribution
and transportation costs also depend on the characteristics of the product. Second,
the company has to evaluate the environment of the products, which refers to the
market attributes and the specific regulations for this product. Market attributes are
composed of competitors' strategy, variability of the demand, and characteristic of
the product life cycle. Finally, the location decision is directly linked to the character-
istics of customer behavior, which is defined by its willingness to wait, its sensitivity
to "Made in the USA" label and its predisposition to follow trends.
Products Characteristics Environment Customer
characteristic
- Technology - Market characteristics - Lead time -
- Manufacturing capability Competitors willingness to wait
requirement Product life cycle - Demand volatility
- Cost structure Demand - "Made in the USA"
Labor cost variability sensibility
Raw materials - Regulations
Distribution/transportation Environmental
- Product life cycle position constraints
I_ Legal Issues
Figure 5-21: Criteria to Determine the Location of the Production Steps of a Product
By defining for each product which functions to keep in-house and among them,
which functions to perform in the U.S., the company can create an optimal solution
for its set of products. The following figure presents a virtual case of the strategy of
company that produce four different products, which a specific location strategy for
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each of these products (Fig. 5-22)
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Figure 5-22: Example of the Location Strategy of a Company with a Set of 4 Products
The location map depends on the features of the products as defined previously
and the attributes of different countries. Until recently, only the manufacturing func-
tion was concerned by offshoring. An onshore location was chosen to ensure IP
protection and quality of products, to access to specific manufacturing capabilities
and skilled workers, to perform operation nearby the R&D and design teams, to be
located close to the customers and the supplier and to preserve the domestic origin of
the product ("Made in the USA"). Onshore production had to support higher wages,
making production cost higher. On the other hand, the offshore location allowed com-
panies to reduce production costs. However, producing offshore exposed the company
to low quality manufacturing processes, political and monetary instability, fluctuat-
ing importing taxes, lack of efficient infrastructures, and a weak IP protection system
(Fig. 5-23).
The recent improvement of developing countries' manufacturing capabilities has
changed the criteria to determine the optimal location for production. First of all,
countries such as China or India are now able to perform almost any kind of activ-
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Figure 5-23: The Old Paradigm of the Offshoring Decision
ity, from R&D and design to support functions and of course, manufacturing. Since
product quality disparity, manufacturing capability and labor force skill level were the
main sources of onshore location advantages, the convergence of low cost countries
capabilities with U.S. onshore performance has changed some of the reasons to use
onshore or offshore plants today. Onshore location insures feedback from manufac-
turing teams and design teams, guarantees a stronger IP protection, and allows the
company to manufacture its products nearby the demand and some suppliers. On
the other hand, onshore production costs are rising due to the increase in health care
costs, retirement plan burden, and environmental constraints. The distance to some
of the suppliers and customers is becoming higher with the development of markets
abroad and the move of some suppliers in low cost countries. Advantages of onshore
production are shrinking whereas disadvantages are emerging, making offshore loca-
tion even more competitive. Manufacturing costs are lower due to a cheap work force,
improvement of the productivity and higher concentration of suppliers and support
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activities. Offshore location gives access to a growing local demand in Asia and al-
lows companies to be close to a large pool of available talents. On the other hand,
IP protection remains weak in Asian countries, disruptions due to terrorism or epi-
demics are possible and the time to reach domestic market remains high since Air
transportation is still too expensive for most of the products. Moreover, relying on
imports from abroad exposes U.S. companies and more generally, the U.S. economy
to trade wars in the future (Fig. 5-24).
Location of Manufacturing Function / The New World
R&D Design - Manufacturing Distribution Support Functions
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Pros - IP Protection - Operating Cost
- Distance to -Distance to
Customers/Suppliers Customers/Suppliers
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Figure 5-24: The Offshoring Decision Factors Today
Depending on the characteristics of its products, a company will decide to locate
the production sites in different countries. A range of solution exists, from pure off-
shore to pure onshore (Fig. 5-25). With the standardization of manufacturing process
and the modularization of the design of an increasing number of products, it is now
possible for companies to finely calibrate their location decision for each product and
for each step of the manufacturing process, taking advantage of onshore or offshore
specificities at each step of the production process. For instance, a company can de-
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cide to manufacture the first step of the manufacturing process of one of its product
in China, if it involves low IP content and high labor intensity or if it can benefit
from the proximity of some suppliers, such as electronic components producers. Sub-
sequently, the company can ship the semi-finished product to another location, such
as Mexico, or in the U.S. to terminate the manufacturing process. By splitting the
manufacturing process into independent stages located in different location, the com-
pany can potentially optimize the global production cost, delivery time and protect
the IP of its products.
Sal. *X -
The manufacturing stage .. . .
=0 w miliFor a given Product A
Mfg. Model Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Offshore
Onshore
Mixed -
Hybrid
Figure 5-25: Production Location Possibilities
After analyzing all its products, the company has to combine the individual so-
lution of each product to obtain an optimal solution for the set of products. At this
stage, the company is trying to aggregate the capacity requirements for each coun-
try and to develop a coherent allocation of activities between the different locations.
Steps involving the same technology will tend to be located in the same plant, and
multiple locations can be used to perform the same process step in order to reduce the
company exposure to supply disruption (See Product D in Fig. 5-26). At this point,
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the company also has to consider the location of its existing production capacities.
The manufacturing stage - For a given set of Products
Mfg. Model Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Product A
Product B
Product C
Product D
Share Mf acities
Product E
Figure 5-26: Production Facilities Possibilities
The company has obtained the map of the production sites location necessary to
produce its set of products.
3rd Step: Mapping the Supply Chain Finally, after deciding where to locate
its operation and which business model to use for each segment of the supply chain,
and each manufacturing process step for each product, the company can represent
the location and ownership of its entire operation (Fig. 5-27).
Therefore, it is clear now that the offshoring decision is not a macro-level decision
and that any location strategy is pertinent at a particular instant t. When political
or economic situations change in a particular country, the optimal location strategy,
for a product or for the whole company, can be altered.
U.S. companies that use this strategy to judiciously locate their operations are trying
to maximize their margins, to improve their market share domestically or abroad, to
preserve IP, or in other words, to build sustainable competitive advantages. Thus,
optimizing employment in manufacturing activities domestically is not the objective
of this process. As described recently in an article from The Economist , American
or European companies are increasingly transnational. They employ workers from all
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Figure 5-27: Company's Optimal Location and Ownership Architecture
over the world, sell products in all continents and receive investment from abroad.
The old saying, "What is good for GM, is good for America" is no longer true. [25]
U.S. companies are in quest of high return on investment (ROI) and sustainable
competitive advantages for their global investors, and do not undertake the duty to
supply manufacturing jobs to U.S. workers.
5.7 The Future of U.S. Manufacturing
When looking at solutions to provide employment to manufacturing workers who lost
their jobs because of imports competition and offshoring, the same ideas are con-
stantly proposed. To supply new jobs for blue collar workers, the U.S. economy has
to create new opportunities in export industries, create new industries, and re-train
blue workers to perform new jobs in services, warehousing or logistics. Nevertheless,
the future success of these different solutions is relatively uncertain. Export industries
are not necessary growing fast enough to absorb more employees, and they are usu-
ally building their domestic expansion on productivity gain rather than on increasing
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the number of employees. The newly created industries, such as biotechnology or
nanotechnology-based industries, will not necessarily require a large number of blue
collars workers and are still in an experimental stage. Finally, re-training manufac-
turing workers to perform service jobs requires large financial expenditure for the
government, the willingness of the worker to perform a new activity and often implies
a cut in its salary. [120]
The common belief that laid-off manufacturing workers that re-train will find jobs
with higher value-added is generally not confirmed. [81] Thus, investing heavily in
education and re-training will be only a part of the solution and the different parties
have to accept that most of the workers will not become engineers or doctors and
might be forced to accept lower pay for service jobs.
In order to reduce the unemployment period and the wage cut for laid-off workers,
and to reduce the governmental investment to re-train workers, it appears that the
best solution is to create manufacturing-like jobs, which require the same skills man-
ufacturing workers already have. Some of these new jobs might be in services, but
most of them can be created in the current domestic manufacturing sector.
By comparing the pros and cons of offshore and onshore locations (see Fig. 5-24), it
appears that the two most important variables are the "skills requirements" and the
"distance pressure." The skills requirements" refer to the manufacturing capabilities,
labor force skills and technological knowledge needed in a given industry to perform
the production of a good. The "distance pressure" refers to proximity to the de-
mand and to the suppliers. It is directly correlated to inventory cost, transportation
cost, lead time and delivery time. For instance, a company can decide to compete
on variety and in order to carry a reasonable amount of total stock, might have to
forecast the demand very well. The best way to improve the forecast is to produce the
goods as close as possible from the time when the demand is realized. The distance
factor relates to this necessity to be close to the demand to create the company's
comparative advantage on product variety. The graph below represents the map of
the optimal location given the distance pressure and the skill requirements of a given
product (Fig. 5-28). For instance, the production of newspaper requires low skills but
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the distance pressure is very high, since a new edition has to be delivered everyday
day and has to be published and distributed the same day. The newspaper will be
produced in the U.S. In contrast, for certain high tech materials used in the fabri-
cation of satellites the distance factor is very low, but the strong skill requirements
make manufacturing in China impossible. Such products are likely to be produced
mostly in the U.S.
The Distance Pressure
Situation
Skill
Requirements
Figure 5-28: Optimal Location Depending on Skills Requirements and Distance Fac-
tor Levels
Maximizing the employment in the U.S., companies can increase the skill require-
ments of their products. Investing in R&D might lead to more complex products
that will have to be produced in the U.S if the technology is not mastered by low
cost countries. Nevertheless, the current trend is the opposite: China and India are
catching up very fast on the technology side and are investing heavily in R&D. More-
over, the objective of U.S. companies is not to maximize the domestic employment.
If IP protection is sufficiently reinforced in Asian countries, U.S. companies will be
tempted to develop or relocate their most advanced technologies in Asia to benefit
from wage differential. Thus, domestic manufacturing employment will not necessar-
ily benefit form heavier investment in R&D (Fig. 5-29).
On the other hand, distance pressure can be increase by strategies such as the in-
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troduction of products with shorter product life cycles, the increase of the variety of
products and variation or by designing products that require after sales services that
have to be performed onshore. To achieve such objective onshore, companies will
have to use such strategies as postponement strategy or mass customization
Moreover, the company will protect its IP, and protect itself from disruption inherent
to the use of offshore facilities. As said by the Economist, "The logistics of shipping
goods over long distances remain complicated and inexact. For example, the V6 car
engines that Toyota sends from Nagoya in Japan to Chicago take anywhere between
25 and 37 days to arrive, forcing the car company to hold costly stocks." [16] Such an
approach appears promising since customers are increasingly sensitive to customized
products, a large variety of products and are not willing to wait for all products.
Tiernds Distance Pressure
Skill
Requirements
Figure 5-29: The Trends in U.S. Manufacturing Activities
The previous figure shows that the development of high-tech manufacturing ca-
pabilities will tend to reduce the number of jobs in the U.S. On the other hand, the
trends on the distance pressure dimension are more uncertain. The introduction of
faster transportation modes or the digitalization of certain products can reduce the
distance pressure and consequently the employment in the U.S. For instance, the
increasing electronic distribution of newspapers reduces the requirement of domestic
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production since editing work can be easily perform in India and then distributed to
American consumers via a web service. Air shipments can be an easy yet expensive
way to use offshore location while being marginally impacted by distance pressure.
Nevertheless, not all products can be replaced by a digital equivalent and air shipment
is still too expensive for a lot of products, making the distance pressure a potentially
sustainable dimension for U.S. companies to focus on to insure domestic employment.
The recent rise of oil price is also a new source of concerns for companies that rely
heavily on Asian sourcing, reinforcing the distance pressure.
Finally, it appears that rather than a single way for U.S. companies to locate and
manage their operation, there is a large spectrum of strategies and organization to
maintain some manufacturing activities in the U.S. and then to provide manufacturing
jobs to blue collar workers. It is possible to imagine a supply chain where the first
steps of the manufacturing process, which involve low IP content and low variance
will be performed in low cost countries to benefit from low wages and then the last
steps of the process will be performed locally to better match the final demand and
to incorporate sensible technologies. Furthermore, since more countries are involved
in the company's strategy, the optimal location map might change more often along
with economic or political changes domestically or abroad. The location strategy
has to be adapted to these changes and to reduce the risks for the company: relying
on operations in countries where changes might be hostile and are more difficult to
predict expose the company to severe disruption. Manufacturing onshore will always
be the safe solution for critical products and sectors. The next chapter will explore
in more details the recent fast growth of the Chinese economy and the birth of this
new manufacturing competitor. Chapter 7 will show how American companies have
to develop new processes to manage operations relying more heavily on international
sourcing through the case study of the implementation of RFID system in Wal-Mart
stores.
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Chapter 6
China, an Increasingly Attractive
Spot for American Companies
"China already resembles the US in building a dynamic, open economy that generates
enormous opportunity and attracts students, immigrants, and investment from around
the world". [2]
6.1 China, a Growing Power
Flextronics, an electronics manufacturer, will increase its manufacturing capacity in
China by more than 40 percent in 2006. Since 2000, the company has cut its U.S.
production from $37 billion to $27 billion while doubling their China output to $31
billion. [47] This company is increasing its capacity in China to support the growing
demand for electronics equipment worldwide. Flextronics makes such items as cell
phones and video game systems in China. [12] Flextronics is not leading the way
but just following the common trend of moving production to low cost countries and
especially China. Companies are starting businesses in low cost countries mainly to
reduce production costs and to find new market opportunities. Sourcing cheap raw
materials, intermediates or finished goods makes companies more competitive and
allows them to expand their global market share, to capture new markets locally,
and to increase their margin. [6] Among low cost countries, China appears, to many
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observers, to be the ideal spot to be to capture all low cost countries' comparative
advantages. In addition to providing low labor cost and efficient manufacturing in-
frastructures, China has three advantages: a relative abundance of natural resources;
a potentially huge domestic market; and a virtually unlimited supply of labor, con-
trary to the Asian NIEs (Chinese Taipei, South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong)
and ASEAN-4 countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines). [126]
Therefore, output has expanded at an average rate of nearly 10 per cent per year
-and total exports at 17 per cent per year- during the last decade. Indeed, China's
share of global manufacturing could grow from about 7 per cent in 2005 to about 25
per cent in 2025 according to experts. [91]
Recently, the cheapest and the biggest low cost country has decided to change its
behavior toward the world: the entrance of China in the WTO marks a new turn in
the history of this country and the impacts of this decision could disturb the stability
of the manufacturing sector worldwide.
6.2 Competitive Advantages
6.2.1 Labor Force and Utility Costs
Like other Asian low cost countries, China has currently a very inexpensive labor
force. Contrary to Asian NIEs, who experienced a shortage of labor since the mid
90s, creating strong pressure on the economic growth, the almost unlimited supply of
labor in China will assure a consistently cheap labor force. Indeed, the massive flux
of China's rural labor force to manufacturing jobs is likely to moderate any increase
in low-skilled wages in the coming years. [19] Nevertheless, recent reports from UBS
and Goldman Sachs present evidence that this assumption might change in the near
future, especially for semi-skilled workers and in certain regions of the country. [33]
Labor shortage in coastal regions might make China less cheap than such country
as Vietnam. Workers currently have a lack of interest in unions but more social
protections might be claimed in the future. To be competitive and attractive for
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companies, government tends to depoliticize companies and to bring in professional
management. There is no job security and, firms can expand or contract their labor
force as required, allowing companies to deal with a high variable demand during
uncertain economic periods. [42]
On the other hand, utility costs, such as construction, electricity, water or sewer
costs remain highly competitive (Fig. 6-1 & Figure D-1 in Appendix D). It is hard
to predict if China will be able to support such an intense growth in the future, but
specialists already predict that the supply of energy will be problematic in the future.
Labor (S/hr) Construction (S/s.f.)
------------------- 
r ....
.CHINA
* MEXICO
Electricity (S/KIWhir) Indiustrial Rent (S/s.f.) -US
Source: EIU & Fantas Analysis
Figure 6-1: Comparative Production Costs
6.2.2 Large Domestic Market
In the past, western companies moved operations overseas to capture low cost pro-
duction advantages, but today, companies are increasingly considering the possibility
of penetrating new markets.
Currently, China's market accounts for over 14 percent of the global business for
multinationals such as Motorola, over 12 percent for Nokia and some 10 percent for
Ericsson, which has increased its production floor space massively since 2004. [5]
China is the world's largest market for such items as refrigerators and mobile tele-
phones, third largest for electronics, fourth largest for chemicals and fifth largest for
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automobiles. It is becoming an unavoidable market for many companies. China's
population, which creates a potentially colossal domestic demand, permits economies
of scale even without exports to western countries. For instance, if we consider a po-
tential annual demand for vehicles of one million, which represents only 0.3 percent
of the total number of families, China can support several "scale-efficient" plants (a
vehicle manufacturing plant's minimum efficient scale of about 0.2 million units per
year). China's firms experience economies of scale at plant level but also at industry
level according to OECD experts. Economies of scale at industry level means that
the productivity of a firm depends on the size of the industrial sector to which the
firm belongs. The effect is known as Marshallian external economies and describes
gains due to flow of news, ideas between firms, and improvement of suppliers of raw
materials or intermediate goods.
However, knowing when the Chinese consumption will really explode, sustained by
the rise of wages, remains critical for companies who invest in infrastructure and
distribution network in China. According to statistics reported by an American con-
sultant, per capita private consumption is projected to rise from US$451 to US$732
from 2004 to 2009 for consumer goods. More and more companies understand that
China, which is an amazing country to manufacture products, could be also a remark-
able country to sell these products. Examples are not difficult to find: according to
a recent published report, Sony intends to expand its sales in China to $4 billion this
year. "Clearly, China has become a very important part of our global operation, not
just for the U.S, the China market itself is growing very fast" says Mr. Clancy, Senior
Vice President of Corporate Communications for Sony Electronics. [100] Therefore,
to take advantage of the market potential of China, all consulting firms encourage
multinationals to build Chinese businesses as opposed to just doing Chinese sourc-
ing. China should be considered as a part of their overall manufacturing system and
they should sell in China with a local brand and a local reputation. China's GDP is
projected to average 7.8 percent growth over the next five years (2 times greater than
U.S., OECD and world averages).
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6.2.3 Positive Political Change
The Chinese government used to manage firmly all aspects of the country life, includ-
ing economics and corporate governance. Nevertheless, some major policy reforms
have occurred since the beginning of the 1990s, changing the country's business cli-
mate. For instance, a more flexible trade policy has totally changed the manufacturing
sector in China. In 1978 China's trade was influenced by central planning, which cov-
ered 100 percent of exports; by 1992, that number was only 15 percent. [84] Planners'
preferences did not correspond with comparative advantage, giving priority to exports
of capital-intensive goods. [53] Such strategy was supposed to encourage the develop-
ment of high-tech and capital intensive industries. After abolishing central planning,
the share of capital-intensive manufactures in total exports fell from 50 per cent in
1975 to 35 per cent in 1980 and then to under 20 percent by 1990, while the share of
labor-intensive manufactures rose from 36 percent in 1975 and 39 percent in 1980 to
74 percent in 1990 (See Table D-2 in Appendix D). OECD has approved the vast gov-
ernment effort to make business more attractive in China, resulting in several major
changes: the reduction of direct administrative control over trade, decentralization
of national foreign trade businesses, de-licensing, and reduced protection of the home
market through tariff reduction. In 2006, Chinese economic institutions were similar
to the capitalist Asian model and China's trading partners. The government refuses
to create institutions with "Chinese characteristics." [104] Consequently, the share of
state-owned enterprises in total industrial sales declined by half in the past 6 years.
Today, in many sectors, firms can be wholly-owned by foreign companies without local
partners (except in sectors considered nationally important, such as airlines, telecom,
and electric utilities). The last major changes resulted from the WTO entry:
* average tariffs were cut to between 7 percent and 9 percent
" import quotas and licenses will be removed progressively by 2006
* all export subsidies were eliminated immediately
" reduction in FDI restrictions (technology transfer, local content, etc)
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Along with internal political changes, the Chinese government has reinforced leg-
islation for Western companies to make manufacturing in China attractive. China
provides low-cost land, low import duties and tax breaks. For instance, one corpora-
tion has declared to have build a virtually cost free plant as a consequence of several
subsidies. [113] Another instrument is the creation of more than 500 special economic
zones where the infrastructure facilitates fast set-up of businesses.
After making its territories attractive for US companies and its national production
competitive for exports, China cannot keep its currency at the current level. Indeed,
the Chinese government is likely to revalue the currency before 2007. [78]
6.2.4 Manufacturing Specialization
As a result of continual foreign investment in manufacturing capacity in the Pearl
River Delta of Guangdong Province and Yangtze River Delta, China is becoming the
world's "factory floor." [77] China manufactures 20 percent of the world's steel, 15
percent of its ships, 18 percent of apparel and textiles, and 75 percent of toys, which
are traditional offshore industries. [89] China is also moving up the value chain, pro-
ducing more than 50 percent of the world's cameras, 30 percent of air-conditioning
and TVs, 25 percent of washing machines, and 20 percent of refrigerators. In 2006,
China has increased its market share in such areas as electronics (Chinese exports
market share of US electronics market increase from 9.5 percent in 1992 to 21.8 per-
cent in 1999), or computers (Chinese exports market share of PC world production
increased from 4 percent in 1996 to 21 percent in 2000) (See Fig. D-2 in Appendix
D).
As espoused by Seki, the structure of industry of a nation wishing to build solid
manufacturing capabilities has to be multi-layered and complex. The manufacturing
industry can be viewed as the superposition of three different layers: the industry-
supporting fundamental technologies; industries based on high technologies; and in-
dustry with assembly technologies. [107]
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Fundamental Technologies In small and rural township, enterprises will grow to
develop such fundamental technologies in the twenty-first century as forging, plating,
heat treatment, painting, machining, pressing, plastic molding, and other process
technologies. China is acquiring these fundamental skills by manufacturing more and
more different products for international companies, primarily as a subcontractor.
Today, even if companies are able to manage traditional manufacturing processes in
China, the quality is occasionally insufficient. Nevertheless, there are no real barriers
that will prevent China from acquiring a level of quality similar to the European and
U.S. standard in the future.
High Technologies The special or high technologies, focusing on new product
development, are usually developed by large private corporations abroad but more
and more companies are operating R&D in China. The Chinese local market attracts
international companies and creates incentives for local companies to supply their own
market. For instance, Intel, with 2,400 employees in China, will have invested more
than $1 billion by the end of 2006, hiring top Chinese engineers for development work.
First, Intel has followed its customers in China who were lowering their production
costs by moving production in China to supply US market. Then the company has
increased its production to meet the local demand but also to supply exports cheaply.
China has become the largest consumer of mobile phones in the world and is expected
to surpass the United States as the biggest buyer of personal computers in six years.
"The quality of work here is equivalent to any of the work we do around the world,"
said Intel China President Wee Theng Tan. [69]
Assembly Technologies In the middle layer between the fundamental and high
technologies are the intermediate technologies linking the two like the assembly tech-
nology. It is a traditional feature of the manufacturing sector in China: Chinese
companies have been assembling every kind of product for years (See Fig. D-3 and
Table D-2 in Appendix D). Chinese assembling companies are costly effective and
very efficient. Moreover, companies operating in China can cut capital costs by using
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the local competitive advantage and skills: companies replace expensive machinery
with inexpensive labor. One leading manufacturer of large kitchen appliances is using
manual material handling instead of conveyors in its Chinese factories. Usually firms
achieve quality comparable to that at home, but at lower cost.
Companies should think about the virtues of using China for some of their manufac-
turing to remain competitive. Some consultants from an American firm think that
as many as 15 percent to 20 percent of industrial products now made in the United
States - together with their associated jobs - will migrate to China and other low
cost countries during the coming years: China is cheap and local companies are able
to produce any kinds of product from high tech chips to footwear. Dave Arland,
Thomson vice president of U.S. corporate communications and government relations
said "China is becoming the manufacturer for the whole world. You have to find a
way to harness that, or watch your competition run away from you" after strategic
partnership with Chinese manufacturing giant TCL.
6.3 Weaknesses
Even though China is creating a strong and competitive manufacturing tool supported
by a modern political agenda, few problems still exist.
For instance, China is usually criticized for the limitation of its financial structure or
its attitude toward environmental questions. [94] As seen in the previous part, China's
labor force is inexpensive and capable to manufacture a broad range of product. Thus,
the real China's stake is to convince companies that China is a sustainable place
to manufacture product and do business assuring the basic requirement to make
companies trustful:
" Protection of intellectual property
* Availability of competent suppliers for raw materials, intermediate goods or
finished goods
" Existence of an efficient distribution network
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6.3.1 Intellectual Property
Innovation is one of the most important competitive advantages for a company. Cre-
ating new products or new processes, companies can make a high margin contrary to
old products where prices are usually low because of competition and its commoditi-
zation. Thus, intellectual property is a key question for a lot of companies producing
items with high tech content.
Some consultants think protecting intellectual property is still possible but it requires
continued, aggressive, locally-focused efforts and it can be done to a sufficient degree
that is worthwhile in China. The paradox is that laws to protect intellectual prop-
erty and patterns exist in China but the government does not give the impression
that they are really concerned with this matter. Nevertheless, the situation seems to
change. To attract activity with high value added, such a research center, and more
advanced technologies, China has started reinforcing patent recognition and intellec-
tual property. [22] This step is fundamental to transform the economy toward high
margin activities. "We couldn't just follow the Chinese way, the old way, of doing
manufacturing and competing on labor costs" says Frank Deng, CEO of Netac Tech-
nology, an USB memory devices Chinese producer. "That is OK in the short term,
but we didn't think it was the right way for the long term. We didn't want to be a
follower but be a leader." In fact, China might start reinforcing IP to protect its own
innovation, which will, subsequently benefit the U.S. and European manufacturers.
Ironically, Netac became recently the first Chinese company to sue an American one
for patent infringement. [24]
6.3.2 Suppliers Network
Sourcing from U.S. and Europe to Product in China While classic offshore
products such as televisions or copiers can easily cost 30 percent to 50 percent less
to make in China than in the developed nations, for other more sophisticated items,
such as particular high tech products needing special intermediate goods to be assem-
bled, the production cost could be significant. Nichicon, a Japanese high-technology
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capacitors manufacturer, estimates that the overall cost advantage can be as little as
10 percent for some of its products after including additional costs to source the raw
materials and intermediate goods needed in the manufacturing processes. Companies
should consider three elements when setting up operations in China:
" Without efficient local suppliers, companies have to import of components, gen-
erating extra costs such as import duties and shipping expenses, and increasing
the risk of supply chain disruption.
" Chinese suppliers may not be able to catch up foreign parts suppliers with a
technological lead for decades.
* The poor performance of many Chinese suppliers could oblige companies to
educate suppliers and create new standards in order to raise the country's overall
quality of supply or even ask western suppliers to move production in Asia (like
in the automotive industry).
Naturally, the availability of local suppliers with sufficient performance on delivery
and quality varies according to industry and manufacturing tradition. For example,
in electronics, a large fraction of parts are supplied by local suppliers : in its large mo-
bile phone plant in Shanghai, the German electrical goods company Siemens, sources
75 percent of the value of components from inside China, which has had a big effect
on reducing costs.
On the other hand, the world's second biggest maker of construction machines, Ko-
matsu, is still producing excavators 5 per cent more expensive in China than in Japan,
as a result of the extra costs associated with shipping key components to China that
are not available locally, according to Masahiro Sakane, chief executive. It is a similar
story at Volkswagen, where Bernd Leissner, head of its Chinese arm, says production
costs in China "are still higher than abroad." [90]
Moreover, China's diverse raw material and intermediate input markets such as steel,
coal and plastics will therefore face significant challenges in responding to industrial
growth rates. Similar difficulties can be expected for infrastructure inputs such as
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electricity, telecommunications and transportation, if appropriate pricing and hard
budget constraints are not introduced, according OECD experts.
Sourcing Finish Goods from China to Supply U.S. Consumption Generally,
the retailing industry has neglected the opportunity to source product directly from
producers in low cost countries: only 3 percent of the $850 billion in goods procured
by North American and Western European retailers in 2002 was sourced directly from
low-cost countries such as China. Usually, imports are handled by third-party agents
according to a study from a leading consultant.
To source goods directly from Chinese suppliers, retailers use typically two interme-
diaries: a Chinese export-trading company and an importer in the retailer's home
market. This process eliminates a large part of potential margin. To increase benefits
of sourcing in China, retailers are opening offices in China to eliminate one or both
middle men by buying directly to the producers. In 2003, Wal-Mart Stores bought
$15 billion worth of Chinese goods, nearly all through its purchasing office in China.
In the same year, the French hypermarket operator Carrefour purchased $1.5 billion
of goods directly from that country.
However, annual operating expenses for a 40-person office could be estimated at $3
million to $5 million in all during the first year or two. As the office increases its
purchasing volume, additional personnel, including senior expatriate managers with
expertise in specific product categories, will be required, but it is an easy way to
capture all benefits from sourcing in China. [99]
6.3.3 Logistics and Distribution
Although China is commonly perceived as the best spot to lower production costs, its
large territory and primitive infrastructure make it difficult to move and distribute
products fast and cost-effectively. "China's supply chain costs are higher than virtu-
ally anywhere else in the industrialized world, commonly amounting to 30 percent-40
percent of wholesale prices," says Vince Calarco, chairman of Crompton, an Ameri-
can chemical firm. [73] A part of savings realized by lower production cost in Chinese
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manufacturing are offset by additional logistics expenditure. For instance, it can
cost as much as 50 percent more to transport goods within China than it does in
North America or Europe due to China's outdated and inflexible freight distribution
systems. It is partially explained by a highly fragmented Chinese trucking industry,
whose average size of a trucking "fleet" is two vehicles. Moreover, a restrictive licens-
ing system complicates the situation: China is made up of 33 provinces, with carriers
only licensed in certain provinces. For example, a carrier not registered in a particular
province must transfer their goods to one who is licensed, making transportation in-
efficient and time-consuming. Companies could consider moving goods by rail, which
is cheaper but presents other challenges such as longer lead time or limited capacity
due to colossal passenger traffic. [117] Furthermore, transportation stakes are taking
a most important part in companies' concerns due to changes in the allocation of pro-
duction sites: business traditionally located along the coast is moving further inland
as development increases, raising significant logistics questions. [87] Nevertheless we
could expect some improvement in logistics for the coming years:
" China is planning 200,000 kilometers of new roads by 2005.
" Restrictions on foreign ownership within the trucking transport sector ended in
2004.
* China will spend $42.7 billion in railroad network infrastructure improvements
in the next few years, and its network should be completely open to foreign
investment in 2006.
Today, most of companies do not have enough experiences in China to build
an efficient supply chain, integrating the relevant local players. It is obvious that
companies will have to invest heavily in the future to improve their supply chain in
China. The limited competition, in such area as warehouse, tends to increase prices
and lower service level, with local companies less customers-oriented. The situation
will remain problematic for the coming years because of the high cost and inefficiency,
but we could expect improvements in the whole supply chain as several global 3PLs
have an expanding presence in China, offering adequate logistics services.
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As seen before, companies also target China as a prospective manufacturing loca-
tion to be close to potential huge new markets for almost any kinds of products from
intermediate goods to finish goods. To take advantage of this new market, companies
have to find an efficient way to serve customers, in a country where the distribution
sector is lacking (Fig. 6-2).
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Figure 6-2: The Chinese Wholesale Channel Structure
A major American consulting firm considers that Chinese distributors are less
focused on sales and services, are limited to order taking, stock keeping and physical
delivery and have few IT capabilities. Consequently, to sell products in China could
be less profitable than originally expected.
Nevertheless, companies have to keep track of the evolution of the situation: joining
the WTO, China agreed to allow foreign companies to enter the wholesaling market,
initially in joint ventures. In addition, modernization seems to take place in the retail
sector. [17] Hypermarkets are becoming increasingly present, serving customers more
directly and taking sales away from traditional retail outlets that have been served by
Chinese wholesalers, allowing US companies who invest in China to capture directly
new customer without expensive intermediaries. [3]
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6.3.4 Management Resource
The human resource, as seen in the first part, appears to be large for labor but the
story is completely different for managers and even grey workers (experienced techni-
cian). Companies are experiencing trouble finding middle and senior managers. Addy
Lee, managing partner in China for Amrop Hever, an international human resources
firm, says: "even though there are thousands of young engineers emerging from Chi-
nese universities every year, the country's manufacturing boom has not been going
long enough to have produced sufficient senior and experienced people, typically aged
35-45 and with a good management record in western-style businesses". Because it is
very important to know whom to partner with in China, such experienced managers
are one of the critical resources in a strategy of production in China. They are the
only people capable of finding robust supply chain organizations built on trustable
suppliers and distributors.
The following section illustrates these observations through a case study in the auto-
motive industry.
6.4 Case Study: Automotive Industry in China
US car manufacturers, as well as their European competitors, have decided to take
advantage of China. Historically a major manufacturing industry and technological
innovator in U.S., the automotive industry is not considering producing car fully in
China to serve the U.S. market. Domestic labor agreements, productivity disparity,
lack of experience of the Chinese work force in the automotive sector, and logistics
constraints such as transportation cost, and lead time, make production in the U.S.
the conventional model to serve the domestic market. Therefore, foreign companies,
such as Toyota are often using American plants to supply American customers.
Nevertheless, companies use China in two ways. First, they create joint-venture in
China to penetrate the Chinese market. Second, they are pushing their US-suppliers
to start operations in China to reduce the overall production costs for the U.S. as-
sembly.
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6.4.1 Operations in China
According to the OECD, the demand for vehicles is expected to increase from 1.2
million cars and trucks in 1994 to between 3 and 6 million in China by 2010, becom-
ing the fifth largest market worldwide. All companies have understood the necessity
to be present in this growing market. Even if current household consumption is still
embryonic, companies can already consider making cars dedicated to local market
due to the scale of the country.
However, the current political position is not very advantageous, since the entry into
the automotive industry by foreign companies is highly restricted. Foreign companies
have to be associated with a local manufacturer to produce in China and cannot own
more than a 50 percent stake of any Chinese auto manufacturer. Indeed, Chinese
market is still dominated by inefficient state-owned manufacturers and their foreign
partners.
Cars produce by these joint venture are usually sold under the foreign partner's brand.
The joint-venture is typically forced to source a large part of the raw materials and
intermediate goods need in the assembly from suppliers in US. As mentioned in the
previous part, many Chinese suppliers are inefficient state-owned companies. As a
result, Chinese consumers pay 30 to 40 percent more, on average, for autos produced
by state-owned companies than do consumers in Japan, the United States, and West-
ern Europe for comparable models. The joint-venture model looks like a method to
subsidize inefficient state enterprises, and the government is pressed to drop the re-
quirement that foreign automakers enter into joint ventures with local companies. [54]
On the other hand, this strategy has allowed the Chinese manufacturer to acquire
technologies and manufacturing processes in only few years. Chinese car makers, after
having assimilated methods, knowledge and experience from their joint-venture with
world class U.S. car maker and European companies, will be able to create their own
cars at a decent level of quality before 2010.
American companies believe that opportunities to sell American cars on the Chinese
market make the current investments and the transmission of capabilities to Chinese
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partners, and soon competitors, worth it. Ford Motor Co.'s China-based joint ven-
ture agreed to buy a second assembly site to build Ford and Mazda vehicles. [92]
Following the same trend, the French manufacturer Peugeot is to invest about $780
million, doubling the capacity of its car manufacturing in China to 300,000 units per
year. [11]
6.4.2 Chinese Procurement
Since U.S. manufacturers are not considering using offshore production to supply the
U.S. domestic market, they consider another strategy to capture Chinese advantages.
They start exercising pressure on their suppliers to make them move their production
overseas. The case of Superior Industries International Inc., a big aluminum-wheel
maker in California, illustrates this trend. This company has refused for years to
move its production offshore because of the average quality of Chinese raw material
and the apparently complicated logistics of shipping thousands of rims. Then the
company has changed its mind when its main customers General Motors Corp. and
Ford Motor Co., with whom Superior does 85 percent of its $840 million a year in
business, urged them to decrease prices and match Chinese wheel suppliers. "It's
presented very simply; this is the price we are getting for this product. You either
match that or the auto maker will look elsewhere" reports President Steve Borick.
To close the gap with Chinese manufacturer Superior has two solutions:
" to cut its profit margins and to keep production in U.S.
" to move operations in China
The company has finally chosen to offshore its production. Companies as GM and
Ford are using Chinese auto-parts suppliers as global "benchmark" prices for quality
and price on many components (such as electric-wire cables, radios, speakers, small
motors, and even brakes, suspensions and aluminum wheels). For instance, Delphi
Corp. has found savings of as much as 40 percent by shifting production to China.
On the employment side, analysts are emphasizing the risk .of the disappearance of
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U.S. jobs in the parts industry in the future. Today, less than 5 percent of the com-
ponents Ford uses to build vehicles in North America come from offshore, says Ford
Spokesman Paul Wood. At GM, only one-tenth of 1 percent of materials and parts
the company uses in North America come directly from China says Tom Wickham,
a GM spokesman. [108] In the future, most of car manufacturers are planning to
source more from LCCs. China is acquiring skills and expertise very quickly through
the development of its own automotive industry, and auto part supplier will have to
grow to supply the Chinese car industry as well as the U.S. manufacturers looking for
cost reduction. With the maturation of high quality part supplier in China, Gm and
Ford might finally look like Dell, sourcing low cost standardized parts from low cost
producers in China and only assembling the car onshore to minimize logistics costs.
6.5 Conclusion
This case study underlined numerous aspects of doing business in China focusing on
the following points:
* China is potentially a huge market for American companies
" Manufacturing in China could lower production cost efficiently
" Logistics and Suppliers could be limiting factors of cost saving
" Political decisions can change the features of manufacturing in China very
quickly
China appears as a must-play place for any global company according to David
Michael, a BCG vice president based in Beijing. Companies will probably need to
sell or to produce in China or to do both in the coming years because most of compa-
nies will compete with Chinese companies, or with others who are seeing the Chinese
potential.
Evidently, companies will not offshore all sort of products and they will keep certain
production onshore. Some highly complex products requiring specific suppliers or
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products with a variety of designs and options and products likely to have variable
demand will probably stay in U.S. Today, China is supplying such products as elec-
tronics, auto components, and cars. For auto parts, companies will probably consider
the option to operate in Mexico to manage efficiently just-in-time inventory.
However, the crisis of employment in the U.S. manufacturing sector might interfere.
With the growing importance of China, U.S. might respond with hostility to the
attack on their textile, clothing, footwear and other affected industries in order to
protect domestic employment. The US furniture industry is a good example. China's
share of the U.S. market for wooden bedroom furniture has increased dramatically
to 27.8 percent in mid-2003, up from 10.3 percent in 2000. In the same period, U.S.
manufacturers' share of the domestic market fell to 42.7 percent from 59.8 percent.
American manufacturers started producing furniture in China in the 1990s in an effort
to reduce costs. Today retailers start dealing directly with the Chinese manufacturers.
US manufacturers are lobbying for duties up to 100 percent to protect their business
and insure artificial competitiveness of a local production. [102]
Companies will follow cost reduction plans and re-organization of the supply chain
to minimize cost, to assure robust supply and to develop and manufacture compet-
itive products. [49] Moreover, the Chinese economy will be an engine of growth and
efficiency for the rest of the world given its need for goods and services, creating
opportunities for the most competitive companies worldwide. Jobs, lost in manufac-
turing in the developed world will be replaced by new jobs to supply the Chinese
consumption. China spends most of the money earned from exports on imports from
rich economies. Thus, China experienced a $78.7 billion trade deficit in February
2004. [14]
Finally, China will affect the world economy by changing relative prices for end cus-
tomers. For instance, average prices of shoes and clothing in America have fallen by
30 percent in real terms since 1995. Consequently, US consumers will have the op-
portunity to spend more money on other products or services, some of which embed
American labor.
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Chapter 7
Wal-Mart: Implementing
Innovative IT System to Support
Global Sourcing
"By figuring out how to exploit two powerful forces that converged in the 1990s -
the rise of IT and the explosion of the global economy - Wal-Mart has dramatically
changed the balance in the world of business. "Hedrick Smith, 2006 [66]
7.1 Wal-Mart and The U.S. Retail Industry
In 2003, Wal-Mart was the Fortune's most admired company, and the world's biggest
corporation. [121] Its sales reached US$285.2 billion in 2005 and 138 million customers
every week visited one of its 3,800 facilities in the United States or one of its 2,400
stores abroad. The company employs 1.6 million workers worldwide.
In the low inflationary U.S. context, it has been difficult for manufacturers to exert
pricing power. As a result, prices for household consumption have remained fairly
stable and low. Americans customers are highly price-sensitive, while looking for
high-quality products. [79] They usually pay more attention to convenience, quality,
low price, and availability than to brand name. Thus, most retailers are now focused
on reducing costs and carrying low-price items. Some others will try to offer higher
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quality products or compete on merchandising, customer service, store ambience,
and peripheral services. Wal-Mart is betting that it can offer all of these: low prices
for all products, including high-end products and fashionable items, while providing
numerous peripheral services and high customer service.
Wal-Mart founded its strategy on "everyday low prices" for all categories of items.
To be able to support its vision, the company had to improve all facets of its model.
First, the company has improved tremendously its own operation by leveraging its
knowledge in supply chain management and in information technology. Before any
other retailers, Wal-Mart understood the power of a tight monitoring of its logistics
and the importance of investing heavily in these areas. Its current effort in the Radio
frequency identification (RFID) technology is one more proof of its focus and lead in
logistics and IT. Second, its size gives the company an unrivaled bargaining power
with every supplier. Wal-Mart systematically puts commodity-products manufactur-
ers in direct competition to get the lowest price possible. Thus, even a brand like
Procter and Gamble, which carries products that Wal-Mart has to carry to satisfy
its customers, is losing its bargaining power since Wal-Mart alone is distributing a
fifth of its production. Indirectly, the pressure of Wal-Mart has forced its suppliers
to improve their own operations in order to provide the same item, or higher quality
items, for a lower price. Third, since the mid-1990s, the company has begun to more
intensively use sourcing from low cost countries for a larger range of products. That
is often an easy way to rapidly get products for a lower price. Finally, Wal-Mart
can also use the availability of suppliers in low-cost countries to bargain with U.S.
suppliers. Even without using suppliers from China, for instance, Wal-Mart usually
can make its U.S. producers align their prices with the Chinese prices. Subsequently,
U.S. companies will have to increase their productivity, and often to offshore their
operations to remain profitable and meet the low prices demanded by Wal-Mart's
customers.
Currently it is hard to believe that the customer's belief in the possibility of getting
high-quality products at a low price will change. Wal-Mart or Target in the U.S. and
Aldi and Lidl in Germany have demonstrated to customers that high quality and low
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prices can come together. Indeed, a majority of U.S. customers already believe that
apparel sold at discount stores is as good quality as that sold in department stores,
according to a survey by Retail Forward. [21]
7.2 Sourcing and Selling Globally
In 2000, Lakewood Engineering & Manufacturing Co., a U.S. fan manufacturer located
in Chicago, opened a factory in Shenzhen, China. About 40 percent of its products
now are made in China, including most heaters and desktop fans, whereas before
2000 all of its production was made in the U.S. In China workers earn 25 cents an
hour, compared with $13 in Chicago. Wal-Mart sells the fans assembled in Chicago
from components made in China at $10 compared to $20 in the mid 1990s. Before
going offshore, Lakewood tried to meet Wal-Mart's low price target by improving its
productivity through automation. Despite the fact that productivity increased the
company finally had to offshore a part of its production to meet the low prices that
Wal-Mart asked. By putting all suppliers in competition, Lakewood had no choice
but to lower its manufacturing costs, since another U.S. or Chinese supplier would
have met Wal-Mart requirements to get the contract.
This example illustrates the current dilemma of doing business with Wal-Mart.
To get access to the premier distribution channel in the U.S., manufacturers have to
supply products at very low prices, forcing them to find new ways to be profitable.
Wal-Mart is the biggest customer of most of the American icon brands such as Disney,
Procter & Gamble, Kraft, Revlon, Gillette and Campbell Soup (Table 7.1). It is the
biggest seller of such products as DVDs, groceries, toys, apparel, dog food, detergent,
jewelry, sporting goods, videogames, socks, bedding, or toothpaste in the U.S. Wal-
Mart is also the biggest film developer, optician, private truck-fleet operator, energy
consumer, and real estate developer in the U.S.(Table 7.2).
Thus, "Wal-Mart has reversed a hundred-year history that had the retailer de-
pendent on the manufacturer," comments Nelson Lichtenstein, a professor at the
University of California, Santa Barbara. [59] Now the manufacturer has to do the
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Table 7.1: Example of U.S. brands' percentage of sales to Wal-Mart
% of Company's Sales to Wal-Mart
Tandy Brands Accessories 39%
Clorox 23%
Revlon 20%
RJR Tobacco 20%
Procter & Gamble 17%
Table 7.2: Wal-Mart's U.S. Market Share for Some Products
Wal-Mart's U.S. Market Share
Dog food 36%
Disposable diapers 32%
Photographicfilm 30%
Toothpaste 26%
Pain remedies 21%
Source:Economy.com, Sec Filings, A.C. Nilsen
bidding of the retailers. In 2002, 7.5 cents of every dollar spent in any store in the
United States was in a Wal-Mart store. [50] Thus, U.S. companies have to adapt their
operations to meet Wal-Mart requirements. The improvements can come from better
supply chain management or from gains in productivity. Nevertheless, at some point,
the offshoring solution looks like the only way to be profitable in the "Wal-Mart
world." For instance, Newell Rubbermaid, the largest producer of consumer rubber
products in the United States, has shut down 69 out of its 400 U.S. facilities, and fired
11,000 workers since January 2001 to open production facilities in low-cost countries.
According to Mark Heaseldon, equity research director at Associated Trust & Co., "to
be able to meet the demands from key customers, like Wal-Mart ... [Rubbermaid has]
to become competitive in price, shifting about 50 percent of production to low-cost
countries." [51]
In 1997, MasterLock, after 75 years making locks in Milwaukee, opened a factory in
Mexico. Today, it makes just 10 percent to 15 percent of its locks in Milwaukee-its
300 employees there mostly make parts that are sent to Nogales, where there are now
800 factory workers. For years, MasterLock was able to justify slightly a higher price
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for its lock, but as the price difference with imported locks from China increased and
the quality of the products started converging, Wal-Mart put pressure on the U.S.
manufacturer to lower its price. Randall Larrimore, a former CEO of MasterBrand
Industries, the parent company of Master Lock declared: "Everyone was willing to
pay more for a Master Lock. But how much more can they justify? If they can
buy a lock that has arguably similar quality, at a cheaper price, well, they can get
their consumers a deal." Finally, in 2000, Wal-Mart decided to drop MasterLock's
products to switch to an offshore supplier.
Thus, Wal-Mart has two main ways to leverage offshoring advantages: the com-
pany can force its traditional domestic suppliers to move their production offshore,
or it can directly source products from local suppliers in low-cost countries (LCC).
The next section will describe in detail the strategy of Wal-Mart in China, by far
its main foreign supplier of consumer goods. Rather than using foreign countries
only to source cheaper products, Wal-Mart is also setting up operations in numerous
countries to capture new markets. While Wal-Mart still generates around 80 per-
cent of its sales in the U.S., its international operations are growing faster than the
domestic market. [27] The company is currently focusing its efforts on the markets
with the highest potential. There are around 200 countries in the world and the
largest 25 represent 80 percent of the global GDP. Companies generally focus on a
few countries which are the most profitable and offer the biggest growth potential for
the future. [101] In line with this approach, in 2006, Wal-Mart operated in only 15
countries. For instance, the company is the largest retailer in Mexico and has shown
particular interest in Central America and Asia (Table 7.3).
Some countries have understood the importance of being part of the Wal-Mart
supplier portfolio to gain access to the best distribution channel in the U.S. [13] For
instance, in 2004, the Indian government decided to set up an inter-ministerial com-
mittee to assist Wal-Mart in sourcing goods from the country. Wal-Mart was sourcing
$2 billion annually from India at that time.
Sourcing an increasing portion of its goods from Chinese suppliers or from U.S. com-
panies manufacturing in low-cost countries has an important impact on Wal-Mart's
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Table 7.3: Number and Location of Wal-Mart Stores
2000 2002 2005 % Change 2000-2005
Global 4093 4485 5289 29.2%
U.S. 3055 3289 3702 21.2%
International 1038 1196 1587 52.9%
Mexico 478 570 679 42.1%
United Kingdom 240 254 282 17.5%
Canada 168 196 256 52.4%
Brazil 18 22 149 727.8%
Germany 95 95 91 -4.2%
Puerto Rico 15 17 54 260.0%
China 8 19 43 437.5%
South Korea 5 11 16 220.0%
Argentina 11 11 11 0.0%
Source: Wal-M art Stores, Annual Report 2005, p. 53
supply chain. By relying more on offshore locations, Wal-Mart has a longer and
riskier supply chain. For instance, the 12 percent to 14 percent projected increase in
container traffic, due to the lifting of quotas on Chinese apparel, is generating a lot
of concerns among retailers. [61] One option can be to use other locations that do not
require shipping to the West Coast to source products. Some clothing manufacturers
are looking back to Mexico and Central America, destinations that they were starting
to abandon, attracted by the lower Asian wages. Another strategy can be the use of
alternative routes: Gap Inc., which relies heavily on factories in Asia and Latin Amer-
ica, has the flexibility to redirect its shipments to alternate ports, says spokeswoman
Amy Lund. Insuring shipping also means insuring delivery on time. In 2005, fearing
congestion and port labor problems, Wal-Mart and other big box retailers decided to
get a part of the goods for the Christmas season earlier and the ports were backed up
by early summer. Some manufacturers have to follow the same strategy in order to
get their shipments on time. For instance, Hot Kiss Inc., a Los Angeles manufacturer
of teen clothing, is placing orders two to three weeks earlier, since it is experiencing
two weeks of delays in West Coast ports. In this case, the strategy is more risky, since
this manufacturer competes on a fashion market, where trends can change quickly,
and make products obsolete. The company has decided recently to look at onshore
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production sites to reduce this risk. By opening a new 20-acre distribution center
in Oklahoma and announcing a plan to open another distribution center in Indiana,
Wal-Mart is also looking to hedge its sources of supply to avoid congestion in West
Coast ports.
Finally, using offshore production tends to be one of the foundations of the Wal-Mart
strategy to sell low-cost products to its customers domestically and to penetrate new
markets. At the same time, relying on suppliers located overseas is generating uncer-
tainty and risks of disruption in its supply chain. In order to mitigate these risks, the
company can use multiple sourcing locations and improve the monitoring of its supply
chain and the supply chain of its main suppliers. The recent vast effort toward the
implementation of RFID technology will undoubtedly give the company more supply
chain visibility, if the whole system is successfully implemented. After looking at the
Case of Wal-Mart in China, Wal-Mart's RFID plan will be outlined.
7.3 The Example of China
In 1995, Wal-Mart declared that it imported no more than 6 percent of the products
it sold in the U.S. [43] Eight years later, in 2003, a study from the retail consulting
firm Retail Forward estimated that 50 percent to 60 percent of the items sold in
Wal-Mart's U.S. stores were imported. In fact, sourcing from suppliers located in
low-cost countries has irremediably increased under the pressure of imports coming
from China.
Whereas Wal-Mart imports data are not released publicly by the company, newspa-
pers have lately been publishing estimates. It is estimated that Wal-Mart's goods
imports from China accounted for approximately $18 billion in 2004 (Fig. 7-1). [83]
That would make the company the fifth-ranking importer of Chinese goods, ahead of
nations such as Germany or England in 2003, representing roughly 10 percent of U.S.
imports from China. Half of its imports are coming from Wal-Mart's direct sourcing
from Chinese suppliers and the other half coming through its other suppliers. [15] In
fact, the origin of products is often hard to track and the opacity of the firm on the
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subject makes it hard to evaluate accurately the real proportion of products sold in
the U.S. stores that have been manufactured in China. Thus, its is not surprising
to find almost nothing but imported products in some categories of item, such as
electronics, apparel and tools, in the U.S. Wal-Mart stores.
Wal-Mart Imports from China, 2001-2004
0 17
NIP
Source: Fast Company-12/03, Forbes-2/04, Bloomberg. com- 12/ 05
Figure 7-1: Wal-Mart Imports from China, 2001-2004
"China is the largest exporter to the U.S. economy in virtually all consumer goods
categories. Wal-Mart is the leading retailer in the U.S. economy in virtually all
consumer goods categories. Wal-Mart and China are a joint venture," says Duke
University professor Gary Gereffi. [28] Looking at Wal-Mart's worldwide database of
suppliers, it appears that around 80 percent of the 6,000 factories supplying Wal-Mart
are located in China.
Wal-Mart is looking at China to find sourcing opportunities to supply its U.S.
stores but also to establish its presence in a promising and already emerging mar-
ket. Whereas the company counted only about 200 employees in China in 1995,
Wal-Mart employed 26,000 workers in 2005 and is expected to reach 40,000 by the
end of 2006. [118] The company now operates 43 Supercenters in China and has two
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distribution centers (DCs) supplying them. Wal-Mart is planning to open a third
one in Shenzhen in 2006. Operating in China has forced the company to adapt its
strategy to the particularities of this country. Wal-Mart is mainly sourcing locally
in China to sell on the Chinese market since many items have to be bought locally
through state-approved vendors. Wal-Mart has buying agents in every city and 90
percent of the market is in local brands. Moreover, moving goods from one city to
another often requires the approval of local officials, making inter-store transfer or
conventional regional distribution strategy poorly suitable at this time.
Finally, doing business in China has been a win-win arrangement for Chinese sup-
pliers and Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart has been able to access a new market and to source
products more cheaply, while Chinese suppliers are getting access to millions of cus-
tomer through Wal-Mart's distribution network and are dramatically improving their
operations to meet Wal-Mart's operating requirements. [103] For instance, many Chi-
nese suppliers have started using Wal-Mart's online portal, Retail Link, in the same
way that suppliers in the U.S. do, to communicate electronically with the retailer.
Wal-Mart has also understood very early the crucial importance of securing an edu-
cated and talented workforce in its stores. The company is training its best employees
in China and sending them to the U.S. to attend the Walton Institute. Wal-Mart's
China operations have a 16 percent employee turnover rate, the lowest of any opera-
tion worldwide, and far below the 40 percent in the U.S.
Thus, through its presence in China, Wal-Mart has been able to leverage low-cost
raw material supplies, modern factories, developing infrastructure such as highways
and ports, and a friendly government to sustain its "everyday low prices" strategy.
But, as a consequence, the company is incurring new challenges by relying mostly
on suppliers located abroad or U.S. suppliers manufacturing abroad. Insuring an
efficient execution of its operations along a longer supply chain appears as vital to
get the benefits from sourcing cheaply in China. Yet, the causes of disruption can be
multiple and Wal-Mart has to develop a new set of instruments to make sure that its
supply chain will be robust enough to rely mostly on suppliers located abroad. One
of the solutions might be the implementation of a global RFID system within its own
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supply chain and its suppliers' supply chain to track goods from the manufacturers
to the customers.
7.4 RFID: Wal-Mart's Next Competitive Advan-
tage
7.4.1 Wal-Mart IT System 1.0
Wal-Mart is building its strategy on a few key principles: using its bargaining power
to get products at a cheap price from suppliers in the U.S. or abroad and managing
its supply chain as efficiently as possible to reduce its costs and be able to offer to its
customers low prices on a vast range of products. Through a constant emphasis on
cost reduction and supply chain control, the company has been able to monitor, at
an unmatched level, the flow of goods from the factory floor to the store shelf while
reducing shipping and inventory costs. "Wal-Mart has done an amazing job as a
logistics company in a way that the average person doesn't appreciate," says Robert
Mittelstaedt, director of Wharton's Aresty Institute of Executive Education. "It is
a common misperception that Wal-Mart's ability to keep prices low stems primarily
from its size and resulting clout with suppliers." [8]
To be successful in the consumer business, the retailer has to collect a vast quan-
tity of data about products and inventory flow as well as consumer behavior. By
integrating this information as quickly as possible, the retailer is able to manage its
supply chain efficiently to respond to changes in demand or disruption of supply.
Indeed, creating efficient monitoring systems that are able to collect relevant data
in real time, and to leverage this massive flow of information in order to create an
objective picture of the supply chain and the demand that will subsequently be used
by managers to make the most intelligent decisions at a given instant, is becoming
the true competitive advantage of successful retailers.
Wal-Mart optimized the architecture of its distribution system very early: it was
among the first retailers to cluster stores around a distribution center, to centralize
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purchases from key vendors and to engage in cross-docking to speed up inventory
movement. [79] Its second step to reduce its operating cost was to add an efficient IT
system to its supply chain to share real-time information between the stores and the
DCs and with suppliers. Inside the company, each store is connected, via a secure
private network, to the company's headquarters in Arkansas, making the company
able to track the sales volume of each item at each store. [68]
Consequently, the company can reorder products, or drop non-selling products. Thus,
Wal-Mart is able to monitor closely its consumers' behavior and rapidly adjust mer-
chandise mix and pricing in order to maximize revenue. With its suppliers, Wal-Mart
shares its sales data through a web-based service, Retail Link, that allows the com-
pany and the suppliers to monitor what products are selling and where they are
selling. [122] Inside of its warehouses, Wal-Mart is relying on automation and com-
puterized inventory management to move items faster and to reduce its stocks. More
than any other retailers, Wal-Mart is building part of its competitive advantage on its
capacity to collect, transform, and distribute information within the company as fast
as possible to reduce its operating costs and to maximize its revenue by responding
quickly to demand changes. Wal-Mart's recent commitment to implement RFID tech-
nology, reinforces the company objective to create the largest and the most efficient
distribution network. "At the end of this year, they will end up operating in I think it
is 117 distribution centers across the United States" said Mike Duke, Executive Vice
President, President and CEO of Wal-Mart Stores Inc. "This year there will be over
5 billion cartons of merchandise processed through this gigantic, powerful network
across the U.S.", he added. The implementation of RFID appears to be a promising
solution to improve Wal-Mart's operations.
7.4.2 Wal-Mart IT System 2.0
"Like Linda [former Wal-Mart CIO], I view RFID as a strategy that offers tremendous
competitive advantage," said Rollin Ford, Wal-Mart's new executive vice president
and chief information officer, who previously served as the company's executive vice
president of logistics and supply chain. In April 2006, Ford reaffirmed that both
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logistics and information systems were at the center of Wal-Mart's competitive ad-
vantage. [26] RFID will certainly be the next driver of improvement.
RFID has existed since World War II. For a long time, applications were limited
to local uses due to a strict RF regulatory environment. Such "niche applications"
included work-in-process tracking, fish and livestock identification, livestock feed sta-
tion control, electronic garage door openers, high way vehicle identification, railcar
and locomotive identification and tracking.
Lately, groundbreaking work in ultrahigh frequency (UHF) transponders and in en-
coding methods to minimize memory requirements, along with the reduction of tags
costs, have made the technology more attractive. Finally, the adoption by the United
Code Council and EAN International, the two main overseers of bar code standards,
of the Electronic Product Code (EPC) as the standard to identify tags, has set up
a common platform to implement a global system. All these innovations have made
this technology accessible and easy to use for a broad range of applications, thus
providing a wide variety of applications across different sectors. Reducing handling
and labor costs, saving time, reducing errors and waste, and tracking goods auto-
matically, are among the benefits of implementing an RFID system. According to a
report published in 2005 by The Aberdeen Group, a supply chain research firm, sixty
percent of the interviewed senior managers at nearly 250 companies from around the
world, said that RFID has great potential for their companies. [60]
The Wal-Mart's Mandate In 2003, Wal-Mart asked its 100 top suppliers to start
putting EPC tags on cartons and pallets shipped to three distribution centers in the
Dallas/Ft. Worth area by January 2005. Wal-Mart's pilot program began in 2005
with 100-plus suppliers tagging pallets and cases destined for 500 stores and five dis-
tribution centers, with the goal of tracking inventory and cutting down out-of-stocks
losses. The initiative included 100 top suppliers and an additional 30 volunteers. [56]
By January 2007, Wal-Mart plans to add 500 more stores, and up to 500 more man-
ufacturers, to its current system. At this time, Wal-Mart's RFID tagging system will
be operating in 1,000 stores and will be supported by 600 suppliers. [112]
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To allow suppliers to ease into the use of this new technology, Wal-Mart is not requir-
ing them to label 100 percent of their SKUs. In the companies that have implemented
RFID use, suppliers instead had to evaluate their product mix and business cases to
determine the best clients for RFID. This resulted in some suppliers tagging approxi-
mately 2 percent of their SKUs and others tagging 100 percent. The average supplier
is currently tagging 65 percent of their SKUs.
Nevertheless, the implementation of a global RFID system early in the maturing cycle
of this technology is raising multiple technical issues.
The Technology The main components of an RFID system are tags, readers, and
software. The tags are fixed to a product package-a box or a pallet. Then, the readers
are placed at strategic locations to monitor the flow of goods. They can be fixed or
transportable by human or vehicle. Finally, software programs are used to collect the
data from the tags, correct the information, store it in databases and send it to the
appropriate clients within the company, or to its suppliers and distributors.
The Regulation RFID, like other wireless technologies, is becoming standard-
ized. In the beginning, systems were usually user or manufacturer specific. To allow
companies, suppliers and third parties to share information and to use the same hard-
ware and infrastructure, a set of standards had to be developed.
First, because RFID systems use the ISM, unlicensed bands, tags and readers must
meet the FCC's regulations defined in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).
Second, the International Organization of Standardization / International Electrotech-
nical Commission (IOS/IEC) in Geneva has defined many RFID standards: the
13.56-MHz tags are 14443 and 15691/15692/15693 standards and a UHF standard is
designated 18000, while lower-frequency tags are defined by the 10536 standard. Fi-
nally, EPCGlobal regulates the electronic product code industry and sets standards.
The Class 0 (read-only) and class 1 (one-time programmable) were used as the first-
generation standards.
The new standard, the Gen 2 UHF tag and reader standards, has been developed by
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over 60 worldwide companies to create and promote a comprehensive international
standard. The Gen 2 standard, adopted in 2005 by Wal-Mart, specifies operation in
the 868- to 956-MHz range with ASK backscatter modulation. It includes a 96-bit
code with a 16-bit cyclic redundancy check (CRC). It can read at a range of up to 25
ft depending on the antenna and the environment.
Tags & Readers There are two types of tags: passive and active tags. Wal-
Mart has mandated the use of passive tags. Whereas, active tags include power to
run applications independently, passive tags do not. Instead, the reader's antenna
emits radio energy that the passive tag's antenna receives and uses to power its chip.
The information contained in its memory is exchanged, and the reader can then send
the data to the IT system. RFID tags store a unique identifying number instead of a
printed bar code, which is shared by several item of the same SKU. In Gen2 standard,
the identifying number is the Electronic product code (EPC), a 96-bit code created
by the Auto-ID Center. [80]
The makeup of a tag is fairly simple: the tag consists of a single chip with an EEP-
ROM containing the ID number, and a radio transceiver or transponder. Readers do
not need a line-of-sight (LOS) scan, and scanning can be automated and executed
continuously, thus cutting costs and human reading errors. A single reader can read
multiple tags at the same time. New tags also contain anti-collision solutions, to
allow the simultaneous scan of multiple tags. Many available schemes can prevent
such collisions. One solution consists of a time-division multiplexed arrangement,
assigning each tag a time slot in which to transmit. Another solution consists of an
access scheme, where a tag waits a randomized amount of time before transmitting.
The reader, or interrogator, is a higher-power transceiver that uses a larger antenna
to integrate the tags. In order to scan a passive tag, the reader and the tag must be
relatively close. The typical range is several inches, but it depend on the frequency of
operation as well as the antenna size. It can range from a few centimeters to twenty
feet. Nevertheless, the UHF frequency of 915 MHz defined by the new Gen 2 standard
provides a longer reading range than previously possible.
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Finally, the cost of the poses a large barrier to implementation. Passive tag prices
have dropped over the years from a few dollars each to around 10 cents if purchased in
large quantities. Companies, such as P&G, ship more than 20 billion units annually.
Paying $0.05 per tags compared with the standard $0.001 cost for bar code tagging
translates into a large investment for the shipper. In spite of this, RFID experts are
confident that the price of tags will continue to decrease, and companies will be able
to leverage more value from the use of RFID tags than from bar codes, ultimately
making the investment profitable. "To get to the sub-nickel level, it's going to have to
be completely printed-printed antenna, printed chip, with a printed label-all done on
one piece of equipment in one pass. That will come some day in the future, probably
10 years down the road. At that point, we'll see Wrigley's chewing gum using RFID,"
said Bob Zaccone, vice president of Graphic Solutions International in Burr Ridge,
IL.
Currently, Wal-Mart is experimenting with UHF Gen 2 passive tags for its cases and
pallets. The RFID labels vary in size-generally from 2x4 inches to 4x6 inches. The
recent tests executed by the company have shown that UHF Gen 2 tags can be read
in water and on metal, removing two important reasons for using HF tags over UHF
tags.
The Infrastructure By implementing an RFID system along its supply chain,
a company has to manage a tremendous amount of data, generated by RFID readers.
The companies thus need to create a new network strategy to support the volume
of RFID data in their existing systems. For instance, Wal-Mart could potentially
generate as much as 7.7 million terabytes of data a day if it scanned every tagged
item in all of its U.S. retail stores. [60]
To handle this excessive flood of data from RFID readers, companies need to ensure
that they have enough bandwidth. Bob Delaney, director of industry solutions for
Sun Microsystems, says that at the pallet and case level, RFID tracking is projected
to cause data traffic to increase up to tenfold. For industries that do not want to
track item at the item level, it appears that gigabit Ethernet networks will be suitable.
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Ultimately, the implementation of optical fiber 10-Gbit Ethernet systems will be the
panacea to RFID system tracking of individual items.
Data Integration Finally, after having tagged the products, scanned the tags
and transferred the data using the appropriate network, the company must leverage
the information via efficient middleware. Recently released software allows companies
to sort out and use the data collected though their RFID system, with existing ap-
plication software packages from companies like Oracle and SAE. According to Steve
Brown, executive vice president of Marketing and Business Development at Acsis,
a middleware publisher, middleware makes an RFID system function on a real-time
basis by allowing critical tracking data to be available almost immediately. [52] Such
software collects, stores, filters, aggregates, and normalizes the data. Consequently,
the clean data is transferred to the company's logistics software, where data is ana-
lyzed and used to make decisions.
The Results Wal-Mart's intends for RFID to improve productivity, reduce check-
ing time and freight handling, thus making its in-store employees more available for
customer service and floor re-stocking.
In November 2005, the University of Arkansas published the first study tracking im-
provements in Wal-Mart's supply chain after the implementation of RFID strategy.
The study was conducted over 29 weeks, comparing 12 stores using RFID tags and
12 stores that were not. A crew scanned all of the out-of-stocks every day over the
29-week period. From this study, it appears that Wal-Mart has experienced a 16
percent reduction in shelf out-of-stocks in stores using the RFID technology as com-
pared to the baseline stores. Indeed, the current focus for improvements due to the
implementation of RFID technology is on improving operations occurring in-stores
between the aisle and the backroom. The revolution is that when an item is removed
from the shelf and sold, the company automatically generates a "pick-list". Thus,
the company is able to know if a worker has actually picked up the item to restock
it. According to the study, tagged items are restocked three times faster than non-
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tagged items, and the result is a reduction in out-of-stock by 16percent. Even if the
study does not reveal the level of increase in sales due to tagged items being properly
re-stocked, the company has admitted that the result is most certainly positive.
The company is now sourcing generation two tags for about $0.10 in quantities of
50,000 or more. In 2005, the company received tagged products from 130 suppliers,
representing over 280,000 tag pallets compared with only 450 a year ago. The com-
pany has received over 5.2 million cases that were tagged in their stores and DCs,
realizing more than 48 million EPC reads. [23]
In the next step, Wal-Mart will also benefit from improvements in their suppliers'
implementing RFID. [38] Wal-Mart's suppliers can also expect several benefits from
RFID, such as higher visibility of end-to-end supply chain, better control of stocks
and deliveries, and better protection against theft and counterfeiting.
Retailers have tried to reduce out-of-stock situations by keeping inventory at various
stages of the supply chain. However, having the right amount of inventory only occurs
when it is located at the right place at the right time. The ultimate goal of RFID
is to allow manufacturers and retailers to align product fabrication and distribution
with real-time shelf-specific demand, thus reducing safety stock inventory, inventory
relocation, inventory obsolescence, material handling costs, and stock-outs.
The Next Challenges The next challenge will be to convince suppliers that RFID
is not creating benefits only for their distributors, but that it can tremendously im-
prove their operations as well. It is not surprising to see some Wal-Mart suppliers
only adding an RFID label when the product is ready to ship. For these companies,
the use of RFID only adds an additional cost without generating any benefits. Ac-
cording to Stephen Schwartz, RFID systems architect for Intermec, "Most suppliers
don't have the IT systems ready to accept (or take advantage of) the serialization
issue. Think back to the costs associated with Y2K. This has far greater impact if
the supplier wants to go beyond a 'slap-and-ship' scenario and actually use the se-
rialization data for production tracking, recall issues, inventory control, etc. If you
create billions of items each year, where will the serial numbers come from?" [97]
177
According to Kara Romanow, research director for AMR Research, Wal-Mart's sup-
pliers spent an average of between $1 million and $3 million each to implement RFID.
"The $1 to $3 million is pretty much for whatever they needed to comply, but at the
bare minimum. It did include all the hardware and software, as well as the tags and
readers, but they only did it for a few products and only in one limited geography
in most cases," Ms. Romanow said. [57] To generate value from the implementation
of RFID, companies must invest in the infrastructure-tags, readers, the middleware,
and the integration to ERP systems. Further, they must decide how to use the data
now available through the RFID system. In order to generate payback, companies
must move from a compliance model to an efficiency model, where data newly col-
lected is integrated into the decision-making process of the company.
By pushing its suppliers to adopt RFID technology, Wal-Mart has allowed the emer-
gence of best practices to adopt RFID. First, companies should start with limited
trials to define the best hardware for their environment. Second, trials of increasing
complexity and scale will determine if the selected system is suitable. Third, the
company must adapt its processes with the RFID technology in order to make its
implementation smoother. Finally, the company must learn to take advantage of the
data in order to improve its management and the performance of its supply chain.
According to the results obtained from Wal-Mart's main suppliers, it appears that
implementing RFID has been a two- to three-year learning curve from initial plans to
advanced pilots. The creation of international standards and the experience gained
by RFID tag and reader manufacturers, software developers and IT consulting firms,
will reduce the implementation time and cost in the future. Although many chal-
lenges still exist, RFID is a promising direction not only for Wal-Mart, but also for
the vast majority of retailers.
7.5 The Future of the Wal-Mart World
Wal-Mart is following its plans of perpetual improvement in its supply chain by
reducing its operating costs, expanding its operations and developing a state of the
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art IT system. Researchers at the McKinsey Global Institute estimate that 4 percent
of the growth in the U.S. economy's productivity from 1995 to 1999 was due to Wal-
Mart alone. Thus, Wal-Mart is not only increasing its productivity, but it also forcing
its competitors and its suppliers to become more efficient in order to keep up.
In the context of free-market economy, Wal-Mart's quest for low prices will result in
the decline of domestic manufacturing for a large range of products, thus reducing
U.S. manufacturing employment. Wal-Mart essentially sells commodities and low
fashion products. For such products, "U.S. consumers aren't willing to pay even a
little extra for a 'Made in America' label" said H. Lee Scott Jr., Wal-Mart Chief
Executive. Thus, it appears that customers are the main winners. A study by Global
Insight estimated that Wal-Mart's direct and indirect effects on the rest of the retail
industry led to a 3.1-percent decline in overall consumer prices between 1985 and
2004, resulting in an economy of $2,329 per household. [21] The Global Insight study
emphasized that Wal-Mart's efficient use of capital and labor in its distribution and
inventory system is, by far, the aspect of Wal-Mart's business that has contributed
to the decline in consumer prices. As expected, the study also noted that Wal-
Mart was more capital-intensive than its competitors. The growth of the company
generates jobs directly visible to customers as well as logistics and IT positions in
the backrooms, DCs, and warehouses everywhere in the U.S. While some jobs in
the supply sector are lost, due to improvement in their productivity or offshoring,
other jobs are simultaneously created through the product distribution process in the
U.S. For the opening of its new store in Evergreen Park, Wal-Mart received 25,000
applications for 325 openings. [109] Earlier this year, the company received 11,000
applications for about the same number of positions for its new store in Oakland,
California. On average a full-time non-management position is paid $10.99 an hour.
It would not be surprising that some of its applicants were manufacturing workers
laid off from Wal-Mart's suppliers.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
As written recently in The Economist, there is no significant difference between jobs
lost because of new technologies or work processes and those lost because of trade:
all of those job losses are a painful but necessary part of a larger process of innovation
and productivity increases that is a source of new wealth and rising living standards.
Although offshoring does eliminate jobs, it also yields important benefits, decreasing
costs. The process of competition ultimately passes the resulting cost savings on to
consumers, which then spurs demand for other goods and services. We could predict
a positive impact translate into economic growth. This statement is compatible with
the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers', N. Gregory Mankiw, recent dec-
larations that offshoring is "the latest manifestation of the gains from trade."
However, as underlined by Alan Greenspan, "there is always likely to be anxiety about
the jobs of the future, because in the long-run most of them will involve producing
goods and services that have not yet been invented."
For the service industry, the key factor is no longer whether a job requires high skill
or high capital investment, but whether a job can be "routinized", or broken down
into repeatable steps that vary little from day to day. A recent study from a research
group at UC Berkeley, lists the common attributes of jobs outsourced: no face-to-face
customer servicing requirement, high information content, work process is telecom-
mutable and internet enabled, a high wage differential with a similar occupation in
the destination country, low setup barriers, and low social network requirements. [34]
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Examples of these business functions include software programming and design, call
center operations, accounting and payroll operations, medical records transcription,
paralegal services, and software research and testing. As compared with protected
jobs that require face-to-face contact, flexibility, creativity and lifelong learning, out-
sourced jobs are easy to replace with a clever piece of software, or to hand over to
low-paid workers outside the U.S. [45] For manufacturing jobs, the analysis detailed
in Chapter 5, demonstrates that the key dimension in determining whether a job will
likely remain in the U.S, is no longer the level of technology required to manufacture
the product, but rather its sensibility to distance-the so called distance pressure. If
American companies cease competition for low prices per quality or technology con-
tent, to criteria that require a shorter supply chain, than manufacturing in the U.S.
is advisable. Furthermore, when looking at the tremendous growth in China, and the
aspiration of the Chinese government to be both the manufacturing subcontractor
for American and European companies, as well as a science and technology leader of
its own right, it is apparent that it is becoming vital for the U.S. to maintain man-
ufacturing expertise onshore, in order to ensure future independence, vis--vis, from
China.
Moreover, manufacturing is also an important step in the innovation process, and not
performing this activity onshore can lead to a decreased linkage of information and
feedback from manufacturing, which would become a handicap for long-term devel-
opment.
The competition with China will be one of the next major challenges for American
companies, who are quickly loosing their technologic edge. Chinese companies are
investing heavily on R&D, and are focused on acquiring IP to speed up their devel-
opment process. This can be seen most pointedly in the invitations by the Chinese
government to foreign automobile manufacturers to join with Chinese manufacturers
in order to have access to China. In this way, the Chinese government has encouraged
the formation of the Chinese automobile industry in just a few years. However, the
expansion of the Chinese economy is not necessarily all bad news for the U.S., as
long as American companies are able to capture some of the market share in China
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through clever investment in Chinese companies with high potential.
Finally, China's infrastructure will begin to look more like the U.S. as people ask
for a higher quality of life, better health care protection, better working conditions
and, at some point, better jobs. Thus, production costs in China will move to ap-
proximate American costs. Eventually, American companies will have to adapt their
supply chain to integrate these changes. In conclusion, to remain competitive, Amer-
ican companies must develop flexibility within their supply chains such that they will
be able to change the location of the manufacturing and Research Centers without
impacting their entire supply chain. This must be done by developing systems to
evaluate new risks of locating steps of their supply chain in multiple countries, and
reducing their exposure to disruption.
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Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2003
Figure A-1: U.S. Productivity Growth
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Figure B-1: Specific Factors Model: the Marginal Product Curve and the Distribution
of Income
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Figure B-2: Model 1:Gains from Outsourcing in a one-good Model
The MPL curve represents the marginal product of labor, given the fixed endow-
ment of capital in the economy. The marginal product of labor is the addition to
output generated by adding one more person-hour.
Before sourcing abroad, the area OW 0 E0 L0 is the wage bill. The return to capital is
the area under the MPL curve and above W 0 E0 . After innovation, the country buys
the services abroad at the fixed wage W'. The country pays the rectangle E'L'LOR for
labor sourced abroad. Domestic labor receives OLORW' and capital the area under
the MPL curve and above W'E'. The triangular area E0 RE' is the net gain from
outsourcing. The rectangle W'EORW' is the income of labor redistributed to capital.
Thus capital gains W 0E 0E'W' when workers lose W 0 E0 RW'.
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Figure B-3: Model 2
Before sourcing abroad, the area 0 1 W 0 E'S0 is the wage bill for Industry 1. The
return to capital is the area under the MPL curve and above W 0 E0 .
Now the country can purchase the services of labor force abroad at a lower wage.
There is an increase in demand for this service. The supply of labor is expanded by
outsourcing (0202'). We have displaced the marginal product of labor for industry
2 to represent the additional supply of labor. After outsourcing, for industry 1,
the country buys the services abroad at the fixed wage W'. The country pays the
rectangle E'FS0 S' for labor sourced abroad. Domestic labor receives O 1 S 0FW' and
capital the area under the MPL curve and above W'E'.
The triangular area EOFE' is the net gain from outsourcing. The rectangle W 0E 0FW'
is the income of labor redistributed to capital. Thus capital gains W 0 E 0EW' when
workers lose W 0E 0FW'.
After outsourcing, industry 2 will follow the same kind of new distribution for income.
Local worker will lose income, re-distributed to capital owners and affiliate workers
abroad.
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Note: To determine whether the job adjustment during recession is structural or cyclical authors have compared the
direction of job flows during the recession and the following recovery. If an industry gains jobs during recovery and
loses jobs during recession (or the opposite), the job adjustments is considered as cyclical. If, instead, job outflows of
industry remain the same during recession and recovery, the job adjustment is classified as structural. Tables above
represent data for all SIC-industry for early 1980s recession and 2001 recession. Whereas to recession in early 1980s
where most US industries have come across cyclical job adjustment, during the 2001 recession, job adjustment has
been structural for most of US industries.
Source: Erica L. Groshen, Simon Potter: "Has structural change contributed to a jobless recovery?" Volume 9,
Number 8, Current issues in economics and finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, August 2003
Figure C-1: Recessions and Employment Changes
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Table C.1: List of Low Cost Countries
Bangladesh Ethiopia Mongolia Swaziland
Benin Gambia Morocco Syrian Arab Republic
Bhutan Georgia Mozambique Tajikistan
Bolivia Ghana Burma (Myanmar) Tanzania; United Republic of
Burkina Faso Guatemala Nepal Togo
Burundi Guinea Nicaragua Uganda
Cambodia Guinea Bissau Niger Ukraine
Cameroon Guyana Nigeria Uzbekistan
Central African Republic Haiti Pakistan Vanuatu
Chad Honduras Papua New Guinea Vietnam
China India Paraguay Yemen
Comoros Indonesia Philippines Zambia
Democratic Republic of Congo Jordan Rwanda Zimbabwe
Congo Kyrgyzstan Samoa
Cote d'Ivoire Lao People's Democratic Republic Sao Tome and Principe
Djibouti Madagascar Senegal
Dominican Republic Malawi Sierra Leone
Egypt Mali Solomon Islands
El Salvador Mauritania Sri Lanka
Eritrea Moldova; Republic of Sudan
Note: Low Cost Country (LCC) GDP2004 Per Capita = 0.05*US GDP2004 Per Capita / GDP: Current US $ Per
Capita
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Table C.2: Imports Origin
Industry 1989 2004
Name NAICS S1 S2 S3 S4 S1 S2 S3 S4
Food manufacturing 311 0.023 0.124 0.433 0.420 0.018 0.098 0.524 0.360
Beverages and 312 0.011 0.399 0.490 0.100 0.004 0.386 0.380 0.230
tobacco products
Textile mills 313 0.160 0.120 0.400 0.320 0.060 0.100 0.400 0.440
Textile product mills 314 0.058 0.092 0.250 0.600 0.012 0.038 0.130 0.820
Apparel 315 0.010 0.010 0.430 0.550 0.005 0.065 0.110 0.820
Leather and 316 0.005 0.025 0.430 0.540 0.002 0.028 0.110 0.860
allied products
Wood products 321 0.003 0.020 0.707 0.270 0.001 0.064 0.655 0.280
Paper and 322 0.020 0.107 0.753 0.120 0.040 0.137 0.653 0.170
paper products
Printing and related 323 0.130 0.120 0.630 0.120 0.020 0.140 0.450 0.390
support activities
Petroleum and 324 0.005 0.085 0.350 0.560 0.005 0.115 0.460 0.420
coal products
Chemicals 325 0.180 0.300 0.410 0.110 0.100 0.450 0.310 0.140
Plastics and 326 0.220 0.130 0.390 0.260 0.110 0.100 0.390 0.400
rubber products
Nonmetallic mineral 327 0.140 0.150 0.410 0.300 0.130 0.340 0.250 0.280
products
Primary metals 331 0.130 0.170 0.450 0.250 0.030 0.100 0.360 0.510
Fabricated metal 332 0.190 0.180 0.350 0.280 0.100 0.150 0.260 0.490
products
Machinery 333 0.390 0.240 0.270 0.100 0.250 0.230 0.250 0.270
Computer and electronic 334 0.380 0.070 0.300 0.250 0.120 0.120 0.150 0.610
products
Electrical equipment 335 0.230 0.120 0.270 0.380 0.080 0.120 0.160 0.640
and appliances
Transportation 336 0.360 0.150 0.410 0.080 0.210 0.170 0.400 0.220
equipment
Furniture and related 337 0.008 0.102 0.350 0.540 0.002 0.038 0.250 0.710
products Miscellaneous 339 0.170 0.110 0.330 0.390 0.050 0.160 0.190 0.600
manufacturing
Manufacturing Sector 31-33 0.240 0.130 0.390 0.240 0.110 0.170 0.280 0.440
Note: Relative Imports Partners GDP Per Capita=Partners GDP Per Capita / US GDP Per Capita
S2004 , ImportS 00 4 / Z Imports 24 n with k E [1; 4]
E1 represents countries with GDP Per capita>1.4*US GDP Per Capita
E 2 represents countries with GDP Per capita<1.4*US GDP Per Capita and >0.8*US GDP Per Capita
E 3 represents countries with GDP Per capita<0.8*US GDP Per Capita and >0.2*US GDP Per Capita
E 4 represents countries with GDP Per capita<0.2*US GDP Per Capita
Source: Data Compiled by Author / BLS / the Office of Trade and Industry Information (OTII) U.S. Department of
Commerce
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Table C.3: Imports Origin
Industry Avg. GDP Avg. GDP Relative Employment
Per Capita Per Capita Avg. GDP
(1995 $US) (1995 $US) Per Capita
Name NAICS 1989 2004 Percent Change 1989 2004 Percent Change
1989-2004 1989-2004
Food manufacturing 311 12 521 16 755 0.34 0.48 0.52 0.007
Beverages and 312 19 894 21 549 0.08 0.76 0.66 -0.140
tobacco products
Textile mills 313 16 370 15 035 -0.08 0.63 0.46 -0.530
Textile product mills 314 9 018 5 453 -0.40 0.34 0.17 -0.160
Apparel 315 7 677 5 479 -0.29 0.29 0.17 -0.697
Leather and allied products 316 6 717 4 505 -0.33 0.26 0.14 -0.686
Wood products 321 14 583 18 375 0.26 0.56 0.57 -0.017
Paper and paper products 322 19 200 22 032 0.15 0.73 0.68 -0.228
Printing and related support 323 20 178 15 976 -0.21 0.77 0.49 -0.174
activities
Petroleum and coal products 324 9 316 15 497 0.66 0.36 0.48 -0.260
Chemicals 325 23 071 26 080 0.13 0.88 0.80 -0.137
Plastics and rubber products 326 19 363 17 597 -0.09 0.74 0.54 -0.019
Nonmetallic mineral products 327 17 355 22 801 0.31 0.66 0.70 -0.062
Primary metals 331 18 843 14 502 -0.23 0.72 0.45 -0.338
Fabricated metal products 332 18 907 16 246 -0.14 0.72 0.50 -0.078
Machinery 333 27 391 25 162 -0.08 1.05 0.77 -0.197
Computer and electronic 334 22 462 13 448 -0.40 0.86 0.41 -0.329
products
Electrical equipment and 335 17 573 12 632 -0.28 0.67 0.39 -0.321
appliances
Transportation equipment 336 26 233 25 050 -0.05 1.00 0.77 -0.199
Furniture and related products 337 10 228 8 318 -0.19 0.39 0.26 -0.078
Miscellaneous manufacturing 339 15 283 11 939 -0.22 0.58 0.37 -0.047
Total Man 20 282 17 546 -0.13 0.78 0.54 -0.255
Note: the Avg. GDP per capita measures correspond to the GDP per capita of a virtual country which would
represent the unique exporter to the US for each industry
US GDP per capita in 1989 (1995 $US) = 26,053
US GDP per capita in 2004 (1995 $US) = 33,736
Source: The Office of Trade and Industry Information (OTII), Manufacturing and Services, International Trade
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce
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US Manufacturing Industries
Avg Relative GDP per capita Change of Exporting Cotintries
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Note: Petroleum and coal products sector has been ignored due to the unusual characteristics of this industry
Source: The Office of Trade and Industry Information (OTII), Manufacturing and Services, International Trade
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce
Figure C-2: Employment Change and Exporting Countries GDP per capita Change
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Figure C-3: US Manufacturing Industries
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Figure C-4: Demand and Supply
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Figure C-5: International Labor Cost Comparison in the Apparel and Textile Indus-
tries
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Table C.4: Apparel U.S. Wages
Industry Segment Weekly Hourly
Total, private industry $506 $14.95
Apparel Manufacturing 334 9.10
Apparel knitting mills 382 10.08
Accessories and other apparel 348 9.41
Cut and sew apparel 324 8.89
Source: BLS / http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/pdf/cgs007.pdf
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Appendices from Chapter 6
Utility Costs
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Figure D-1: Recessions and Employment Changes
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Table D.1: China's total exports and imports by groups of commodities
1978 1980 1985 1990 1993
Exports
Agriculture-intensive 36.1 26.3 21.7 12.5 9.2
Capital-intensive 15.2 15.6 12.8 26.7 28.8
Labour-intensive 31.1 30.2 35.4 50.9 56.8
Textile and Clothing 19.8 20.8 27.0 37.8 40.0
Mineral-intensive 17.0 27.3 28.8 9.4 4.7
Imports
Agriculture-intensive 29.0 33.8 10.8 16.3 10.7
Capital-intensive 59.0 52.8 73.3 60.5 72.1
Labour-intensive 4.2 8.1 9.7 16.0 12.7
Textile and Clothing 1.7 4.3 5.2 9.3 9.5
Mineral-intensive 7.0 4.2 5.1 5.1 6.5
Note: Textile and Clothing are part of labour-intensive products
Source: UN trade data, International Economic Databank, the Australian National University
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Output of Selected Manufactured Goods, Index,
1998=100, 1995, 1998 and 2001
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Figure D-2: Output of Chinese Selected Manufacturing Goods
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Figure D-3: U.S. Imports from China
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Table D.2: Export Value by Major Categories: January - May 2004
Commodity
Machinery and electronic products
High-tech products
Automatic data processing
Equipment and components
Accessories of garment
and dress
Yarn, fabric and products
Spare parts for automatic
data processing equipment
Footwear
Wireless telephone,
handset or vehicle mounted
Furniture and parts
Integrated circuit and
micro-electronics components
Components of TV, radio and
telecommunication equipment
Plastic Products
Video tape recorder
and reproducer
Travel goods and bags
Toys
TV sets (incl. CKD)
Steels
Sound Recorder, Player, Receiver
Auto Parts
Static Converter
Lamps and Lanterns, illuminating
equipments and similar products
Aquatic Products
Jan-May
11,358,529
5,726,162
2,089,148
2,079,864
1,262,955
856,056
568,742
490,218
404,384
402,138
393,689
350,478
267,067
237,611
196,148
178,308
192,350
163,686
147,939
145,087
147,331
138,725
This Time Last Year
7,875,945
3,569,457
1,265,147
1,720,899
1,018,511
626,900
492,873
240,587
287,895
220,557
262,522
286,698
178,230
201,125
191,033
98,713
120,920
130,203
90,256
101,143
123,030
112,013
Increase in Percent
44.2
60.4
65.1
20.9
24
36.6
15.4
103.8
40.5
82.3
50
22.2
49.8
18.1
2.7
80.6
59.1
25.7
63.9
43.4
19.8
23.8
Note: Unit: US$10,000
Source: Chinese Ministry of Commerce http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/200406/200406002358571.xml
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